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This thesis argues that the Chinese political economy is best understood as a 
hybrid form of governance in the context of a differentiated developmental state. 
This argument is developed through an analysis of China’s central state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and in particular the complex relationship between central 
SOEs and the ministerial institution created by the Chinese state to oversee 
them, the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). 
Central SOEs have experienced a significant rise and expansion under the 
SASAC’s leadership since 2003. However, the state’s role in the promotion of 
this institutionalisation process is rarely explored. This research starts with a 
theoretical investigation of the developmental state. It then explores principal-
agent relations among the central SOEs, the SASAC and the market. After this, 
the research moves to an empirical analysis that provides a detailed examination 
of the SASAC, a competitive central SOE – the China National Building Material 
Group Corporation (CNBM) – and a monopolistic central SOE – the China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Based on government policy papers, 
company annual reports, financial disclosures, and semi-structured interviews 
with more than 30 SASAC officials, SOE senior managers and government 
research staff, the conclusion reached is that the SASAC’s management of 
central SOEs follows a developmental state path, partially adopting market forces 
and market competition while rejecting neoliberal ideology. Ultimately, this 
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research suggests that the Chinese central state’s practice of “governing through 
the market” is a strategy that benefits both the state and the central SOEs: the 
state can strengthen its principal’s control more effectively, whilst the enterprises 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Research Agendas: What are we talking about when we talk about 
central state-owned enterprises in China?   
 
The core debate in the study of the political economy of China is how to 
characterize the dynamic and the process of China’s economic growth. 
Specifically, the role of the Chinese state and how it relates to China’s economic 
development is seemingly a perpetual puzzle. This thesis studies the interactions 
among the Chinese central government, the market and state-owned enterprises, 
to reflect on and contribute to the grand debate on state and market as it relates 
to the country’s political economy. To be specific, this research provides a 
comprehensive and dispassionate investigation of Chinese central state-owned 
enterprises and their government supervisor—the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The importance of state 
enterprises in China is not universally recognized (Tsai and Naughton 2015, 2). 
In fact, state-owned enterprises are often seen as a drain on state assets, and as 
running contrary to globally acknowledged market principles. However, the 
current economic performance and financial data of these central SOEs tell a 
different story. As seen in figure 1.1, in 2003, when the SASAC was founded, 
there were in total 12 Chinese enterprises ranked on the Fortune Global 500 list, 
of which six were central SOEs. However, by 2016 there were 50 central SOEs 
on the Fortune Global 500 list, which represented almost half of the total number, 
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Figure 2.1 Source: SASAC; Global Fortune 500; Xinhua News Agency. 
Organised by the author from information accessed in January 2017. Note: The 
Chinese enterprises here include companies from the Chinese mainland, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan.  
 
Acknowledging the strength of the central SOEs today, it is worth mentioning the 
importance of the state’s role and its influence on the growth of the SOEs. Given 
that China is the fastest growing developing country in the world, the country’s 
economic growth and the roles the central SOEs take in this development are 
both unique and doubted by the western world. The fact that China actively 
joined the WTO and opened its own markets showed the Chinese government’s 
willingness to engage in the global market. China has largely abandoned its 
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planned economy system; but what remains unchanged is that the Chinese 
central government still holds a small number of world-class state-owned 
enterprises tightly under its administration, while at the same time listing these 
SOEs on overseas stock exchanges. Why and how is it possible to make these 
central SOEs globally competitive without their being held back by an ossified 
structure, the government’s close surveillance of them, and their inherited social 
welfare burdens? How can state-owned enterprises win on the standardized 
global market while rejecting neoliberal ideology? The Chinese state and its 
central SOEs are very important to an understanding of how China has been 
able to achieve rapid industrialization in a short period of time without being 
crushed by privatization, and the extent to which this growth is sustainable.  
 
The impact of the growth of Chinese central SOEs has gone beyond domestic 
China to influence the global market. In the past, attention was paid to studying 
how these SOEs’ overseas investments had an influence on the politics of less 
developed areas, such as Africa and South America. Now, central SOEs’ 
overseas investments have started to affect the political economy of developed 
countries in Europe. The debates and criticisms center on, but are not limited to, 
investment by the China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) in the Hinkley 
nuclear plant; a bid by the China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation (CRRC) to 
invest in the UK’s HS2 high-speed railway project; and the purchase by the State 
Grid (SG) of 24% of shares in Greece’s power grid operator (China Daily 2017) 
three years after it had acquired 25% of Portugal’s national power grid (Reuters 
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2014). Coincidentally, all these controversial overseas investments were made 
by central SOEs under the SASAC’s administration.   
 
This research has both empirical and theoretical contributions. It offers a valuable 
insight into how central SOEs operate within a developmental state framework 
and how they interact with government and regulatory institutions at different 
levels. This research is important for the study of the political economy of China 
for five main reasons. Firstly, through explaining how the Chinese state interacts 
with its central SOEs and how the central SOEs function in boosting China’s 
economic growth, such research contributes to a larger debate about the state’s 
role in markets. Secondly, both developed countries and developing countries 
can draw on China’s experience of governing and administering its SOEs. Thirdly, 
the research explores principal-agent relationships within complex administrative 
networks. Fourthly, China’s experience in developing central SOEs can also be 
incorporated into developmental state theory. Lastly, in terms of domestic impact, 
this research can serve as a reference for policymakers seeking a more 
productive style of economic governance, and for central SOEs seeking to 
achieve more fruitful solutions in their negotiations with different government 
institutions over various issues and policies.  
 
The central problem of the existing literature is that there is no comprehensive in-
depth analysis of the SASAC as the core institution that directs the Chinese 
state’s most valuable assets. There is plenty of literature that assesses China’s 
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different models for its political economy, among which the developmental state 
model is the most widely analyzed. The most popular interpretations of China’s 
economic success tend to divide into two categories. One group of scholars 
focuses on the uniqueness of China, especially its governance system, to 
construct a “China Model”. The other group of scholars studies the various 
shapes and dimensions of China’s political economic system and works to fit 
China into existing models. The most representative academic works by these 
two groups are, Breslin (2011; 2012) on China as a variant of the developmental 
state; Pearson (2007; 2011; 2015) on China as a regulatory state; and McNally 
(2007) on China as a state drawing on a variant of capitalism. This thesis argues 
that China is a variant of the developmental state in its management of central 
state-owned assets; and it adopts the market as a tool to practice its strategy of 
governing through the market. After all, although Beijing rejected the neoliberal 
policy package suggested by Western economists and went for an alternative 
developmental model, the market maintains a central role in the latter model. As 
Peck and Zhang (2013, 388) suggest, China’s developmental model went 
through a market nexus and thus it is “not an alternative to market rule but an 
alternative modality of market rule”. Following this line of thought, the present 
thesis suggests that the Chinese government’s economic governance of its 





1.2 Research Questions  
 
To be more specific, this research seeks to answer a key research question: How 
can central SOEs be owned by the state while being effectively based on market 
standards? The aim and the objective of the research are to provide an empirical 
understanding of the multiple roles central SOEs play in China’s economic 
growth and their seesaw battle with the central government. Through the 
theoretical lenses of the developmental state and principal-agent theory, the 
thesis pursues a detailed examination of how a 2003 established ministry level 
institution—the State Assets Supervision Administration Commission (SASAC) – 
functions, and the struggle it experiences between following the official line and 
tightly controlling the central SOEs and pushing these central SOEs into global 
market competition. In particular, the following five sub-questions are related to 
the key inquiry that this thesis intends to answer:  
 
1. Is China a developmental state? How should we interpret the market 
characteristics appearing in China’s economic development processes in the 
developmental state context?  
 
2. To what extent can the SASAC be seen as an important actor, and how does it 




3. What kind of roles does the SASAC play in promoting the growth of central 
SOEs?  
 
4. How can central SOEs operate as enterprises and have their high-performing 
assets listed on overseas stock exchanges while being constrained by the 
administrative rules of many different ministries?  
 
5. What are the differences between central SOEs in competitive industries and 
those in monopolistic industries regarding relations with the government, social 
responsibilities, reform plans and listing processes? 
 
 
1.3 Argument and Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis argues that China is a variant of the developmental state that 
established a pilot agency—the SASAC – to govern its central SOEs through the 
market, adopting market as its tool. The principal-agent theory is the most 
appropriate analytical tool for the examination of interactions between the 
principal, the SASAC, and the agents, the central SOEs. Through performing its 
multiple roles as an investor, supervisor, facilitator, policy-maker, peace-maker 
and sometimes as a buffer area for negotiation, the SASAC is able to exercise 
sufficient control of its agents. In particular, the Commission’s most important role 
is to supervise the central SOEs because it is their largest investor. Therefore, 
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efforts can be seen in the SASAC’s activities that indicate constant improvement 
of its ex ante and ex post supervision methods. This thesis argues against the 
neoliberal idea that state-owned enterprises are a drain on state assets and 
cannot be seen as a market actor. The two case studies provided here show that, 
for central SOEs in competitive sectors, they can be seen as a market actor and 
can be competitive and profitable under state ownership. As for central SOEs in 
the monopolistic industries, these have shouldered more social burdens and 
historical legacies as part of a monopolistic status inherited from the planned-
economy of the past. Surprisingly, the Chinese state has pushed them too into 
global market competition, and even creates competition among central SOEs in 
the same monopolistic industry to improve their business performance. It can 
clearly be seen that, for the Chinese state, the market is not an abstract concept, 
but rather it can be employed by the state, and the market can be selectively 
adopted to achieve the Chinese government’s developmental state goals.  
 
As for the empirical section of the thesis, the analysis focuses on the 
performance of two different types of central SOE and examines the importance 
of the market in the reform and transformation of central SOEs. It provides an 
innovative understanding of the internal operational structure of SOEs and 
argues that the three-layers of operational structure that appeared after years of 
reform unintentionally created a division of labor among the three. The group 
level mainly deals with government-related issues and works as a strategic 
center for the entire company, thus blocking the administrative concerns of the 
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developmental state above listed company level. The listed company controls the 
enterprises’ high-performing assets and operates according to market rules, 
taking the maximization of shareholders’ interests as its top priority. The 
subsidiary companies, operating under the listed company, focus on production 
and business competition in the domestic and global markets. In other words, the 
listed company and the subsidiaries mainly follow market concerns.   
 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. After the introduction, it moves to the 
theoretical chapter, 2, that sets the scene with the macro theoretical debate on 
the developmental state. It then moves to the theoretical chapter, 3, which uses 
principal-agent theory as a theoretical lens to examine the relationship between 
the pilot agency, the SASAC, and the central SOEs. Chapter 4 focuses the 
discussion on the SASAC’s various roles, such as supervisor, manager, 
transmitting body and buffer area, and its interactions with the central SOEs. 
Chapters 5 and 6 offer case studies in which two central SOEs, one 
representative of the competitive industries, one from the monopolistic industries, 
are analyzed. One SOE is the CNBM, which belongs to the competitive 
industries; the other is the CNPC, which belongs to the monopolistic industries. It 
concludes that China is a variant of the developmental state that adopts market 




1.4 A Brief Methodological Note: Case Study and Elite Interviews 
 
The methods this thesis adopted are case study and elite interview, with 
documentary analysis as a supplementary method of analysis. First-hand 
material was collected by interviewing SASAC officers and central SOE 
executives, as well as by analyzing a sample of central SOEs’ annual reports and 
financial disclosures since the year of their listing, and over 200 official 
documents issued by the SASAC and relevant ministries. Using the totality of the 
interview materials, companies’ financial reports since they were listed, and 
policy documents issued by relevant central government bodies and regulatory 
committees, it was possible to support a triangulation of the present realities of 
operational and institutional interactions within the companies.   
 
This research uses case study, and the method of analysis is paired-comparison, 
which means sorting similarities from differences by comparing two cases.  
“Case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly 
evident.” (Yin 2014, 17) Hence, case study should not represent a “sample” to 
show something in its specificity, but should be used to produce generalized 
theories (Yin 2014, 21). Case study as a method can bring evidence from all 
aspects of sources to support arguments that cannot be supported by other 
methods (Thomas 2011, 216). For this reason, the thesis compares two cases – 
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the China National Building Materials Corporation and the China National 
Petroleum Corporation – to examine the government’s means of supervision, and 
the differences and similarities between the different perspectives of these two 
companies’ business operations, as well as their interactions with government 
institutions. So, the choice of the cases for this study was based on three major 
points: firstly, the selected companies should be representative of the category of 
SOE; secondly, the selected companies must be listed on stock exchanges; and 
finally, as well as the first two points, the existence of contacts and connections 
who could be helpful in arranging interviews had to be considered.  
 
Let us start with the first indicator for the choice of cases. In 2015, when the 
fieldwork of this thesis were designed and conducted, there were 106 central 
SOEs, and these were roughly divided into two categories for the purposes of 
this thesis—central SOEs in monopolistic industries and central SOEs in 
competitive industries. Companies in the monopolistic industries were 53 central 
SOEs operating in the strategic sectors, and these were managed by the First 
Bureau of Personnel Management of the SASAC, and their senior executives 
were appointed by the Organization Department of the Communist Party of 
China. As for the companies in the competitive industries, these were operating 
in non-resource rich sectors and in industries that were fully open to all kinds of 
companies. Their senior executives were managed and appointed by the Second 
Bureau of Personnel Management of the SASAC.  
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Taking into consideration the division between these two large categories, the 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was chosen to represent the 
monopolistic central SOEs for the following three reasons. Firstly, the CNPC is 
the successor of the former China Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) run by the 
Ministry for Petroleum Industries. It is China’s largest oil and gas producer and 
supplier. It is one of the three national oil companies (the other two are Sinopec 
and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation) that are licensed by the 
Chinese state to conduct upstream petroleum exploitation. It is also the most 
problematic national oil company, and has long been criticized for its abundant 
employees, lack of transparency, soft budget constraints, profits based on 
monopolistic status, and repeated appearances in corruption cases. Secondly, 
the CNPC has a company, PetroChina, which is listed on the stock exchanges of 
New York, Hong Kong and Shanghai. Although the CNPC is PetroChina’s largest 
shareholder, holding 86.17% of the shares in 2016, the listing of PetroChina in 
overseas markets means that there are company annual reports and relevant 
financial disclosures available for research. Thirdly, what about contacts for 
interview opportunities? Unlike the case of the CNBM, the CNPC is more 
conservative and meticulous when it comes to interviews. Fortunately, there are 
more academic research articles and books available on the CNPC and China’s 
oil and gas industry. However, in order to make up for a deficiency of interviews 
on the CNPC, efforts were made to visit some other central SOEs in monopolistic 
industries and central-government-directed research institutions to conduct 
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interviews, in order to give a full account of this category of monopolistic central 
SOEs.  
 
The case chosen to represent central SOEs in the competitive category was the 
China National Building Materials Corporation (CNBM). This was selected 
because it is China’s largest building materials company and was directed to 
follow market logic from its establishment. The CNBM formed its listed company 
and has been listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange since 2006, which 
means more transparency of the shareholding structure and business 
performance of the company. Most importantly, I have extensive connections in 
the CNBM, which allowed me to interview senior executives and various 
department directors in the CNBM group, the CNBM listed company, the CNBM 
operational companies and their local third-tier companies. Having done so, I 
have been able to present a clear understanding of the company so as to 
develop my idea of the three layers of operational structure and to sharpen my 
arguments about governing through the market. In order to make the analysis 
more representative I also interviewed staff from other central SOEs in the 
competitive industries: for example, the China State Construction Engineering 
Corporation (CSCEC).  
 
Burnham et al (2008, 73) suggest that the chosen cases should not be isolated 
ones: “It is necessary to choose cases that are representative, not one-off or 
unusual, and to minimize the effect of all other factors.” The CNPC is one of 
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China’s largest and wealthiest central SOEs by international business standards, 
while being one of China’s most problematic central SOEs, and having all the 
shortcomings of a stereotypical SOE. By contrast, the CNBM is one of the best 
performing central SOEs in the competitive industries, and represents SOEs that 
compete in markets without being privatized. All in all, the two cases were 
carefully selected and efforts were made to tell the story of China’s central SOEs 
to the best of the researcher’s ability.  
 
Let us turn now to a discussion of the interview as a research method. Since 
case studies have an exploratory nature (Gerring 2007, 40), the interview as a 
method can be helpful in finding relevant evidence that provides a short-cut to 
help the researcher understand the situation (Yin 2014, 113). Thus, the in-depth 
interview allows the researcher to understand the lived experience of other 
people and those people’s own understanding of the experience (Seidman 2013, 
9). In the case of China, interviews can be very helpful for understanding the 
logic of the political economic context. They can not only provide insightful 
comments based on the experience and career paths of interviewees, but can 
also help the researcher to distinguish which are the important policies from a 
large number of policy documents, thus saving time that might be spent going 
through papers. It is rare to hear interviewees simply repeat the official line, 
because if they do not want to undergo an interview with a researcher, they can 
simply ignore or reject the researcher’s request. If they agree to an interview and 
spend time on it, the interview can usually be useful.  
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According to Yin (2014), interviews are a valuable resource for enabling the 
researcher to have a systematic understanding of organizations’ behaviors. 
Besides, political economic elites who hold senior positions usually have a long 
working experience and have been involved in many institutional reform activities 
over time. In the Chinese context, it is not easy for young early career officers to 
have a deep understanding of the politics of the system, as their work is usually 
limited to acting on orders passed down by senior staff. Moreover, young officers 
are more concerned and nervous about interviews that may have a negative 
impact on their future career, while higher-ranking officers are more relaxed 
about sharing their opinions. It is worth noting that high-ranking officers usually 
have more than 10, and even up to 30, years of working experience inside the 
government, and their comments may contain bias and personal interpretation of 
the government; so checking with relevant policy documents can be useful to 
increase the validity of these interviews. Moreover, whenever possible the 
researcher crosschecked the answers with a similar set of answers from other 
interviewees. As Yin (2014, 121) suggests, “Data triangulation helps to 
strengthen the construct validity of your case study. The multiple sources of 
evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon”. 
O’Brien (2004, 36) used an iterative approach during his interviews in China by 
testing arguments directly with interviewees. After the first few interviews, I also 




Rubin and Rubin (1995 in Sæther 2004, 48) suggest that the interviewer should 
be critical and prepare follow-up questions for the interviewees. However, 
Sæther (2004: 49) notes that her interviews in China were more like seeking 
affirmation than posing critical and open questions, due to the language barrier. 
O’Brien (2004, 35) notes that China’s political elites are uncomfortable at being 
led step-by-step by the interviewer. He sometimes let the conversation flow, 
since members of the Chinese elite regard themselves as intelligent, with 
abundant knowledge in their own field. It is also crucial to maintain control over 
the direction of the interview. In this research, the interview questions were 
divided into six main categories to make sure that no matter how talkative the 
interviewees encountered were, at least one question in each category could be 
covered during the interview. Interviews were conducted in Chinese, for this 
research depended on note taking as the method of recording. There were two 
main reasons why a recorder was not used: the unpredictable nature of political 
phenomena in Beijing; and, most importantly, to protect interviewees who were 
concerned at being recorded, in case their interviews appeared in the news. It is 
better not to use a recorder if this may cause concern to interviewees. In order to 
benefit from a fresh memory of what had been said, and to recall as much 
information as possible, the interviews were transcribed immediately (within the 
same day), based on the notes I took. The advantage of note taking was that 
officers were less concerned and more talkative, providing valuable comments 
that turned out to be very useful in generating the grand arguments of the thesis.  
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Let us move on to discuss the selection of interviewees. In the fieldwork for this 
thesis, policy makers in both central and local departments of the SASAC were 
visited. There were six in-depth interviews conducted in the central SASAC, to 
help the thesis to explore how the SASAC worked, thus providing a broader idea 
of China’s state ownership system. The interviews with four local SASAC officers 
provided a closer look at the individual implementation of SASAC policies. This 
was because the local SASAC deals with more detailed problems caused by 
state ownership reform on a daily basis, due to the experiment-based 
policymaking characteristic of China. 
 
Before going on, it is worth mentioning that years of internationalization and 
marketization have substantially improved social equality and freedom of speech 
in China. However, government officers and employees in the state sector 
maintain a relatively conservative and sometimes rigid demeanor. The lack of 
democratic elections means that government employees have no incentives and 
no need to respond to researchers’ interview requests. Therefore, diverse ways 
of getting in touch with interviewees have to be used. Government officers can 
be reached through personal or family connections. Another way to contact them 
is through middlemen. The snowball technique is also practicable. An efficient 
way to use the snowball technique in China is to roll the snowball from 
government to SOEs, which is much easier than the other way round. The 
positive side of conducting academic research in China is that the Chinese 
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authorities are more concerned with negative information gained from interviews 
that might be published by international media and news agencies. Less 
attention is paid to the work in academic disciplines. Moreover, the Chinese 
authorities care more about quantitative research then qualitative research, 
which they do not consider a real scientific method (Thøgersen and Heimer 2006, 
13).  
 
Coping with interviewees who just give the official line can also be a challenge. 
Contrary to the stereotypical assumption, in all my 38 interviews, there was only 
one interviewee who gave the official line in answer to some, though not all, of 
my questions. At this point, the strategy of interjecting “Please give me an 
example” mentioned by O’Brien (2004, 31) is very useful. When this official 
started to talk about how “we are serving the whole people of China, therefore, 
even if the salary is lower than in private enterprise, we find ourselves satisfied 
and proud” I used the question, “Since you are satisfied with your salary, would 
you please give me an example of how the reform of SOEs’ salary structures 
affects your life? Are there any differences between today’s salary system and 
that of the old days” to redirect and continue the interview. I had noted Halliday’s 
(2002, 149-153) discussion of “the complex politics created by the cultural 
baggage” brought to the interview by both the interviewer and the interviewee, 
and therefore the questions were designed to be quite open and easy to answer. 
On the one hand, this allowed the elite enough space to talk about their 
experiences. On the other, it was easier for the interviewee to avoid important 
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points and address trivial issues. It was important for the researcher to be familiar 
in advance with the policy documents issued by the central government. By 
mentioning policy documents with their specific number, issuing authority and the 
date, the researcher was able to earn more respect from the officers and thus 
have more productive and fruitful interviews.  
 
The fieldwork experience also showed that people in higher positions were more 
open-minded and talkative, while young employees were more concerned and 
frightened. Also, employees in non-monopolistic industries and in both central 
and local government were much more flexible and showed high levels of 
intelligence in the conversation. By contrast, employees in the monopolistic 
industries were more conservative and careful, because some monopolistic 
enterprises have part of their business in the military and defense industries. In 
order to conduct a useful interview, a middleman can be very helpful in getting 
the researcher well prepared for the interview by introducing the interviewee’s 
personality and education background. The middleman also helps in guiding the 
researcher through the office politics inside a bureau, so that the factional 
relations inside the institution can be avoided. Another great challenge for 
anyone who is going to conduct interviews in China is interviewees’ variable and 
frequently adjusted working schedules. Due to interviewees’ flexible schedules, 
the researcher has to be ready for interviews at any time and to sort out 
problems such as overlapping appointments.  
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1.5 Doing Fieldwork in China: Keeping up with the Government’s Reform 
Path 
 
The Chinese government is known for its adaptability and flexibility. The 
literatures mentioned above did provide a comprehensive understanding of how 
to do fieldwork in China and what to expect when doing this fieldwork. 
Nevertheless, it is also very important for political science researchers to keep 
up-to-date with the government’s latest policies and measures. The empirical 
materials in this thesis consist of interviews, government issued policy papers, 
policies and regulations issued by relevant regulatory committees, central SOEs’ 
annual reports, and extensive fieldwork interviews. SASAC officers from different 
bureaus provided views from different working backgrounds; and the 
interviewees also included officers in the Development and Research Centre of 
the State Council, which is the official “think tank” that directly reports to China’s 
highest state administrative organ, the State Council, in order to provide a 
different perspective on the story of central SOEs from officers who work outside 
the state assets management system but still inside the central government 
system.  For the fieldwork period, from June 2015 to October 2015, the 
researcher visited, and interviewed in, central SOEs’ headquarters in Beijing, and 
their operational companies in local areas, such as Shanghai and Hangzhou. 
There were interviews with central SOE staff ranging from group company level 
senior executives to listed company board members, as well as with 
departmental directors, central SOEs’ operational companies’ (subsidiaries’) 
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general managers, and independent shareholders, to present a full-scale picture 
of how central SOEs conduct their business activities; how they respond to 
SASAC orders and policies; and how they cooperate with the SASAC and other 
relevant government institutions. 
 
Policy papers issued by bureaus and departments in the central government 
ministries should be given more attention, as they can be very useful for 
triangulation. These policy papers are available on the official websites of 
individual ministries and governmental institutions. Noticeably, unlike the 
carefully organized government policies and archives published online in the 
West, Chinese archives and policy documents, although published on websites, 
are not well organized. They may be classed according to policy titles, 
sometimes by policy number, or even have the issuing date as the title. Sifting 
through these requires patience and care on the part of the researcher. Through 
a systematic analysis of 195 SASAC policy papers publicly displayed on its 
website under the heading “policy announcements”, this thesis provides an 
analysis in Chapter 3 of ex ante measures devised according to the principal-
agent theory. This was in addition to searching on the website, for the SASAC 
regulation, Notice on Issuing the Implementation Measures of the SASAC for the 
Disclosure of Information on State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
(SASAC 2009, No. 18). In chapter 2, article 8, it reads: “Chinese citizens can 
request the disclosure of documents by the SASAC”. Contrary to what might be 
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generally assumed, I had a response from the SASAC the next working day after 
I sent them the request form.  
 
As for the government-issued policies that are analyzed in this thesis, they 
consist of 195 policy documents issued by the SASAC; policy papers issued by 
other ministries related to the management of central state assets; SASAC 
departmental regulations; and central SOEs’ annual reports from their year of 
listing to 2016. Other approaches for acquiring useful information from traditional 
media were also used. For example, a series of conference reports and videos of 
the SASAC’s director meeting the press and SASAC spokesmen meeting the 
press were very useful, because the director’s answers to questions were less 
bureaucratic than his public speeches. Furthermore, up-to-date social media 
tools were also used for acquiring information. For example, the SASAC news 
agency provides an official account, “guozixiaoxin” [国资小新], on WeChat (the 
most popular social media application developed by Tencent) which offers 
updates on newly issued policies, and the latest data related to central SOEs’ 
financial performance.  Furthermore, because most central SOEs are listed 
companies, they have a responsibility to answer to questions from their 
shareholders and the general public, which provides another way for researchers 
to acquire information. The CNPC has a section called “Mailbox of the Secretary 
of the Board” [董秘信箱 ] that serves as a question and answer platform for 
anyone who is interested in asking questions related to the CNPC and the 
energy industry. The questions are carefully worded, with sufficient data provided, 
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and are easy to access from this SOE’s official website. When this researcher 
used this site, only some questions asking for a prediction of the rise and fall of 
market share prices were refused, although McCulloch (2004, 30) points out that 
primary sources are usually fragmented and scattered, and thus may constitute 
imperfect raw evidence. However, with the assistance of the policy documents 
and media mentioned above, these primary sources can be triangulated with 
each other and can thus make more sense. So, to summarize, the Chinese 
government does to a certain extent improved its transparency, which provides 
more opportunities and possibilities for researchers to conduct empirical research 













Chapter 2  Governing through the Market—Towards a Differentiated 
Developmental State?  
 
2.1. Introduction:  
 
Setting the State and Market Debate in China 
 
This chapter focuses on the macro-theoretical debate that is central to the thesis, 
arguing that China is a variant of the developmental state type and that it 
selectively introduces market competition and criteria to reinvigorate central 
SOEs and make them powerful domestic actors and increasingly important 
actors in the global market. Is China’s success story of economic prosperity a 
story of the success of the market, or a story of state-led development? Lardy 
(2015, 97) argues that China’s economic success after the reform and opening 
up should be seen as contributing to the rise of the market, the elimination of 
state regulated price mechanisms, the prosperity of private enterprise and an 
improving regulatory system. In Markets Over Mao, he emphasizes the 
increasing importance of market allocation of resources and a vibrant private 
sector. He also discusses the Chinese party-state’s evolving role in facilitating 
the emergence and growth of a prosperous private sector. The state sector is a 
drag on China’s economic growth that has impeded China as a liberal market 
economy (Lardy, 2014).  China’s marketization and the country’s integration into 
the global market have fundamentally transformed China from a state-planned 
economy to a quasi-market economy.  
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China encourages the inflow of private capital, invites market competition, and 
celebrates the growth of a vibrant private sector. However, a discussion on SOEs 
is unavoidable. According to The Economist (2018), China’s state-owned assets 
account for 40% of its stock market holdings, a third of the country’s investment, 
and 45% of its debt. By the end of 2016 (SASAC 2017B), the total value of the 
assets of SOEs (excluding financial SOEs) in China was 131717.45 billion RMB, 
of which the central SOEs’ total assets accounted for more than half the value – 
69478.87 billion RMB. As illustrated by the data, SOEs, in particular central 
SOEs’, company performance, can affect the economic situation of the whole 
country, and can decide the stability of the country’s financial system. 
 
The state maintains the privileged position of the central SOEs. It creates an 
uneven playing field, especially in sectors with absolute state monopolies, to 
ensure that the market central SOEs act in discriminates against potential 
competitors and enhances the opportunities of these central SOEs. At the same 
time, the state acknowledges the drawbacks that such practices bring to its 
SOEs; so, it has introduced the market standards and practices of multinational 
corporations and private enterprises to evaluate and assess these state sectors. 
Branstetter and Lardy (2006, 21) note that China dramatically increased its 
openness to trade and FDI in the late 1990s to prepare for its 2001 WTO entry. 
The Chinese premier of that time, Zhu Rongji, expressed the view that the 
market competition China’s WTO membership would bring would lead to a more 
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rapid and more healthy development in China and would encourage state-owned 
enterprises and banks to undertake additional structural reforms.   
  
In Nee and Opper’s pioneering work, Capitalism from Below, they paint a picture 
of the rise of a prosperous private sector in the Yangzi Delta. One of the vital 
points they raise is that the promulgation of the Company Law of 1994, which 
was intended primarily to “rescue” the dismal state-owned enterprises, 
accidentally created an institutional contingency which triggered the initiative of 
private entrepreneurs. This is an inspiring story, but Nee and Opper leave half of 
the story untold. They touch on the 1994 SOEs’ reform and modernization 
program but refrain from tracing the processes of the SOEs’ diversified and 
vibrant development post-1994. How do SOEs and private capital co-existent 
with each other? How do SOEs survive in a capitalized market?  The concept of 
capitalism from below tells us how private capital has grown in China as a result 
of contingency. The other half of the story this contingency tells is how the 
prosperity of private firms has stimulated SOEs to exert and exercise their 
entrepreneurship to fit in with market competition. Because SOEs realized, or 
were told at some point, that their monopolistic status in most industries had 
vanished, even in oil and petroleum, SOEs now have to face competition from 
their counterparts. This competition is, ironically, created by the state. The state 
has used state-led market competition to mobilize and revitalize its state-owned 
enterprises. So, how should we understand China’s economic development?  
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This thesis argues that China is a variant of the developmental state that is using 
market forces to revitalize its central state-owned enterprises. This is achieved by 
adopting state-led developmental models and market experience from other 
countries without being trapped in any related ideology. The government’s 
‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, as Kennedy (2011, 9) points out, leaves 
space for it to interpret its chosen policies and development models freely. Thus, 
this thesis argues, market forces and market competition are simply tools for the 
Chinese government to promote its own developmental state model, especially in 
the management of central state-owned assets. It is not wise to be too black and 
white about what China is, or to put China into a particular category. The country 
has, in fact, a magpie approach to economic policy making. It provides an 
evolutionary example of how to make economic policies.  
 
Locating China in a Political Economy Model?   
 
It is simplistic to distinguish China from any other political economy model in the 
world by establishing a ‘China Model’ or a ‘Beijing Consensus’. It is also 
superficial to class China as a ‘post-communist state’ or as belonging to the 
‘BRICS’, because China does not share any political, economic or sociological 
characteristics with these countries. This thesis argues that China can best join 
the grand political economy discussion as a variant of developmental state. The 
term ‘developmental state’, as discussed in this thesis, refers to the classical 
developmental states, namely Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Like the classical 
developmental states, China has experienced a significant GDP growth, with an 
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average of nearly 10% a year since 1978 (World Bank 2017). So, is China 
another developmental state? One that is continuing the East Asian miracle in 
the twenty first century?  
 
How should we interpret China’s economic success since there are diversified 
state-market relationship happens all together? Yang and Zhao (2015, 68) 
suggest that China’s economic success does not build on a particular set of 
policies it has adopted, but lies in strong state capacity and state autonomy. 
Given these conditions, the government can free itself from ideological 
constraints and from lobbying by interest groups. It can implement new policies, 
or adjust impractical policies, when necessary. Yang and Zhao’s observation 
partly echoes the reference to “policy experimentation” that Heilmann (2008 and 
2011) identifies as explaining the Chinese government’s policymaking processes. 
Heilmann observes that the Chinese government tests a “pilot policy” on its more 
experimental points before issuing it as a nation-wide policy. Drawing on 
previous research, this thesis argues that China adopts an ideologically light 
approach in its management of central SOEs, despite the fact that its state 
ownership system is ideologically based on communism, and is a legacy of 
China’s historical relationship with the Soviet Union. This is similar to the 
situation in South Korea, which has “not shifted from developmentalism to 
neoliberalism but neoliberally restructured their developmental system” (Chang, 
Weiss and Fine 2012, 4). The Chinese government follows a developmental 
state path in leading its economic growth, while it is adaptive, flexible and 
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responsive to market signals and uses market competition as a tool to better 
achieving this goal.  
 
I argue that China is a differentiated developmental state that varies its practices 
from industrial sector to industrial sector and from province to province. It is a big 
country that brings together variations on a developmental state model. It is a 
continental-size country that has long been studied as “fragmented 
authoritarianism” (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992). Goodman (1994, 11) studied 
the roles and characteristics of China’s sub-central level of government—the 
province. However, the characteristics of economic development are not even 
province-wide. Goodman (1997, 2) assessed the importance of provincial 
government in pursuing economic growth based on provinces’ particular 
comparative advantages, and how national policy was mediated by local 
conditions. Nee and Opper (2016, 37-51) paint a completely different picture of 
the economic development patterns of the Yangzi Delta. Zhejiang province is a 
hub for vibrant private economies; and Jiangsu province is largely advancing its 
township and village enterprises (TVEs). Shanghai is dominated by a large 
number of giant joint-capital firms and strong state-owned enterprises, while 
private capital has been suppressed and its development has been limited. 
Indeed, local government’s capacity and policy-making processes have very 
different characteristics from those of national government. The sub-provincial 
level of government—the city – has different characteristics yet again. Shen and 
Tsai (2016, 121) examine and compare three cities – Suzhou, Wenzhou and 
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Dongguan – situated in different regions of China. They argue that the three 
cities have different developmental models, among which they single out 
Suzhou’s strong economic performance and crisis-managing ability based on a 
“local developmental state model”: that is, “adaptive governance as proactive”. 
Chen and Lees (2016) see China’s growing renewable energy sector, led by the 
pilot agency, NDRC, as embodying an effort at re-centralization and re-
intervention that is consistent with the developmental state paradigm. Binz, 
Gosens, Hansen and Hansen (2017, 433) argue that China’s development of the 
wind industry has followed the top-down mechanism in which policy measures 
take a decisive role; whereas the government’s roles in the solar PV industry and 
biomass power plant industry are much less significant. So, whether China can 
be said to be a developmental state depends on the industry sector and 
geographical location under discussion. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follow. Before we examine the developmental state 
model, a brief discussion will be provided on how scholars understand China’s 
political economic models, and why I believe that the developmental state is the 
most appropriate concept to help us analyze China. For many years, academia 
has been arguing about how to characterize China’s political economic model. 
The official discourse of the Chinese government —‘Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics’ – has failed to persuade academia to accept this ‘simplified’ 
notion. The following section reviews the literature of the academic debate on 
Chinese political economic models other than the developmental state. There are 
 43 
four main ways in which China’s economic governance has been studied, none 
of which I find persuasive. I argue that, of these, the developmental state model 
is the most helpful for understanding China.  
 
In studying China’s political economy, some scholars have suggested there is a 
uniqueness about China that they call the ‘China Model’ or the ‘Beijing 
Consensus’; or they have analyzed China as a regulatory state, as Margaret 
Pearson does, or as a ‘civilization-state’ as Martin Jacques does. Ramo (2004) 
proposes the concept of a Beijing Consensus as an opposite to the Washington 
Consensus. However, Kennedy (2010) strongly criticizes the concept of a Beijing 
Consensus for its misguided and inaccurate positing of China’s development as 
the opposite of the Washington Consensus and neoliberalism. This view is 
supported by Breslin (2011, 1323) who points out that there is no agreed 
understanding of a China Model: China has simply followed a statist 
development path which is an alternative to orthodox neoliberalism. Furthermore, 
China’s territorial size means that different provinces and industries have 
different development paths. China frequently adjusts its policies as a result of 
experimentation in government policy-making.  
 
Building on this understanding, Breslin (2011, 1328) echoes Heilmann’s (2008) 
comment on the Chinese government’s policy experimentation. “For most 
observers, it is this experimentation and non-ideological (perhaps even de-
ideologized) commitment to doing whatever it takes to promote growth while 
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maintaining the political stability that is the defining hallmark of the Chinese mode 
of governance.” Referring back to the previous section, one of the distinctive 
characteristics of the countries mentioned there was that an authoritarian 
government was in power during their developmental-state period. The 
characteristic of high state capacity that usually coexists with a developmental 
state in the East Asian context was compatible with the collective goal of 
pursuing modernization. Thus, state capacity can lead rather than follow the 
market, especially in industries that have a connection with national security 
matters (Wade 1990, 303). Consequently, research on China can contribute to 
expanding developmental state theory to make it applicable to a larger country. 
Apart from that, the theory has reshaped the understanding of China as an 
‘ideologically light’ country that uses state capacity to push forward economic 
development and thus, in turn, consolidate the political stability of the state. 
 
Apart from focusing on the uniqueness of China, academic discussion has 
brought into the discussion various kinds of political economic model other than 
the China model. Chu (2010, 307-310) sees China’s high economic growth as 
caused more by internal than external factors, and as thus being a form of 
market socialism. It is not caused by insulation from the outside world, but by the 
government’s willingness and ability to stimulate aggregate demand, reflecting 
Keynesian economic thinking. China’s strong economic performance during the 
financial crisis supports Gerschenkron’s theory of the ‘advantage of 
backwardness’, according to which a government consistently intervenes in 
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economic growth in order to enable a latecomer to catch up with industrialized 
countries. Pearson (2011, 25) argues that China is not unique: rather, its 
experiences support the theory of ‘varieties of capitalism’; and she further 
expands her argument to apply it to China’s emerging regulatory state. The fact 
that this restructuring of state ownership was started by the government instead 
of by the private sector, as Oi (2011, 5-6) argues, does differentiate China from 
the standard capitalist model. Nevertheless, as Boltho and Weber (2015, 247-
261) conclude, although China may perform differently from other developmental 
states, if broader comparative standards are applied, it can be firmly described 
as following the East Asian model of development.  
 
China’s GDP, the growth in its productivity, and its rising share of world exports 
of manufactured goods share certain level of similarity to those of a 
developmental state. Nevertheless, it is arguable whether China is a 
developmental state, because of the many characteristics that differentiate it from 
the classical developmental state. There is the process of industrial 
modernization, eliminating the orthodoxy of a communist planned economy while 
the Communist Party maintained its legitimacy as the ruling power. Secondly, 
China has a much higher inequality of income distribution than the other 
developmental states. Also, China’s industrial planning, in the form of five-year 
plans issued by the central government, was general and descriptive, rather than 
providing detailed industrial development plans. This is particularly different from 
that of Japan. Thirdly, China’s large territory, and the economic decentralization 
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in the early years of reform and opening up, may have allowed local interests to 
challenge central state capacity. Lastly, the international situation had become 
more liberalized when China started its developmental state process. So that, 
compared to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, when China opened its market to 
foreign investment and businesses, as the largest recipient of FDI in the 
developing world (Harvey 2005, 135) it was more involved in the global trading 
system, especially after WTO accession and the development of its external 
policies. China’s policies regarding openness to FDI were more relaxed than 
those of Japan and Korea were during their developmental state stage. China’s 
FDI between 1985 and 2005 accounted for 2.9% of its GDP, compared with the 
developmental state periods of South Korea (0.6%), Taiwan (0.4%) and Japan 
(less than 0.1%) (Kroeber 2011,44). However, these are not particularly 
problematic issues, and they can be accommodated in the developmental state 
model.  
 
Although the above characteristics may make it sound as though China was in a 
difficult position to start, and coherently conduct, its developmental state model, 
there were other characteristics according to which China could be viewed as 
having had an advantage over the classical developmental states. For example, 
Naughton (2010, 438) emphasizes China's potential to attract foreign investment 
into its inland areas. China’s underdeveloped inland market provided the 
potential to expand China’s developmental state growth. Besides, China’s 
abundant labor force helped to give it a comparative advantage in labor-intensive 
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industries, which gained time during which the state could move towards 
industrial upgrading. All of these are fundamentally important points for China’s 
economic success. Most importantly, China had a high percentage of state 
ownership, especially in the infrastructural sectors. The state maintained full 
control of the infrastructure sectors and key energy sectors, which contributed to 
its ability to adjust the economic situation when necessary.  
 
To conclude, there are various arguments which attribute China’s success to its 
being a developmental state, a regulatory state, a civilization state, and many 
other models of state. Among all these, the developmental state provides the 
most suitable category into which to fit China and analyze and compare its 
performance, especially when trying to place China in a discussion of 
international political economy. Despite the debates about which political 
economic model China is, Johnson (1982, 306) is correct to argue that a country 
“must, first of all, be a developmental state—and only then a regulatory state, a 
welfare state, an equality state, or whatever other kinds of functional state a 
society may wish to adopt”.  
 
Turning back to the discussion of China as a variant of the developmental state, 
the next sections of the thesis start with a literature review of developmental state 
theory and then move to a discussion of whether China is a developmental state, 
or the extent to which it can be seen as a developmental state. The subsequent 
section investigates how the emergence of marketization in China affects the 
 48 
practices of the developmental state. It then moves the discussion to the core 
question of the thesis—how to manage central SOEs from a developmental state 
perspective. This thesis examines China as a differentiated developmental state, 
in which different provinces and industrial sectors present different shapes and 
variants of the developmental state. The main argument is that China follows the 
developmental state model of economic governance in the management of 
central state-owned assets. This research contributes to the broad debate about 
whether government’s involvement in market activities can bring prosperity, and 
also argues against the idea that state-owned enterprises are a drain on the 
country’s economy.  
 
This chapter comes to the conclusion that the developmental state can be seen 
as offering a group of examples for latecomers to follow in order to achieve 
industrialization within a comparatively short period, but not a model for other 
developing countries, given the variants embedded in it. Since we acknowledge 
the fact that the developmental state is not in complete opposition to market and 
everything it brings, discussion of the developmental state cannot avoid touching 
on state-market relations, and this thesis identifies and explores the market 
characteristics that are involved in the developmental state model. Discussion 
then moves to how the authoritarian government leads state development 
through effective supervision of its agency in the developmental state. After a 
discussion of the extent to which China is a developmental state, the next 
chapter attempts to explore the analytical theory of this thesis, the principal-agent 
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theory, in the context of China’s management of central SOEs. The empirical 
chapters that follow will provide first-hand fieldwork materials to facilitate the 
theoretical discussion.  
 
 
2.2 Developmental state theoretical review  
 
Developmental state theory was built on the development experience of capitalist 
Northeast Asia, which used state policy to increase a nation’s economic 
competitiveness and took development as its priority. The theory of the 
developmental state drew on Chalmers Johnson’s analysis of the Ministry of 
Industrial Trade and Information in the book MITI and the Japanese Miracle 
(1982). Late industrialization developmental states are under the twin influences 
of ‘social mobilisation’ and ‘economic nationalism’. The developmental state is 
interventionist, that is, plan-rational, through state-guided, privately-owned 
enterprises (Woo-cumings 1999,2-3). The rise of neoliberalism brought the idea 
that the general public lived a better life in a neoliberal world (Harvey 2005,37); 
but such discourse may not be true. Developmental state theory and the rapid 
economic growth in North East Asian countries challenged the neoliberal 
domination of Western economic thought and questioned whether the state could 
be a positive factor in economic growth.  
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The discussion of the developmental state focuses on the state’s capacity, and 
its advantage in having a broader social and political ability to push forward 
economic growth (Wade and White 1985,20). The idea of the state’s capacity to 
lead industrialization presented here is hugely different from the interpretation of 
the Soviet planned economy. That is, the Soviet Union’s actions in providing 
state planning were not plan rational but “plan ideological”.  The goals the Soviet 
Union set for its already inefficient SOEs were not developmental driven. The 
Japanese state took on a developmental function that led to the country’s 
industrial development, which Johnson (1982, 18) believes was fundamentally 
different from that of the Soviet Union. He distinguished the United States from 
the Japanese developmental state, because the US’s developing strategy was 
regulatory oriented. The Japanese developmental state, despite having the state 
take the leading role, was developmental oriented. It was “developmental, plan-
rational, and has a dominant feature precisely the setting of such substantive 
social and economic goals” (Johnson 1982, 19). When a state proposed 
economic development in its national policy, “its state intervention was more 
performance-oriented and targeted than in western countries” (Kjær 2004:135 in 
Chen and Lees 2016, 4). In other words, the state’s capacity to direct economic 
growth can be effective and efficient.  
 
The notion of the developmental state became widely adopted by scholars in 
their interpretation of the economic success of the Northeast Asian countries. 
Research into this experience expanded the theory—developmental state theory 
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does not have a long history. The main authors pioneering the concept have 
been: Chalmers Johnson (1982) on Japan—MITI and the Japanese miracle; 
Robert Wade (1990) on Taiwan—Governing the market; and Alice Amsden 
(1989) on South Korea—Asia’s Next Giant. The key point of the developmental 
state is the state’s national policy of recognizing economic development as its top 
priority and providing sufficient intervention and support to achieve that goal. The 
state itself takes on a developmental role and leads industrialization in the 
developmental state model. There are several characteristics that are shared by 
the developmental states. The developmental state provides government 
intervention in the development of national economy that aims to catch up with 
industrialized countries. The logic underneath is that the developed countries 
enjoyed the first-mover advantages so that the later-comers require the 
assistance from their government (Bramall 2009, 399). The developmental state 
also has a pilot agency with a supportive bureaucratic staff. The government 
maintains an authoritarian approach throughout the developmental state period 
(Boltho and Weber 2015, 242). Weiss (2000, 23) turns the discussion of the 
developmental state to focus on the institutional setting of what makes a 
successful developmental state. It was she who generated the term ‘governed 
interdependence’ to illustrate the combination of three essential criteria for the 
formation of a developmental state. 
 
All in all, the developmental state focuses primarily on industrial governance, the 
state persistently pursuing a development goal through strong state capacity and 
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the conducting of an effective plan-rational intervention in economic development. 
There is no consensus on the precise definition of this experience-distilled 
concept. In the following section, a table of the 10 main characteristics of the 
developmental state will be presented, based on the type of background against 
which a developmental state is formed; the factors that determine a 
developmental state; and the distinctive features of how a developmental state 
achieves economic success. A separate discussion of the three groups of 




Figure 2.1. Characteristics of the classical developmental state.  
Source: Drawn up by the author 
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This section illustrates the historical background and the geographical conditions 
that motivate a country to become a developmental state. The classical 
developmental states are undergoing post-war restructuring and, at the same 
time, are under an external security threat. As argued above, the rapid 
industrialization of the East Asian developmental states happened under the 
guidance of the state. There was another common characteristic of the historical 
backgrounds of these developmental states: their future was under threat from 
external enemies. For example, Taiwan’s potential enemy was mainland China, 
located just across the strait; and South Korea’s enemy, North Korea, was much 
closer (Wade and White 1985, 7). Also, the post-war period saw a major 
redistribution of power and wealth – an egalitarian redistribution of income – that 
accelerated rapid industrialization (Öniş 1991, 117). Gore (2014, 306) used the 
metaphor of ‘the rebirth of Phoenix after a fiery baptism’ to refer to the historical 
background of the post-war East Asian developmental states.  
 
Traumatic memories of wars, revolutions, and foreign colonial occupations 
motivated the developmental states to start on their developmental path. Under 
these circumstances, the state started to pave its way to economic development. 
Robert Wade (1985), in his pioneering study of Taiwan’s developmental state 
path, suggests that the authoritarian one-party state governed by the Nationalist 
Party (KMT) aimed at industrialization. It did not choose to let Taiwan maximize 
its profitability based on the country’s comparative advantages. Through its 
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control of capitalist interest groups, and through major land reform, the KMT was 
able to center political power in the party. The agrarian reform provided people 
with a sufficiently high standard of living to avoid major political turmoil. In fact, it 
is argued that the developmental state process always starts with an 
authoritarian regime: for instance, the military dictatorships in Taiwan and South 
Korea, the strongman style of rule in Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew, Japans’ 
domination by a single party (the Liberal Democratic Party), and the communism 
of China (Gore 2014, 305).  
 
Apart from a post-war historical situation, a latecomer position and an external 
threat to the developmental state’s security are also determining factors that 
generate a developmental state. Weiss (2000, 26) points out the importance of 
an external security threat to the forging of a developmental state. In fact, a long-
term intensive security threat can drive the developmental state to act cohesively 
to achieve industrialization (Zhu 2002,9), because the external threat can give it 
a clear indication of the importance of economic strength as the core of its 
political survival (Knight 2014, 1337). Apart from the external security threat’s 
importance in the post-war construction period, Beeson’s (2009, 13) argument is 
also worth noting. He addresses the similarities in the historical backgrounds that 
these East Asian countries share. The political history and cultural background of 
the East Asian developmental states made it possible to have a powerful, 
centralized, interventionist state.  
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This section demonstrates the importance of a developmental state’s motivation 
and determination to catch-up with advanced Western economies: in other words, 
the driver for the adoption of developmental state institutions. It also examines 
the state’s prioritizing of economic success and industrial development, and how 
that affects the economic development of the country. It is very important to 
address the key factor of what makes a developmental state so determined to 
catch-up with developed economies, and its prioritizing of industrial upgrading 
and economic growth. Elizabeth Thurbon focuses on the ‘developmental mindset’ 
of the state in promoting a developmental state path, rather than a particular 
institution or a particular set of policies. She then addresses the importance of 
state capacity in formulating and executing such a developmental strategy based 
on this mindset (Thurbon 2016, 4%). The industrial policies that follow the 
development-oriented mindset, however, may change over time and be adjusted 
to suit changing conditions in both local and international terms (Thurbon 2014,8). 
For example, an historical case of having a strong state in forming and adjusting 
short-term economic policies according to fast economic growth is South Korea 
(Amsden 1989,93). Therefore, strong state capacity in making development 
plans, and the capacity to adjust plans, are crucial for a state to be a 
developmental state.  
 
A developmental state’s determination to achieve industrial modernization helps 
significantly to improve a country’s general industrial productivity and upgrade 
the industrial value chain. Developing countries have often been advised by 
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neoliberals to focus on labor-intensive production (Chang 1999, 185). However, 
Dudley Seers (in Payne and Phillips 2014, 72) suggests that countries with a 
peripheral status should not rely on comparative advantage to produce export 
commodities. The developmental states have rejected the western economists’ 
advice on producing products that have comparative advantages in the 
international trade system. Their peripheral status can only be changed if they 
invest in industrial upgrading in order to change this status. The East Asian 
‘newly industrializing countries’ are in a better position because they have not 
been constrained by a focus on the export of raw materials like the Latin 
American countries, and have had a stronger desire to catch up with advanced 
industrial countries (Evans 1995, 11). For example, the Chinese government 
redirected China’s dependence on export-led growth to a domestic-market-driven 
one. It also promoted the upgrading of China’s industrial structure from being 
labor intensive to having a higher value-added and more technologically 
advanced focus (Gore 2014, 303). It is the developmental state’s determination 
and capacity for industrial upgrading that leads the country out of  a peripheral 
status in the global trading system and leads to prosperity. According to Kay 
(2002, 1097), the East Asian states’ capacity for making and conducting effective 
development policy is one of the main reasons why they have outperformed Latin 
American countries, even though the latter enjoy abundant resources and started 
their industrialization half a century earlier. Therefore, in order to achieve rapid 
growth, state-led industrial upgrading is a crucial factor and can be better 
achieved by a developmental state government.  
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This section explores the characteristics of the developmental state as well as 
the elements that constitute a functional developmental state government. One of 
the determining factors is that state capacity for achieving developmental goals 
strategically intervenes in development activities and can adjust policies over 
time. Also, a developmental state’s economic success can be achieved through 
state-led industrial upgrading. In Governing the Market, Robert Wade (1990, 7) 
notes the crucial feature of East Asian developmental states: he sees in Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan an “intense and almost unequivocal commitment on the 
part of government to build up the international competitiveness of domestic 
industry.” Wade (1990, 6) uses Taiwan’s developmental state period to illustrate 
the successes of what he defines as a ‘nearly free market’ and government’s role 
in raising Taiwan’s international competitiveness and finally making Taiwan into 
an industrialized economy. In the case of China, the SASAC’s higher authority—
the State Council – issued administrative orders directly in relation to the 
management of state assets, calling constantly for industrial upgrading and 
promotion of the international competitiveness of SOEs. An example of this are 
the Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the State-owned 
Assets of Enterprises, which aim to “promote the strategic adjustment of the 
layout and structure of the state-owned economy.......” (State Council 2003, 
No.378). Similar orders can be seen in the Guiding Opinions of the General 
Office of the State Council on Promoting the Structural Adjustment and 
Restructure of Central SOEs (State Council 2016, No.56) which “.......promote 
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the reform and restructuring of the central SOEs to optimize the distribution of 
state capital......and to push forward the industrial upgrading of assets”.  
 
In his theory of ‘causal relations linking state intervention with rapid economic 
growth’, Chalmers Johnson (Woo-Cumings 1999,2) challenges the western 
neoclassical economic idea of seeing free trade, lower protection, a free labor 
market, high interest rates and conservative government budgeting as the five 
main factors in Taiwan’s rapid economic growth (Wade 1990,52). The problem 
now moves from whether the state should intervene, since the late-industrialized 
countries have seen significant government intervention, to the challenge of 
finding a mixture of state intervention and market orientation that provides a rapid 
and effective industrialization of the country (Öniş 1991,110). The East Asian 
Miracles that took place drew fundamentally on ‘activist industrial, trade and 
technology policies by the state’ (Chang 2006,49). South Korea’s case certainly 
demonstrates the importance of the state’s strategic intervention in development. 
Amsden (1989) emphasizes the Korean state’s role in directing capital into 
particular industries and selected groups of companies, rather than depending on 
market rationality. At the same time, the Korean government imposed a strict 
supervision mechanism to guarantee the efficiency of the allocated resources, 
which Öniş (1991, 113) defines as a dual policy of support and discipline by the 
South Korean government.  
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The fundamental characteristic of East Asian development is to prioritize 
industrialization, rather than maximizing profitability based on a country’s current 
comparative advantages according to market rationality (Öniş 1991, 110). Lin 
(2014) calls for the government to take a role, but holds a different view, believes 
that a catching-up state’s central government should follow its comparative 
advantages in order to achieve economic growth. He conceptualizes the 
framework of the “new structural economy” and argues that, from eighteenth 
century Western European countries to the most recent example of China, the 
government’s positive role in promoting industrial upgrading and diversification 
can be seen in almost every successful catching-up economy in the world. The 
way in which state policy changes in order to achieve development varies over 
time; but state policy should have a determining role in policies deployed for 
development purposes.  
 
It is also worth emphasizing the state’s control over key resources, such as 
finance. Wade (1990) notes Taiwan’s strategy of government direction of capital 
accumulation and investment towards a small number of key industries, which 
has made them competitive in the international market (Stubbs 2009,2). The 
government’s capacity to apply strict control over the financial system (Öniş 1991, 
113) can, in fact, enable the state to impose its industrial plans. One of the 
strengths of the East Asian developmental state model is companies’ high debt-
to-equity ratio and high investment. The potential for financial instability has been 
reduced due to the close and long-term interlinking of government, banks and 
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firms (Wade 2000,98).  The question is, to what extent can we identify a causal 
relationship between the state controlled financial system and economic growth 
in China’s transitional economy period.  
 
In the Chinese context, where the financial system has been heavily influenced 
by the state, the state has had the flexibility to mobilize financial resources in 
order to provide sufficient support for the development of the state sector. The 
four big banks, namely the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China, are 
owned by the state, which shows that the Chinese state retains a powerful 
position in the financial system. Breslin (2014, 997) identifies the role of the 
financial and banking system in facilitating the Chinese state’s control over 
capital allocation to preferred industrial sectors. He further adds that, although 
vigorous reform of banks has taken place since 1994, banks should still be 
acknowledged as a key tool of control by the state. Consequently, due to the 
state sector’s privileged position in the economic structure, Breslin believes 
development was funded by state-owned banks. Other research, however, has 
shown that the lending bias and preferential loans to SOEs by the big four state-
owned banks have been reduced in the recent years. Lardy (2012, 33-36) notes 
that the Chinese government’s 4 trillion RMB stimulus program through the 
People’s Bank of China did not reinforce the state’s power at the expanses of the 
market and the private sector. The individual businesses and private firms also 
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can access to a large share expanded supply of bank credit as the SOEs 
continued underperformed.  
 
According to Lin, Sun and Wu (2015, 141), there are three interpretations of the 
decline of ownership bias in loan decisions made by the big four banks. One is 
that the 2003 financial reform significantly changed banks’ lending behavior; 
another is that the SOEs achieved better market performance after 2003, so that 
loans were given on a merit base; a third possibility is that bank loans to SOEs 
went through ‘redistribution channels’ to non-SOEs. After all, the 
commercialization of state-owned banks in 1993 gave a positive direction for 
China’s state-owned banks to be less state-directed, and more like a normal 
bank. The big four banks’ listing in Hong Kong is beneficial for them in terms of 
both raising capital and raising standards (Allen et al. 2012 in Breslin 2014, 1001). 
The listing of central SOEs will be discussed in the empirical chapter, because 
the listing activity itself not only shows the lack of internal funding from 
government and state-owned banks, but can also be examined as a supervision 
method in the principal-agent relations between the SASAC and central SOEs. 
 
State control over finance is seen as one of the core factors for the 
developmental state model. Then, discussion of the Asian Financial Crisis is 
unavoidable. Can we attribute the financial crisis to the widely adopted 
developmental state model of economic governance? Neoliberals tend to 
attribute the East Asian Financial Crisis to the high level of state intervention in 
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the economy in the East Asian developmental states. However, Weiss (2000, 38) 
opposes this view and argues that the East Asian Financial Crisis was not 
generated as a result of the developmental state mode of governance. The 
Southeast Asian countries that were badly hit were not developmental states, but 
interventionist ones. The two developmental states that were affected by the 
crisis were Korea and Japan. However, Weiss believes that it was Korea’s 
reduction of its transformative capacity and its neoliberal trend that caused its 
crisis, while Japan’s was more like a self-induced banking crisis. In her earlier 
work on state power and the East Asian Crisis (1999, 337), she points out that it 
is “low domestic transformative capacity”, not a high level of state intervention, 
that “increases vulnerability to international shocks like financial crisis”.  Wade 
(2000, 107) attributes the East Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s not to the 
developmental state model but to the quick opening up of the affected countries’ 
financial systems. This meant that these countries were easily affected by other 
core economies and their governments in the international financial market.  
 
Thus far, this thesis has argued that the developmental state cannot be defined 
only by certain criteria of institutional arrangements or a set of policy settings. As 
the developmental state evolved over time to cope with domestic and 
international challenges, so the conceptualization of the developmental mindset 
is also important in understanding the developmental state (Thurbon 2006, 
11115). The developmental state is known for state intervention through 
preferential policies and favorable loans; but it is also important to notice that 
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developmental state support and subsidies have been decided and granted 
based on performance. Through a complicated but precise supervision 
mechanism, the SASAC has managed to adopt both internal and external 
supervision strategies to manage the national team of central SOEs. A detailed 
document analysis of SASAC-issued regulatory policy papers will be presented 
in the principal-agent chapter. 
 
2.3. Is China a variant of the developmental state?  
 
The above section covers the debate on what makes a developmental state 
function. This section assesses whether China possesses the ten key features of 
the developmental state. China is normally viewed as a developmental state, 
since the Chinese government has prioritized economic growth since the reform 
and opening-up in 1978, which set the cornerstone of China’s developmental 
state path. According to Nolan (2008, 4), for a long time the principal goal for any 
Chinese leadership was to reduce the poverty rate in China. More recently, 
China has started the institutional adjustment of its governance system to 
support its developmental state strategy. Institutional capacity can turn a 
government’s developmentally driven intervention into effective policy outcomes 
(Thurbon 2014, 11). China’s development strategy has constructed a strong 
foundation of institutional settings and series of policies, though the institutional 
settings and policies change frequently. This section starts with an overview of 
the extent to which China fits into the ten main characteristics of the 
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developmental state listed above. It then moves to discussion of the variant of 
the developmental state that China represents and how the changing global 
political economy makes China’s developmental state different from the classical 
developmental states in the 1980s.  
 
Although China’s market reform did not start at the same time as those of the 
classical developmental states, after the Second World War, it was in a similar 
historical situation at the starting point of its developmental state. After the end of 
the war, China experienced the Great Leap Forward, between 1958-1960, and 
the even more tragically, the Cultural Revolution, from 1966-1976. China’s 
history of wars and revolutions left it a weak society. Then, the weak society met 
a communist government that was “strong, authoritarian, developmentally 
oriented and interventionist.” (Gore 2014,320). Similarly to Taiwan, which was an 
authoritarian state under the National Party’s control at the same time, it was a 
corporatist developmental state (Wade 1990, 228). The years of political turmoil 
had given China a similar latecomer position and a relatively authoritarian 
political system (Stubbs 2009, 2) to fit into the developmental state model. Nolan 
(2008, 8) develops this argument on the causal relations between political 
democracy and economic development, pointing out that there is hardly any 
example that shows a country that has had its income rate increased from low to 
medium under political democracy.  
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Similar to the classical developmental states, China has various security threats 
including, but not limited to, territorial disputes with Russia and India, and the 
internal security threat from Tibet and Xinjiang. The Chinese government also 
has to deal with cross-strait disputes with Taiwan, as well as disputes over ocean 
territories with many neighboring countries. This makes the social and economic 
situation of China similar of that of the post-war developmental states. China’s 
determination to catch up with the advanced western economies is strong. The 
state also gives high priority to economic development because economic 
performance is one of the sources of the legitimacy of the authoritarian 
government.  
 
Another significant aspect China’s situation is that the Chinese central state has 
a strong state capacity for achieving developmental goals, as illustrated by the 
continuous growth of GDP over the past 30 years. It is also able to intervene in 
the economy strategically and adjust policies as needed, which studies by 
Heilmann (2008, 12) identify as experimental-based policymaking. Furthermore, 
the Chinese state has aimed to move from labor-intensive industries to techno-
advanced industries. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) 
of China issues industrial development plans every five years to promote the 
upgrading of Chinese industries to a higher value. For example, the state council 
issued Industrial Transformation and Upgrading Plan 2011-2015 (State Council 
2011, No. 47), and also the MIIT issued Made in China 2025, which announced a 
state strategy for advancing industrialization (MIIT 2016, 433).  
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We shall now move on to consider the state’s control over key resources, such 
as finance. The Chinese government maintains close supervision in the financial 
market, and the big four banks, namely, the Bank of China, the China 
Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the 
Agricultural Bank of China are all owned by the state. Although financial reform 
and the commercialization of state-owned banks has taken place since 1993, the 
state’s influence on these banks should not be underestimated. Regarding state 
support and subsidies to industries and SOEs, the subsidies have been given on 
a performance basis. In the management of central state-owned assets, the 
government’s rigorous assessment and requirements of central SOEs has shown 
that preferential policies and loans (if any) have been given based on market 
performance.  
 
Institutions such as the MITI, which triggered the Japanese miracle, can be found 
in the Chinese context too. A similar body is the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT), which is in charge of China’s industrial 
development and upgrading; and there is the National Development Reform 
Committee (NDRC), which is in charge of economic development and reform, 
and which issues licenses to new industrial projects. However, the difference is 
that China also has a pilot agency in many different sectors, and this thesis 
explores the role of the SASAC as the pilot agency that leads the growth of the 
central state-owned sector. Another criterion for a developmental state is the 
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meritocratic nature of the central government bureaucracy. A likely explanation 
for this in the Chinese context is that China’s nation-wide public servant entry test 
for central state institutions has only around a 1.2% acceptance rate, which may 
be sufficient to construct an elite bureaucracy. Likewise, the developmental state 
requires the bureaucracy to have an external institutional link with organized 
economic actors (Öniş 1991, 111). Apparently, China’s central SOEs are the 
most influential economic players in each industrial sector, and this means they 
can provide information that enables the SASAC to have a better understanding 
of the market. Also by joining market competition, the central SOEs can serve as 
an information-gathering point and can be actively involved in industrial 
associations.   
 
As discussed in the introductory section of this chapter, there are four key 
features that may challenge China’s status as a member of the developmental 
state group. One is China’s continental-size territory, in which governance 
difficulties, for example, central-local relations and the decentralization and 
recentralization of decision-making powers, have occurred. However, the size of 
the territory can bring a larger market into operation on the Chinese mainland, to 
the benefit of the country’s industrial growth, which is highly concentrated in the 
eastern area. Another crucial change is that the twenty-first-century global 
political economic environment has changed greatly from what existed 30 years 
ago. Cumings (1984) argued that the key to the success of the classic 
developmental states had been the support of US policy. The US had tolerated 
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these countries’ import substitutions and opened its market to them without 
demands for commensurate access to their markets.  America’s Japan policy 
after the Second World War had marked a key turning point and fundamental 
change in the geopolitics of North East Asia. The Korean War had won South 
Korea and Taiwan an ironclad commitment of American defense from 
communism. “Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have been protected markets 
dependent upon American grain, among which Japan is ultra dependent on the 
US” (Cumings 1984, 20-25). Thus Cummings believed the developmental 
successes of the classic developmental states were historically and regionally 
specific.  
 
The world situation China is facing today is nothing like that facing the classic 
developmental states in the 1980s. Horesh and Lim (2017, 437) see China as a 
“Chinese variant of the East Asian developmental state”, with its goal being to 
“secure freedom to engage the global system of capitalism while keeping intact 
its primary domestic focus of state-led development”. This leads to the third 
crucial difference, which is China’s full integration into the global market. Ha-joon 
Chang (2003, 24) notes in many of his works that virtually all countries currently 
considered as developed actively used state intervention in protecting infant 
industries, promoting industrial growth, and developing trade and technology in 
their catch-up periods. That is, state planning, mercantilism and protectionism 
are characteristics unique to East Asian countries. These forms of state 
intervention in leading industrial growth could also be found in Britain in the 18th 
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century, and similarly in America’s economic path before its later 20th century 
prosperity (Horesh and Lim 2017, 438). Besides, the Communist Party maintains 
its position, following the elimination of the orthodox planned economy, through 
the process of industrial modernization. Johnson describes China’s communist 
power as a “specific nationalist movement” (Woo-Cumings 1999, 7). All in all, the 
developmental state theory is one that draws upon the development experiences 
of newly industrialized countries. As I argued earlier in the chapter, China’s 
economic policymaking has both state-led and market-led characteristics. There 
is no common definition of what constitutes a developmental state. Furthermore, 
there are also many interpretations of developmental state theory and practices 
in China, whether these relate to a local area or to a particular industrial sector. 
These interpretations again give rise to a series of discussions on whether China 
is or is not a developmental state. For example, Heilmann and Melton (2013, 617) 
refuse the East Asian developmental state interpretation of China but see it as 
“recombined governance based on loosely institutionalized, malleable, and 
adaptive policy processes”. A developmental state should not be defined by a list 
of policies. Moreover, as Chen (2016, 77) points out, the common characteristic 
of these debates is that a “developmental state seems to be considered a 
desirable policy paradigm that political leaders have intended to pursue”. This 
echoes my previous discussion on the developmental state mindset in achieving 
industrialization to catch up with the West.  
  
The question this thesis intends to explore is whether the Chinese government is 
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achieving the goal of revitalizing its central state-owned enterprises through a 
developmental state strategy. Since the central SOEs are operating as the 
“lifeline of the economy”, as Weiss and Hobson (1995, 244) argue, 
“Institutionalized collaboration between policy-makers and industrialists lies at the 
root of state capacity and thus national competitiveness, in the modern word”. 
These authors emphasize the state’s success in terms of the infrastructural 
power and industrial performances it has achieved. The infrastructural power 
refers to the state’s capacity to mobilize resources for developmental ends, which 
is increased by public-private collaboration. This is particularly significant when 
we look at Japan’s economic growth (Weiss and Hobson 1995, 168). Zhu (2018, 
198) sees how the East Asian late developers “stressed government-business 
cooperation governed by the developmental state”. The Communist countries, on 
the other hand, represent an extreme version of organizational power in terms of 
central planning systems. So, to what extent can the Chinese government’s 
policy paradigm in governing these CSOEs contribute to China’s economic 
development? Most importantly, the rise of market forces and the flow of foreign 
capital into China has created a highly competitive market. The rise of market 
competition is an irreversible trend to which the central SOEs have to become 
accustomed. In the next section, I will discuss the rise of market forces in China 
and how the Chinese state has been using the market as a governing strategy to 
reactivate the ossified legacy of Leninism. I shall also argue that privatization is 
not the only solution to stop the foundering of SOEs, as we can see from the 
massive failure of such experiments in Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
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Contrary to the neoliberal idea that rejects the possibility of state planning for 
economic development and encourages the privatization of state-owned assets 
(Birch and Mykhnenko 2010, 3), China’s developmental experiences provide an 
example that opposes such a claim. This thesis argues that with strong state 
capacity, proper supervision and adequate positive and negative incentives, 
SOEs have in recent decades been able to increase their short-term gains and, 




2.4. The emergence of market forces in China. How does it affect the 
developmental state?  
 
As discussed above, I argue that China can best be understood as a variant of 
developmental state. The developmental state model is effective in explaining 
central government’s management of state-owned enterprises. In the next 
chapter, by adopting the principal-agent theory as the analytical tool for this 
thesis, we shall discuss the dilemma caused by central government’s strict 
supervision mechanisms, and the profit managerial autonomy can bring. We 
shall argue that the evaluation of central SOEs’ performance largely rests on 
business performance and the financial indicators of a company’s revenue, 
profitability and return on assets. If central SOEs are evaluated based on their 
competitiveness as a business entity, does this mean that China also recognizes 
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the positive results that market mechanisms can bring? This leads to a 
discussion of China’s increasing involvement in the global market, and the nature 
of market competition. To what extent is China embracing marketization? Should 
we attribute China’s success to state-led development or the rise of private 
sector? This section starts with a literature review of marketization. It then moves 
on to a discussion of the emergence of market competition in China and how that 
has affected SASAC’s governing strategy in managing its Central SOEs. It 
argues that the Chinese state has adopted market mechanisms to facilitate the 
growth of its Central SOEs. In this context, the market, rather than being seen as 
an abstract notion, can be viewed as an institution. The government has taken 
the decision to govern central SOEs through the market to achieve economic 
success.  
 
Open door to the market 
 
Zhu Tianbiao (2018, 199) argues that China’s ending up on the Soviet side and 
embracing an extreme form of central planning in the Cold War was an historical 
contingency, and one consequence of this was an extreme form of government-
business relations. The break between the Soviet Union and China in the 1960s 
meant that China and the US had mutual interests, which later led to China’s 
incorporation into the world trading system. After being incorporated into the 
international system, the Chinese state gave up its central planning system; but it 
did not want to completely surrender to a free market economy, and it has been 
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struggling to guide the process of economic development.   As Breslin (2017) 
explains, China’s economic development is actually part of deregulating 
processes. The deregulation here can be understood as being less ideological, 
more experimental, more practical, and more development-oriented. It has 
moved from the extreme of central planning to its current situation in which 
private capital is allowed to flourish and contribute to tax revenues and 
employment. China has broken through the communist ideological limitations and 
is determined to pursue rapid economic development, while maintaining socio-
political stability. Its top-down state intervention undoubtedly assists rapid 
economic growth (McNally 2008a, 117). China does not reject the idea of the 
market mechanism in resource allocation. In fact, it is the Chinese government 
that has loosened its control and made the market appear as it is today. Polanyi 
is correct when he talks of the market mechanism and argues that “contrary to 
conventional economic wisdom, markets are neither neutral in their distribution 
nor natural in their origins” (Blyth 2002, 3). Market competition has been used 
and market indicators have been adopted as one of the decisive factors in the 
evaluation of central SOEs’ performance. Furthermore, Pearson (2015, 27) 
believes that the growth of state capitalism in China does not conflict with the 
hardline aspect of the government’s ideology; on the contrary, it is recognized as 
a positive factor in strengthening the legitimacy of the one-party state. Changing 
global political and economic conditions, and China’s involvement in the world 
trading system, make it less possible to practice a classical developmental state 
strategy in closing the domestic market to foreign capital.  
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Based on the argument that the market is not neutral, and a self-regulating 
market does not exist, the discussion then moves to focus on the government’s 
role in the dysfunctional market. McNally (2008, 31) offers an analysis of modern 
China and argues that China’s political and economic transition is driven by 
capitalist development, as seen in the UK, the US, Germany and Japan, through 
the “twin processes of urbanisation and industrialisation” (2008, 107). A similar 
argument is made by Pearson (2011, 41), who sees China’s uniqueness 
expressed in the ruling Communist Party’s vague adaptation of capitalism as well 
as its policy moves towards capitalism. She sees China’s state intervention in the 
economy after the global financial crisis as being “ahead of the wave rather than 
the last vestiges of socialism”, and thus as an emerging regulatory system 
(Pearson 2015, 28). However, it is worth acknowledging the fact that China is, 
even today, not a liberal democratic state. Besides, two key factors differentiate 
China from a capitalist country. One is its state ownership; and the other is the 
structure of party control (Pearson, 2011). Oi (2011, 6) supports this idea and 
points out that, although China’s reform, and the privatization of its small and 
medium size SOEs, are sometimes seen as China moving towards the capitalist 
group, the reform was initiated by the state, not the firms themselves, which 





SOEs, Private enterprises and the local government: Is Guanxi important?  
 
The pyramid structure created for central SOEs contains multiple layers, 
reaching right down to the operational companies that conduct their business at 
local level. Also, there are many different actors with various interests who are 
involved in central SOE businesses. Apart from the central state, there are local 
banks, local officials, foreign investors, private firms, and many others. As 
Lampton (2014, 90) rightly notes “China is not one voice.” China’s policy-making 
system has become increasingly complex and fragmented. This has presented a 
major policy-making challenge for the multiple actors positioned across China’s 
administration system, and has caused coordination problems among them, 
leading to equivocation over decisions throughout the system. Unresolved 
decisions wait until they reach the overloaded top leaders, who, although they 
have the power to decide, have only limited information (Lampton 2015,766). Xu 
(2017,98) provides a similar picture in his analysis of the competition among 
central agencies with regard to overseeing one particular central SOE--the State 
Grid Corporation of China. Xu argues that central agencies such as the SASAC, 
NDRC and SERC have different interests and perceptions. They will reach 
agreement on managing the State Grid only when there is a shared interest 
among them, or the “top leaders” intervene. Top leaders at the central level make 
the most important decisions in China. On the other hand, principal central 
bureaus, their local branches and local governments have an enormous capacity 
to make independent decisions in actual practice.  
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Apart from offering local government the capacity to make decisions and adjust 
policies based on local conditions, China’s policy of fiscal decentralization has 
strongly incentivized local government to support market-oriented economic 
reform. According to the fiscal revenue-sharing system, lower-level governments 
have to submit a fixed proportion of their fiscal revenues to the level of 
government above them, retaining the remainder for their own budget（Nee and 
Opper 2007,103). The cadre evaluation system imposes heavy pressures on 
local government officers to promote economic development. However, such 
evaluation focuses on only a few economic indicators, such as GDP, and can 
lead to uneven development, inequality and social instability (Zhan 2013,96). 
Having acknowledged that economic indicators are local government’s and local 
cadres’ priority, the assumption of SOEs is that strong political capital puts them 
in a superior position in business; while private enterprises are operating in a 
more difficult situation and the success they achieve is more vulnerable. 
However, the value of political connections varies among different industries.  
 
Nee and Opper (2007, 111) argue that entrepreneurs whose businesses are in 
the free market sectors are not interested in playing the game of politics, 
whereas entrepreneurs whose businesses are in highly regulated sectors are 
likely to invest more effort in building personal connections with government 
officers. This argument is based on the extensive interviews these researchers 
carried out in the Yangzi Delta. In fact, the advantages of political capital and 
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political connections are particularly important in state dominated markets, such 
as the credit market, and in acquiring government contracts. In competitive 
markets, firms’ political capital cannot guarantee a positive payoff. Zhu and Wu’s 
(2018，175-177) research supports this view. They find that private firms in 
industries which rely more on government support, for example through 
government policies or licenses for state-controlled resources, are more likely to 
be actively engaged in formal politics. Private entrepreneurs in industries such as 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, energy and construction have more political 
connections and are more interested in building strong ties with government 
officials, while entrepreneurs working in industries like science and technology 
and social services have the lowest degree of political connection. Zhu and Wu’s 
findings also reveal that private enterprises’ strong ties with government in 
sectors such as real estate and mining should not be underestimated, because 
these enterprises rely on state-controlled resources and favorable government 
policies. This shows that the decentralization and privatization of economic 
activities in China’s path to marketization have led to a decline in the value of 
political connections in the marketized sectors, which also promotes the creation 
of a rational-legal bureaucracy. An increase in the competitiveness of a market 
sector will be accompanied by the declining value of political capital in that sector 
(Nee and Opper 2010, 2128-2132). 
 
All in all, the global political and economic environment provides an entirely 
different situation for China today than the one faced by the classic 
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developmental states 40 years ago. Developmental state theory views the state 
as the key engine for achieving development goals, whereas neoliberal ideas 
contend that a market-led mechanism of resource allocation is the most effective 
way to achieve industrialization. (Payne and Phillips 2014, 93). By engaging in 
the global political economy, China’s series of political acts, from “reform and 
opening up” to the warm welcome it gave to foreign capital, to the establishment 
of private enterprises, to joining the WTO, shows that the Chinese state has 
sought a balancing point between state and market. So, how has the emergence 
of the market in China accelerated China’s developmental state path?  
 
 
2.5. Managing central SOEs: from a developmental state perspective 
 
The previous sections explained and analyzed the many aspects of the 
developmental state and its relationship with neoliberalism. The following 
sections focus the discussion on managing central SOEs from a developmental 
state perspective; the Chinese government’s determination to hold onto ‘the 
lifeline of the economy’; and its official discourse, which describes central SOEs 
as “the eldest son of the People’s Republic of China”. Economists tend to praise 
the efficiency with which the market, trade, privatization and the labor force have 
moved from agriculture to industrial production. State ownership of investment 
and production is seen as a non-important factor in China’s implementation of 
developmental state policies (Knight 2014,1341). However, the Chinese 
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government’s determination in maintaining central government control of SOEs 
and its motivation in building a strong team of central SOEs to compete in the 
domestic and global markets is based on a developmental state logic. Two years 
after the SASAC’s establishment, its aim was to deepen reform by “using the 
reform of the state assets management system to promote the reform of SOEs” 
(Li 2004). An example can be seen in the SASAC 2006 version (No.16 [expired]) 
of the Interim Measure for the Supervision and Administration of Investments by 
Central Enterprises, which decrees in Article 6 (1) that the enterprise’s 
investment has to follow the principle of complying with national development 
strategy and industrial policy. In the latest revised version of this measure 
(SASAC 2017, No.34), this principle was eliminated. However, this does not 
mean there has been a decrease of government power in regulating these 
enterprises. The 2017 version pays more attention to the SASAC’s role as the 
investor, and focuses on the supervision of CSOEs through the investment 
process. The above characteristics make it possible to analyze China through the 
theoretical lens of the developmental state. Under the strong influence of 
globalization and neoliberalism, China has partially adopted neoliberalism while 
rejecting the ideology. Unlike the widely criticized way in which governments 
have picked winners in the classical developmental states, the SASAC adopts 
market criteria to evaluate and assess its central SOEs’ performance, thus 
ensuring that subsidies and preferential policies are allocated on a merit base. 
For a long time, the state sector has been seen as an obstacle that held back 
industrial growth and the reform process in China.  
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Under the direction of the SASAC, through years of merger and acquisition, 
China’s central SOEs have either gained oligopolistic status and competed with 
their oligopolistic counterparts; or they have managed to be in one of the top 
three positions in the competitive sectors. Consequently, the central SOEs have 
performed strongly in raising revenue and profits that have made them powerful 
enough to confront competition from the global market and the inflow of foreign 
capital and products. China’s official political discourse asserts that contemporary 
China is practising ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ which, although far 
different from orthodox socialism, provides flexibility and a plausible position from 
which the government can adopt western capitalist policies (Kennedy 2011,9). 
China’s ambiguous attitude towards the theory and ideology in Western political 
science, alongside its partial acceptance of neoliberalism, has formed a political 
economy model that has not been designed or led by economists or political 
economists in the Anglo-Saxon world. China’s constantly adjustable political 
economic policies have formed a developmental state model that coincidentally 
uses neoliberalism as its tool in the pursuit of economic development. The core 
of a successful developmental state lies in its institutional setting. In the Chinese 
context, the SASAC is an institution that serves as a pilot agency leading the 
central SOEs down the developmental state path, and this will be discussed in 
separate chapter later.  
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Developmental state characteristics can be identified in China’s governance of 
SOEs ever since the economic reform started, in the 1980s, and private 
enterprises gained a legal position. Naughton (1995, 1090) raises the subject of 
a new ‘de facto division of labor’ between growing investment from non-state 
companies in competitive sectors and state-, especially central state-, dominated 
investment in not-fully-competitive sectors. In terms of profitability, private 
enterprises have easily outperformed SOEs in competitive sectors, while at the 
same time, there has been a need for increased investment by government in 
public goods and infrastructure development. As a consequence, the state’s 
investment has largely been allocated to infrastructure and strategic industrial 
sector development. After that, SOEs, in particular, central SOEs, have been 
recognized as a ‘pillar’ of the economy, in serving the national strategy (State 
Council 2016 No. 56). Political continuities have enabled the SOEs to offset the 
impact of imported neoliberal ideology since reform and opening up. During the 
years of institutional change, central government even established a new 
institution to exert its forceful political power in lifting the profile of central SOEs. 
This view contrasts with that of Beeson (2009, 37), who argues that China’s 
socialist ideology restrains powerful political SOEs as problematic and 
representing an obstacle to future reform. In fact, China’s management of central 
state assets follows a market standard and uses market criteria to assess the 
performance of central SOEs. A ‘grasping the big, letting go the small’ policy gets 
rid of the majority of low-efficiency SOEs with their surplus staff. Besides, since 
the SASAC’s establishment, its assessment of the operational performance of 
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people in charge (SASAC 2003, No.2) has focused on two major points, which 
are profit and return on assets. The SASAC’s first director, Li (2005), explained in 
an interview with CCTV that “a central SOE has to be in the top three of its 
industry, otherwise, we will get rid of it. The SASAC has also issued “Guidelines 
on Strengthening the Management of CSOEs by Using the Economic Value 
Added” (SASAC General Bureau 2014, No.8) to promote the industrial upgrading 
of central SOEs and increase their competitiveness. In other words, the company 
will be acquired or sold to other businesses, and the senior executives will be 
fired. Certainly, the team of central SOEs, after ten years of the SASAC’s 
administration, are not only the top SOEs in strategic sectors but are also the 
winners in each industry based on the market standard.  
 
As noted above, the government’s strategic intervention, and its capacity in 
carrying out such intervention, is a crucial feature of the developmental state. 
State-industry relations are a determining factor for a successful developmental 
state. “Strategic industrial policy forms a central component of the developmental 
state model” (Öniş 1991,121). The government has its selection of ‘important’ 
industries for import subsidies and export promotions, which challenges the 
fundamental neoliberal doctrine of market liberalization and rationality. So, how 
does the developmental state make sure its industrial policies are implemented 
properly? This makes the examination of the ties between government and 
industries crucial. Evans (1995, 49) addresses the “maze of ties” between the 
Japanese central government and major industries. MITI has constructed an 
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inter-personal coherent network inside its bureaucratic structure that gives it a 
better participation in external work and guarantees its efficiency. Johnson (1999, 
27) points out that one of the fundamental problems of the developmental state is 
the relationship between state bureaucracy and privately-owned businesses. 
This view is supported by Pearson (2011, 40) who argues that “Japan’s industrial 
policies were carried out through comprehensive or sector-specific bureaucracies, 
Japan’s MITI being the archetype.” Yeung (2014, 76) echoes this view by arguing 
that the “highly interventionist and yet controversial industrial policy” is the most 
powerful instrument of the developmental state.  
 
The previous section has shown that a linking of government with enterprises 
can be a positive factor in promoting industrial development. This view is echoed 
by Gomez (2012, 69), who sees the developmental state’s core concern as lying 
in the “nature of state-business ties”, that is in the government’s financial support 
for privately owned enterprises to help them realize industrial modernization. This 
is the characteristic that differentiates China from the classical developmental 
states: a strategy that avoids the formation of big ‘interest groups’ that can 
challenge the Chinese government’s power and efficiency in policy 
implementation, and also keeps the central government distant from lobbying. 
The Chinese government has drawn on Japan and Korea’s experiences and 
mixed these with the remaining part of the communist heritage of state-owned 
enterprises. China uses SOEs, especially central SOEs, to promote economic 
growth and industrial modernization. Through the selection of the board of 
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directors by the SASAC and Central Organization Department, the Chinese 
government also tries to minimize cohesiveness problem, so as to make policy 
implementation processes run more smoothly and efficiently.   
 
The developmental state in China’s central state sector cannot guarantee its 
success only through subsidies to government-picked-winners and preferential 
policies and loans. Leftwich’s (1995, 401) argument fails to acknowledge the 
market side of the developmental state. He argues that “developmental 
objectives have been politically driven” although “political purposes and 
institutional structures of developmental states have been developmentally-
driven”. Wade’s (2010, 155) argument, however, that East Asian industrial policy 
comprises both “leading the market” and “following the market” sounds more 
reasonable. In China’s developmental state model of governing central SOEs, 
market factors are seen as one of the most important factors. The central SOEs 
in free market industries have to be in the top three of their industry to maintain 
their position in the national team. For those who cannot reach the top three in 
their industry, they will be eliminated and absorbed by other central SOEs. 
Central SOEs in monopolistic industries also face government-created 
competition from oligopolistic central SOEs. It is arguable that the Chinese 
government adopts some neoliberal criteria in evaluating central SOEs’ 
performance as well as in making decisions on state support grants.   
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Thus, Thurbon (2016, 35) is correct to argue that the developmental state is the 
most suitable conceptual framework for explaining the East Asia countries’ rapid 
economic success and industrial upgrading from labor intensive industries to 
more skilled ones. It is the most suitable theoretical tool for examining China’s 
rapid success in raising its national team of central SOEs from being a major 
drain on the economy to being globally competitive firms. Not only do central 
SOEs achieve good market performance, but they also fulfill other roles. Central 
SOEs operate in many different areas of the domestic arena and sometimes 
carry out roles of social responsibility on behalf of the government, especially 
when an environmental disaster happens. Central SOEs are in a leading position 
in industry, so they can provide a general overview of industry to government, 
which contributes to efficient policy making by the latter. Central SOEs also offer 
an experimental field on which the government can test its proposed measures. 
To create adequate supervision of these central SOEs, the Chinese government 
has even set up a pilot agency that has gathered together fragmented aspects of 
power from other central government institutions to focus its developmental state 
strategy on the management of central SOEs. The institutional settings of the 
central state ownership system and the interactions among the SASAC, the 
central SOEs and other institutions will be analyzed in the empirical chapters of 
the thesis.  
 
Developmental states vary in terms of their policies and institutional settings. 
Although close ties between large private sector enterprises and the government 
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were seen in the case of Japan and South Korea, in Taiwan, a large public 
enterprise sector remained in control of the commanding heights of the 
Taiwanese economy (Wade 2010, 155). The Chinese government’s methods in 
promoting development have been ideologically light, and thus instrumental and 
pragmatic. It has partially adopted neoliberalism, while rejecting neoliberal 
ideology. It does not practice one ‘ism’, but rather it conducts a mixture of 
ideologically free methods in its economic development processes. It adopts 
neoliberal criteria to evaluate, assess, supervise, motivate and eventually 
strengthen central SOEs using a developmental state logic. Thurbon and Weiss 
(2006, 18) define both the inward and outward FDI of South Korea and Taiwan 
as driven by strategic considerations relating to the developmental state. They 
argue that it is “less a matter of protecting domestic firms and their market share 
from technologically superior foreign competitors, and more about pushing 
domestic firms to cooperate with - and even to acquire - foreign corporations.” 
The SASAC also issues orders to regulate central SOEs’ foreign investment, to 
encourage these companies to increase their global competitiveness, for 
instance, the Measure for the Supervision and Administration of Investments 
outside China by Central Enterprises (SASAC 2017, No.35), revised, and based 
on 2012 order No.28. Therefore, this thesis argues that China being a 
continental-sized country, the application of the developmental state concept 
varies in different regions, provinces, sectors and industries. In the management 
of the central state-owned sector, China is on a developmental state path. 
China’s central SOEs are operating in every strategic sector and in leading 
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positions in non-strategic industrial sectors. The SASAC functions as the pilot 
agency on which the management of central state-owned sectors centers. This 
section not only provides a fresh analysis of the growth of China’s state sector 
but, more importantly, it fills a gap in the literature of the developmental state 
theory and its application to China.  
 
China’s authoritarian government has taken an economic decision to create 
highly efficient policy implementation processes that are more effective than 
those of liberal democratic countries. As Breslin (2011, 1342) notes, China has 
made national development the priority of its national policy. The Chinese 
government has opted for ‘soft planning’ of its national economic development 
through a state-led growth project. China’s activities also include the protection 
and promotion of its main industrial sectors and economic actors, as well as a 
centralized financial system. This research argues that the Chinese 
government’s determination in maintaining and supporting central SOEs in non-
monopolistic sectors demonstrates a strategy to remedy China’s shortcoming in 
not having globally competitive firms like Japan and Korea. Chinese central 
SOEs' leading position in industry makes it possible for them to influence industry 
regulations and build production standards.  As Kennedy (2011, 133) suggests, 
industry’s influence on China’s policy making has increased significantly. In the 
formulation of economic regulations and laws, big business’s suggestions are 
taken account of, so that despite state ownership this policy making is no longer 
dominated by political elites.  
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Besides, the strong position of central SOEs in industry has, to some extent, built 
an invisible wall to prevent the formation of giant private companies, since the 
Chinese government is unwilling to have regime change or social turmoil caused 
by robust private businesses. In Japan and Korea, private enterprises have had a 
high political impact. It is true that a developmental state is heaven for big 
businesses, given the oligopolistic nature of these industrial groups (Woo-
Cumings 1999,17). Therefore, it is crucial for the Chinese state to help in the 
formation of central SOEs instead of supporting the formation of large privately-
owned businesses. As Tsai (2011, 136-158) suggests, China’s newly formed 
private capitalists are not likely to start promoting massive democratic 
transformation, because of their diversified social, economic and regional 
backgrounds. However, China’s fragmented but influential private entrepreneurs’ 
impact on policy-making should not be neglected, because the class power of 
society has been reconstituted due to a neoliberal transition, albeit one with 
Chinese characteristics (Harvey 2005, 151). However, major political and 
institutional transformations are likely to happen without regime change. Also, as 
Evans believes, the developmental state model has adopted many of the 
characteristics of the embedded autonomy he describes: that is, the state has the 
capacity to implement developmental goals and direct social change. The state’s 
capacity can be exercised through collaborating with business groups and 
directing them towards its economic development plan (Kohli 1999, 132). 
Notwithstanding this, in the case of China, having large business groups like the 
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central SOEs has made it relatively easier for the central government to direct its 
development plan. 
 
It is also worth acknowledging that the power of the central government may also 
be challenged by the decentralized power it shares with local governments, due 
to China’s unique horizontal and vertical lines of administration (the Tiao-Kuai 
relations). Yeung (2014, 92) argues that China’s developmental model has been 
less directed by central planning, due to decentralization programs since the 
1990s which left local authorities large bargaining spaces. It is likely that the 
significant role that local governments play in economic development will 
challenge the central government and make Chinese central government less 
powerful than the governments of other developmental states. However, the 
Chinese central government is still able to intervene in economic activities 
through its half ‘market actor’ half ‘quasi-governmental body’, central SOEs. 
Breslin (2011, 1331) believes in the Chinese state’s power to impose direct 
control in economic activities, unlike the South Korean state, which has chaebols 
as the middle layer in between government and economic enterprises. However, 
the central SOEs’ operational branches also need to negotiate carefully with local 
government for local policy support. This argument will be further expanded in 
later chapters. All in all, Robert Wade (1990, 345) is correct to argue that, even 
though this does not indicate any failure by the market, it is possible for the 





The theoretical framework of this research focuses on the debate on whether 
China is a developmental state and whether neoliberalism has influenced China’s 
developmental state path. The analytical theory of this thesis—the principal-
agent theory –  will be studied in the next chapter. The principal-agent theory 
aims to provide a detailed understanding of how the SASAC regulates and 
supervises central SOEs. The developmental state as a conceptual and 
theoretical term centers on the idea of the state’s ability to direct market forces to 
achieve the state’s developmental goals, based on the post-war development 
experiences of East Asian countries (Gore 2014, 304). Developmental state 
theory is helpful in the search to answer the question of why East Asian countries 
succeeded in their post-war construction and achieved sustainable economic 
growth, while other third-world countries failed to do so.   
 
It should be noted that one of the greatest challenges in understanding the 
political economy of contemporary China is the difficulty of using one single 
western theory to interpret the country’s development path. This is due to its 
continental size, to unequal development among the provinces, and to 
unbalanced growth in different industrial sectors. Although the developmental 
state model is the most discussed one, there are other interpretations. David 
Harvey (2005) sees China as being on a path towards neoliberalism. Margaret 
Pearson (2007) sees China as a regulatory state. After all, the developmental 
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state model is about the state’s determination in prioritizing economic 
development and its capacity to do so through effective institutional settings. 
Central state-owned enterprises are an important component, both good and bad, 
in China’s economic system. However, things may change over time. As Kim 
(1999, 456) notes, the relationship between the Korean state and large business 
groups (Chaebols) experienced a fundamental shift because of economic 
liberalization and the democratic movement. State capacity had largely declined, 
so that it was hard for the Korean government to continue its authoritarian rule, 
and this led to a decrease of the old-style developmental state.  
 
This thesis argues that the developmental state model is a useful theoretical tool 
with which to explain the enormous economic success achieved in their post-war 
recovery by the East Asian countries. It concludes that China’s continental size 
makes it difficult to explain its development using a single theoretical framework, 
such as that of the classical developmental state. Instead, China can arguably be 
seen as offering a kaleidoscopic presentation of a developmental state. The 
developmental state model of economic governance can be found in many 
different regions, sectors and industries in China. The developmental state theory 
is particularly suitable for analyzing the growth of the 102 central SOEs, for which 
the SASAC is the pilot agency which acts as a central point for the management 
of their growth. China is a developmental state and adopts a developmental state 
model of governance in the central state-owned sector of its economy, which 
contributes to the economy’s development and success. The government’s 
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determination and its capacity to make and implement policies has contributed to 
the growth of China’s central-government-owned sector. It is also believed that 
China will continue to advance its support of the central state-owned sector. The 
SASAC is the pilot agency from which the development of central SOEs is 
managed. The central SOEs themselves can also serve as a think-tank, 
providing feedback to government and taking part in policy-making processes. 
The role of central SOEs in China's economic development will be discussed 
further in the empirical chapters. These SOEs also act as an experimental field in 
which to try various industrial policies which will have broader implications for 
China’s development of effective industrial policies that lead the country along its 
developmental state path to industrialization.  
 
The key to building a developmental state lies in its institutional setting and its 
ability to minimize information asymmetry between principal and agent. East Asia 
has proved that institutions can have a positive role in promoting economic 
growth (Haggard 2004,81). A system of multiple supervision mechanisms, 
incentives and punishments have all contributed to the Chinese central 
government’s efforts to promote its national team of central SOEs. As Meisel 
(2008 in Wade 2010, 157) argues, the state's capacity in coordinating institutional 
agents and implementing national development plans is crucial for catch-up 
economies. This chapter has focused on discussion of the developmental state 
and its application to China, and it has also invoked the controversial debate on 
neoliberalism to illustrate how China plans its catch-up functions. All in all, this 
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thesis is about how the state achieves its objectives through the market. The 
state, through an arm’s-length strategy, gives some control to the market. By 
doing so, the state retains and even strengthens its capacity for control. The 
market may be employed by the state. It is not the state or the market that 
predominates: it is how the state uses the market; or we can say it is how the 
state governs through the market.  
 
The keys to understanding of effective twentieth century developmental states 
are bureaucratic capacity and state-society ties. A well-functioning institution can 
bring productive and dynamic economic outcomes (Evans 2008, 18). The 
following chapter moves to a discussion of principal-agent relations in the key 
institution that manages the growth of China’s state-owned enterprises. It adopts 
principal-agent theory as the theoretical lens through which to analyze the 
institutional dynamic of state sector management and answers the question of 
how the government achieves its developmental state objectives. One central 
feature that this thesis identifies is the establishment of the SASAC, which serves 
as the principal institution for China’s central state sector management. The 
Chinese central government’s reassignment of power from various other central 
government institutions to a newly established institution, the SASAC, has helped 
to reduce the multi-principal problems that have challenged SOEs for years. By 
limiting my research to central SOEs directly administrated by the SASAC, rather 
than dealing with the general category of SOEs, I am able to offer a more 
focused discussion. It can be argued that China’s developmental state strategy 
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for building its national team of central SOEs has not only allowed the central 
government to have tight control over key resources but has also had broader 
implications for China’s developmental state path towards achieving 
industrialization. At the same time, its institutional setting contributes to the 
application of principal-agent theory in government-business studies and 
provides new ideas on how to minimize the goal of conflict and how to solve 





















The previous theoretical chapter argued that China is a variant of the 
developmental state and discussed its upward spiraling economic growth, which 
incorporates a seemingly contradictory market mechanism. This argument is 
especially suitable for explaining how China’s group of central SOEs has grown 
significantly since they were first administered by the SASAC in 2003, and why 
the SOEs are not necessarily a drain on state assets. In fact, given an adequate 
supervision mechanism, these enterprises can be competitive and profitable. To 
support a macro-theoretical debate on the developmental state, the principal-
agent theory is adopted as an analytical tool to illustrate institutional interaction. 
Hindmoor (2006b, 134) explains that “the principal agent model is an analytical 
expression of the agency relationship”. The interactions here are not limited to 
principal-agent relations between the principal, the SASAC, and its agent, the 
central SOEs; rather, various other central government institutions that are 
involved in oversight activities are also taken into consideration. As Chang (2007, 
105) has rightly noted, “the principal-agent problem is at the center of the 
neoliberal argument against SOEs.” This chapter builds upon such observations 
and further argues that market standard can be an effective tool with which the 
Chinese government can solve the principal-agent problem between the SASAC 
and the central SOEs. Thus, this theoretical chapter seeks to explain the 
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application of the principal-agent theory to current relations between the SASAC 
and central SOEs. Drawing on Chinese laws, 195 SASAC policy regulations 
issued between 2003 and 2017, in-depth fieldwork interviews and relevant 
secondary literature, this chapter highlights the principal-agent relations between 
the SASAC and central SOEs. It argues that these relations depend first and 
foremost on the government’s innovative and rigorous supervision mechanisms; 
secondly, on its ability to impose and constantly adjust policies; and thirdly, on 
the its new strategy to use the stock market and the interests of third-parties to 
assist the principal. These measures have proved to be the key to explaining 
how central SOEs have performed increasingly well since 2003.   
 
From Fragmented Authoritarianism to the Developmental State  
 
In this thesis, the principal is the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), which acts as a shareholder for central 
SOEs, and which can and does affect central SOEs in many ways. The SASAC 
has recentralized powers which had previously been spread among many other 
ministries, and it can be seen as the most important principal in the state 
ownership management system. However, its status is not as stable and 
powerful as the SASAC itself has claimed. Brødsgaard (2012: 630) argues that 
its policy-making processes are fragmented, which gives more power and 
opportunities to business groups to act according to their own interests. Although 
the SASAC has gathered together previously dispersed powers for the 
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management of state owned assets, there are other government institutions that 
can interfere in the administrative processes.  
 
The built-in conflicts that exist between departments within China’s government 
system are still seen as the one of the unavoidable obstacles to the efficient 
working of enterprises. As part of everyday practice, enterprises in China need to 
go through lengthy application processes to get their projects approved by the 
government. In the years of 2011-2013, on average, applications to the 
government by the enterprises in question numbered 17.67 applications per year, 
with the long waiting time for government approval of a project standing at an 
average of 171.35 days. Enterprises have to interact with an average of 5.67 
governmental departments and go through an average of 9.40 processes to gain 
approval (DRC Enterprise Research Institute 2013 No.147). Therefore, it has 
become important for the government to clarify responsibilities and decrease 
overlapping bureaucratic functions. It is also worth noting an improvement has 
been seen in bureaucratic procedures. Zhu (SHSE/28/2015) points out the 
noticeable delegation of power from the government to the enterprises; for 
example, project application procedures have been shortened and simplified.   
 
China has long been regarded as exhibiting ‘fragmented authoritarianism’, due to 
its economic decentralization process in the early years of reform and opening up. 
According to Lieberthal (1992, 6), there are three dimensions to the study of 
decentralization and centralization: “value integration; structural distribution of 
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resources and authority; and processes of decision making and policy 
implementation”. If, as Liberthal (1992, 8) argues, China’s political system below 
the central government level is “fragmented and disjointed”, Gore (2014, 303) 
also identifies the problem of the application of the developmental state model to 
China, due to its size and the decentralized power held by local governments. 
This kind of fragmented institutional setting can lead to problems like bargaining 
between bureaucracies (Pearson 2007, 727). Indeed, the fragmented 
authoritarian nature of government in China leads to frequent bargaining 
activities in China’s bureaucratic system. The bargaining activities happen 
among bureaus which have significant power to negotiate for resources. The 
fragmented authoritarian system thus encourages the bureaus’ search for 
consensus in the development of major projects (Lieberthal 1992, 9), so it is the 
central government that must meet the challenge of how to align local 
developmental agendas with national strategy through political and economic 
incentives (Lim 2016,431). Although there are many issues that need to be 
coordinated among different governmental actors, the SASAC was founded to 
institutionalize the complex bureaucratic system for the management of state 
assets. It is acknowledged that the SASAC represents the central government’s 
move to transform its state assets system from fragmentation to a coordinated 
developmental state model of economic governance.  
 
Nevertheless, the Chinese government has long been devoted to building 
mechanisms to retain power in central government.  A lively state sector requires 
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not only a market mechanism but also new forms of state oversight (Pearson 
2015, 27). In the old state assets management system, there were tensions 
between various central government agencies and central SOEs. The State 
Council has the authority to establish special institutions to manage any affairs 
that are not well managed by the ministries responsible for institutions (Yang 
2011, 58). The SASAC’s first director, Li (2009), noted that there would have 
been no future development of SOEs if no reform had taken place. The SASAC 
was created to clarify ownership of, and take responsibility for the management 
of, state assets. If the SASAC was appointed to be in charge of the problematic 
state ownership system, then is principal-agent theory the most suitable 
analytical theory to help us understand China’s state ownership system?  
 
As argued in the previous chapter, China is a variant of the developmental state 
with market characteristics. Hailmann (2008; 2009) and Breslin (2011) both note 
that China is going through a period of policy experimentation to pursue a 
gradual economic reform. That is to say, the Chinese government has issued 
laws and regulations based on experiences of both success and failure gained 
through local policy experimentation So, China has employed its top-down 
administrative orders to direct policy experimentation at local level and has 
adopted the experiences and feedback drawn from this top-down method of 
policy experimentation to form and improve the policy that will later be issued to 
the entire country. Thus, it can be argued that policy experimentation and gradual 
market reform activities require a principal with strong capacity and one that can 
 100 
build an effective mechanism to supervise, manage and evaluate agent activities. 
Therefore, the principal-agent theory has been adopted to examine the relations 
between the principal, the SASAC, and the agent, the CSOEs. The 
characteristics of asymmetry of information and conflict of interests can be found 
in all principal-agent relations. If the principal is a rational actor, it will adopt some 
methods to mitigate these problems through administrative controls and 
oversight procedures (Moe 1984, 761). The discussion will then move to ex  ante 
and ex post control, as well as to police patrol and fire alarm oversight 
mechanisms. There are many scholars who have done this before; and 
discussions of the practice in western contexts are found in the work of 
McCubbins (1984; 1987; 1989; 1994), Pollack (1997; 2006; 2007), Tallberg 
(2002; 2006) and Waterman (1998; 2004a; 2004b). This chapter expands the 
understanding of principal-agent theory into the Chinese context. It also serves 
as a bridge that links the grand theoretical debate with the empirical chapters in 
the second half of this thesis.  
 
There are, admittedly, intrinsic problems embedded in rational choice theory. Hay 
(2004, 46) criticizes the simplistic assumptions that rational choice theorists 
make based on modeling. The problematic aspect of rational choice is its 
assumption that any actor’s actions are based on the choice of utility 
maximization in a given institutionalized scenario (Hay and Wincott 1998, 952 
and Hay 2011, 66). Furthermore, rational choice theorists fail to acknowledge the 
complexity and contingency of the political system (Hay 2004, 39). They tend to 
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focus on the power of choice the actors have, and the seemingly everlasting 
game of choice, rather than on the power of the state or the power of the 
structure (Blyth, Helgadottir and Kring 2016, 148 and Smith 2009, 32).  
 
Even given the flaws in rational choice theory, I still think principal-agent theory is 
the most appropriate one for analyzing how the SASAC supervises CSOEs, for 
the following reasons. Central SOEs cannot define ‘utility maximization’ in this 
context based on their interests. Instead, the developmental state has its pilot 
agency, the SASAC, to visualize the goals that both the principal and the agent 
should have. That is to say, according to the macro plan driven by the 
developmental state model, the pilot agency is appointed, to be precise, to limit 
the scope of ‘utility maximization’. Moreover, as argued in the previous chapter 
about state strategy in governing through the market, principal-agent theory here 
allows me to explore how the SASAC could use market and, most importantly, 
market indicators as a tool to promote the growth of central SOEs.  
 
While the existing literature rarely adopts the principal-agent theory in discussing 
China, Chen (2016, 89-102) uses the principal-agent theory in the study of 
central-local relations in the making and implementation of renewable energy 
policy in China. He uses the principal-agent lens to argue against the notion of 
decartelization and fragmentation of China’s governance system. His research 
context – that of governing renewable energy in China – can also be explained 
by the above understanding of having central government establish a goal to 
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‘visualize’ the concept of the undefined and sometimes ambiguous assumptions 
of ‘utility maximization’. This chapter argues strongly against Jones and Zou 
(2017, 7) who believe that “there is no single ‘principal’ with a clear goal that 
could be imposed upon SOEs”. In fact, they fail to examine the various roles the 
SASAC plays and the powerful status it has in the management of central SOEs. 
Besides, there is no causal relationship between central SOEs’ overseas 
expansion in pursuit of market interests and the SASAC’s diminishing power to 
control and supervise them. This point will be analyzed further in the following 
chapters.  
 
This chapter consists of four main sections. It starts with a theoretical literature 
review of publications on the analytical theory of this thesis—the principal-agent 
theory, its origins, assumptions and debates. From the second part onwards, the 
discussion moves to the detailed analysis of the oversight mechanism under the 
circumstances of conflict goals and asymmetric information between the principal 
and the agent. This is followed by an analysis of the two oversight mechanisms 
that are discussed here—police patrol oversight and fire alarm oversight. In the 
fourth part, ex ante and ex post supervision mechanisms will be addressed, as 
well as the incentives and constraints agents to have to follow their principal’s 
line. The debate on principal-agent theory will be blended with extensive 
empirical evidence that includes the application of principal-agent theory to the 
Chinese central state’s management of central SOEs. Administrative procedures 
(ex ante), like laws and government regulations, and oversight mechanisms (ex 
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post) will be addressed. The argument is that the SASAC is the primary principal 
in the supervision system, but other institutions that conduct surveillance 
activities should not to be underestimated. There is the Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
which has final control over finance-related activities, and the Organisation 
Department of the CCP, which is the most important character in the CCP 
nomenklatura system. Besides these, there is the significant role that the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has played since Xi Jinping took 
office, as well as the rising importance of the National Audit Office (NAO). It is 
worth noting that although significant, these ministries and institutions should not 
be defined as multi-principals of the agent (CSOEs). The chapter also discusses, 
most importantly, the market’s role in assisting the state (principal) to supervise 
its central SOEs (agent) effectively.  
 
This chapter provides a novel understanding of the mechanisms of principal-
agent theory. As discussed in the previous chapter, the management of central 
state assets has followed a developmental state model. The crucial feature that 
drives the developmental state from rags to riches is its highly efficient 
institutions. The principal-agent theory in political science was further developed 
with rational choice institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalism is part of a 
new institutionalism set of ideas that takes institutions into account in the 
understanding of political activities. Hay (2002, 11) suggests that the key 
contribution new institutionalism makes to political science is to “acknowledge the 
crucial mediating role of institutions in shaping political conduct and translating 
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political inputs into political outcomes.” Therefore, this chapter adopts the 
principal-agent theory to help explain the SASAC’s way of promoting the 
developmental state path for the growth of central SOEs. It seeks to answer the 
following sub-questions of the thesis:  
 
1. How does the principal (SASAC) regulate its agents (CSOEs)?  
 
2. Which government institutions are involved in the supervision mechanisms?  
 
3. What kinds of oversight mechanism are practiced in the conducting of 
supervision? Are these mechanisms sufficient? 
 
The following figure shows the basic principal-agent relations of the State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) and the 102 central groups. The State 
Council is the principal, and the SASAC is the agent; the SASAC is the principal, 
and the central SOE groups are the agents. The principal-agent relations 
between the State Council (principal) and SASAC (agent) are based on state 
power, laws and government regulations—the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises [effective] (2009 Order No. 5 of 
the President of the PRC). In Article 3, it reads, “State-owned assets shall be 
owned by the state, i.e. owned by the whole people. The State Council shall, on 
behalf of the state, exercise ownership of state-owned assets.” The law further 
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clarifies the SASAC’s authority over state-owned enterprises by describing it as a 
ministerial-level institution under the direction of the State Council. Here is what it 
says in Article 11: “The state-owned assets supervision and administration body, 
under the State Council......according to the provisions of the State Council, shall 
perform the contributor’s functions for state-invested enterprises on behalf of, 
and on the authorization of, the corresponding people’s government.” It can be 
seen from this clause in the law that the SASAC is one of the State Council’s 
direct operational arms in the management of state assets. Therefore, a possible 
assumption is that there have not been many principal-agent problems between 
the State Council and the SASAC, as one is the operational arm of the other. 
Thus, this thesis focuses on discussion of principal-agent relations between the 
SASAC and the central SOEs. Figure 3.1. presents the structure of basic 
principal-agent relations. Detailed figures and analysis of the principal-agent 
relations between the SASAC and the central SOEs, as well as of other relevant 





Figure 3.1,  Principal-agent relations among the State Council, the SASAC and 
central SOEs. Drawn up by the author.  
 
This chapter provides three innovation points in the theoretical discussion. First 
and foremost, China’s principal-agent mechanisms build on the checks and 
balances idea of supervision. The police patrol oversight mechanism is not 
conducted by a single police team but by many different teams of police. Teams 
of police regulate its patrol activities, in turn adopting a ‘wheel war’ strategy. 
These rotating wheel wars of supervision not only provide continuous oversight 
of agents but also unintentionally perform ‘cross-check’ supervision among 
different inspection teams. In the monitoring of central SOEs, the police patrol 
‘wheel war’ teams include, but are not limited to: 1. An inspection team sent by 
the SASAC; 2. A central inspection team dispatched by the Central Commission 
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for Discipline Inspection (CCDI); 3. An accounting team sent by the China 
National Audit Office (NAO).  
 
The second innovative point is that the police patrol is conducted on a dual track 
of ‘resident on-site’ and ‘short-term inspection’ tours. For example, the SASAC 
sends the Board of Supervisors onto the site of every central SOE’s 
headquarters to serve as a means of police patrol. These Board of Supervisors 
teams are permanently located in the central SOEs, whose meetings they audit 
and whose reports they review.  The SASAC also dispatch inspection teams to 
the central SOEs randomly to conduct oversight activities. The inspection teams 
are sent for regular visits, or because complaint letters sent by a third party as a 
‘fire alarm’ have been received by the SASAC.   
 
Thirdly, this chapter gives a new interpretation of the CCP’s role in the 
management of state assets. The party is too important to be ignored in the study 
of contemporary Chinese political economy. It is widely believed that enterprises 
have the motivation to innovate, whereas the government is stubborn and 
ossified. If this were true, how could the party not to be a negative factor? 
However, the Party can also be seen as the origin of innovative activities, such 
as restructuring institutions and improving regulatory activities. In the democratic 
countries, ruling parties gain legitimacy through elections. However, there is no 
causal relation between democratic government and good governance 
(Fukuyama 2013, 350). Teets (2013, 35) proposes a new concept of ‘consultative 
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authoritarianism’ to understand China’s civil society, and argues that the 
operationally autonomous civil society does not necessarily act as an indicator of 
democratization, but can exist inside an authoritarian regime. The Chinese 
Communist Party legitimizes its rule from sources other than democratic 
elections. Moreover, the party has evolved over time to provide good governance, 
so as to continue economic growth and thus enhance its legitimacy. The 
oversight mechanisms of the principal-agent theory fit with discussion of the 
institutional setting of the Communist Party. The central SOEs used to have two 
people, each taking a separate role: one was the ‘president of the company’, and 
the other was the ‘party secretary’. The SASAC (2017) issued a new regulatory 
call for the top leader of each central SOE to have a dual position in the 
company’s system, taking both the top role of the party secretary and the other 
top role of president or chief executive in the company’s business operation 
system. This clarification not only improves the company’s corporate governance 
structure but also provides a solution to avoid the problem in principal-agent 
relations where the president and the party secretary blame each other for any 
misconduct of the business. The SASAC’s (2017) official discourse of “uphold 
party leadership, strengthen party construction” [In Chinese: 坚持党的领导，加强
党的建设 ] can be interpreted as a method of clarifying responsibilities and 
enhancing the principal’s oversight capacity.  
 
The three principal-agent mechanisms mentioned above are unique to China’s 
central state assets management system. This chapter offers only limited 
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discussion of principal-agent relations and supervisory relations among the 
various institutions and central SOEs. In the chapter that follows, a more detailed 
specific analysis of the SASAC will be presented, dealing with its institutional 
settings, historical background and the variety of roles it plays in managing, 
promoting and supervising the central SOEs.  
 
 
3.2. Theoretical Literature Review  
 
This section aims to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on the 
principal-agent theory, its origins, development and debates.  
 
 
What is the principal-agent theory? Definition: 
 
The principal-agent theory studies the relationship between the principal and the 
agent with the assumption that each has different goals and preferences (Pollack 
2007, 3). The principal-agent relationship has two major characteristics, which 
are: a conflict of goals, and an information asymmetry, between the principal and 
the agent. In the principal-agent relationship, the agent has the advantage of 
more expertise and discretion (Waterman et al. 2004, 66). In this situation, if 
there is also a conflict of goals between the agent and the principal, a typical 
principal-agent model presents itself. The information asymmetry and the conflict 
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of goals certainly create issues in the hierarchy of control, since what is optimal 
for the principal may not suit the interests of the agent.  Meanwhile, the principal 
is unable to gain full sight of the agent’s activities (Moe 1984,757 and Tallberg 
2006, 200). Therefore, there occurs a problem of how to create similar goals so 
as to incentivize the agent to follow the principal’s preferences. The principal-
agent theory also suggests that both the principal and the agent are rational 
actors who seek to maximize their own interests (Waterman and Meier 2004, 20). 
When the principal delegates power to its agent, it can use various administrative 
and oversight mechanisms to limit the behavior of its agent. The principal’s 
control mechanisms aim to minimize the ability of the agent to sidestep the 
principal’s goal (Pollack 1997, 108).  However, every agent has a certain level of 
autonomy, since control mechanisms are costly (Tallberg 2006, 201). This 
degree of discretion allows the agent to be more efficient in the business 
operation and the decision-making processes. Chen (2016, 92) applies the 
principal-agent theory in the study of China’s central-local relations. His 
contribution lies in his explanation, using principal-agent theory, of how the 
central level National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) supervises 
its local agent—the provincial level NDRC. Principal-agent theory in this thesis is 
applied to relations between the government and its central SOEs, which 





The application of principal-agent theory in the study of political science: 
 
The principal-agent model was originally generated from the study of economics 
and management. To begin with, principal-agent relations were discussed in the 
business environment. In the business context, the manager is the principal, and 
the employee is the agent. An employee (agent) is presumed to be lazy, passive 
and always trying to minimize the effort the work requires. The manager 
(principal) needs to motivate the employee (agent) to work. This theory was later 
applied in political science, to examine the relations between politicians and 
bureaucrats. Built on the principal-agent model implemented in the business 
context, the theory assumes that bureaucrats also are passive and calculating 
people who try to avoid work. Cook and Wood (1989, 971) point out the 
shortcomings of this principal-agent assumption. They argue that when principal-
agent relations are the subject of bureaucratic policies, they are not the same as 
in a business context.  
 
According to Kassim and Menon (2003, 122), the application of ‘the new 
economics of organization’ has had a significant impact in political science 
research, in particular, when related to rational choice institutionalism. The ‘new 
economics of organization’ proposed by Moe (1984) provided the toolkit that 
applied economic thinking to the understanding of institutional activities. This is 
useful in the study both of how institutions emerge and evolve, and how they 
interact with each other. Also the new economics of organization contributes to 
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the study of ‘rent-seeking’ and the transactions that processes bring to 
institutional operations and development. Hall and Taylor (1996, 10) also noted 
the impact the “new economics of organization” had on the development of 
rational choice institutionalism.  
 
The principal-agent theory in political science was further developed with the 
inclusion of rational choice institutionalism. Under the assumption that actors are 
all rational actors, rational choice institutionalism is seen as the best way of 
identifying the interests and motivations of these rational actors within structured 
institutional settings. Colin Hay (2002, 13) defines rational choice institutionalism 
as a highly influential hybrid theoretical model that examines “the extent to which 
institutions might provide solutions to collective action problems and, more 
generally, the institutional context-dependence of rationality.” As a ‘deductive’ 
theory, it can help users to understand the reasons behind actors’ actions and 
the likely outcome the actions may lead to within a given institutional incentive 
structure (Schmidt 2006, 102), as shown by the application of rational choice 
theory in the study of American congressional behavior. Rational choice 
institutionalism was developed to aid understanding of US congressional 
behaviors in the 1970s, and it “reintroduces institutional factors into formal 
models of majority voting in the US Congress” (Pollack 2006, 33). Rational 
choice institutionalism later became a handy toolkit for the study of political 
science (Hall and Taylor 1996, 10 and Schmidt 2006, 102). Also, it helps relate 
the importance of the flow of information to power relations and political 
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outcomes. Rational choice institutionalism contributes to the study of politics in 
addressing the most central but often neglected feature of policies—the 
management of uncertainty in political activities (Hall and Taylor 1996, 18).  
 
The principal-agent model consists of two assumptions: there is goal conflict 
between the principal and the agent; and there is an asymmetry of information 
between the two in which the agent has information advantages over the 
principal (Waterman and Meier 1998, 173). The principal-agent framework can 
be widely seen at work in studies of: decision-making by the European 
Commission (Kassim and Menon 2003); American Congressional politics 
(McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987); politician-bureaucrat relations (Waterman 
and Meier 1998; 2004); and EU member states’ implementation of EU law 
(Jensen 2007, 452). It can also be seen in an analysis of national legislative-
executive relations in the making of foreign affairs (Raunio and Wagner 2017). It 
is believed that the principal-agent theory raises awareness of institutional 
interdependence in the study of political science.  
 
The application of principal-agent theory in the analysis of China’s management 
of central SOEs: 
 
As argued in the previous chapter, China’s economic governance strategy 
towards central SOEs follows a developmental state path that partly adopts 
market as a tool. The key to China’s success in transforming central SOE groups 
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and making them competitive in the global market is the institution. It is a widely 
held view that SOEs are “inefficient, immense bureaucracies—generally beds of 
corruption and nepotism” (Deng 2015, 3). Musacchio, Pineda and Garcia (2015, 
6) examined state-owned enterprises in Latin America and they attribute the 
problems they found to two areas—corporate governance and fiscal 
management. They call for bureaucracies to conduct sufficient oversight of SOEs 
and clarify the regulations on transfer of funds from government budget to SOEs. 
How can China’s central state-owned enterprises became successful while SOEs 
in other developing countries fail, since “the principal-agent model is often 
presented (or at least empirically tested) as a top-down political model” 
(Waterman, Rouse, Wright and Meier 2004 , 94).  
 
Waterman and Meier (1998, 174) note that “Principals seek to manipulate and 
mould the behavior of agents so that they will act in a manner consistent with the 
principals’ preferences.” They also point out the differences between the 
application of the principal-agent model in the field of economics and the 
application of the model in the field of institutional or regulatory activity. China’s 
central state assets management blurs the border between the political and the 
economic, with the principal (SASAC) being located in the political, bureaucratic 
system, while the agent (central SOEs) is in the competitive market or quasi-
oligopolistic market field. The principal-agent relationship between the SASAC 
and central SOEs should be understood in both political and economic terms. In 
theory, the principal and the agent clearly have different goals and preferences in 
 115 
the marketplace, where the principal wants to minimize its service, but the agent 
wants to maximize its profit, as Waterman and Meier (1998, 185) indicate. 
However, in the bureaucratic setting, principal and agent may not have goal 
conflicts over policymaking processes and implementation. It is clear to see that 
the SASAC (principal) and central SOEs (agent) have similar goals, one of which 
they agree is the maximization of the central SOEs’ profitability. These similar 
goals have been set by the pilot-agent – the SASAC – under a developmental 
state plan for making the central SOEs “bigger, stronger and better”. However, at 
the same time, they have goal conflicts over other issues. For example, the 
SASAC’s (the principal’s) priority goal is to prevent a drain on state assets, which 
means detailed all-round oversight mechanisms and low tolerance of corruption 
or violating state policies. Central SOEs (the agent), on the other hand, aim for 
more managerial autonomy and freedom in decision-making in the marketplace. 
So, after all, goal conflicts exist; but they may not exist equally between principal 
and agent (Waterman and Meier 2004, 22 and Waterman et al. 2004, 81). 
 
From multi-principals to a single principal 
 
As noted in the earlier section, this chapter limits its discussion to just principal-
agent relations, since, in a multi-principal situation, different principals may hold 
different goals and interests. Also, the principals may fight for a higher degree of 
influence over the agent. The agent not only faces problems such as a variety of 
authorization processes, but it also has to choose which principals it should 
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respond to. The situation may be even more complicated if an agent with an 
information advantage is able to choose which principal to ally with. Besides, the 
agent has incentives to respond to different principals in a variety of ways and 
means (Moe 1987; Waterman and Meier 1998, 181; Waterman and Meier 2004, 
35 and Mitnick 1986 in Waterman and Meier 1998, 179; Waterman et al. 2004, 
110). The establishment of the SASAC was aimed at solving the multi-principal 
problem mentioned above, so that the system could rule out any other 
externalities. The SASAC's establishment was a milestone, and from that time on, 
the managements of central SOEs have followed a process of “from nine 
dragons rule to one dragon governs” 从 九 龙 治 水 到 九 龙 归 一  (  
BJSASAC/02/2015). This has clarified and simplified principal-agent relations in 
the management of central state-owned assets and defined the principal-agent 
relationship between the SASAC and central SOEs.  
 
Obviously, central SOEs have more resources than, and information advantages 
over, their principal, the SASAC, particularly regarding professional-related 
issues. This is where a greater level of expertise in the agent occurs, and thus 
makes the principal hard to control (Waterman et al. 2004,65). This situation has 
left the SASAC in a dilemma. If the SASAC draws in other ministries to conduct 
principal-agent supervision of its agents, those other ministries will have a say in 
the central SOEs’ business. The SASAC then will have to face the risk of going 
back to a multi-principal situation. The SASAC is in a dilemma and struggles to 
position itself as the only principal in the central state assets management 
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system. In the case of multi-principal systems, the agent will choose to team up 
with the most influential principal – the one that can best represent its interests 
(Waterman 2004, 81). Also, competition among principals may increase the 
agent’s ability and willingness to use asymmetric information to its own 
advantage (Miller 2005, 211). The post-2003 principal-agent structure has 
achieved a single principal (the SASAC) and a single agent (the central SOEs). 
The research fieldwork interviews support the argument that the central SOEs 
see the SASAC as the most important institution (the principal) that they should 
respond to. As for the central SOEs, for them, other government institutions, 




3.3. The dual importance of ex ante and ex post mechanisms 
 
This section starts with a discussion of the information asymmetry and the goal 
conflict between the principal and the agent that set the terms of the principal-
agent relationship. It then focuses on an analysis of the ex ante and ex post 
mechanisms that the principal adopts in regulating the agent. For the ex ante 
analysis, an analysis of 195 SASAC-issued departmental regulations was done 
to discover what aspect of the central SOEs’ operations matters the most. As for 
the ex post mechanisms, it examines the supervision role carried out by the state 
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— the SASAC, other central government ministries, and, most interestingly, the 
market—stock market listing and other market mechanisms.   
 
In order to gain an overview of an agent’s activities, ex-ante should be introduced 
as an instrument to define those activities and the decision-making procedures 
the agent must follow. Ex-ante control is usually presented in the form of 
administrative proceedings (Pollack 1997,108; Kassim and Menon 2003, 124), 
while an ex-post mechanism usually consists of two supervision methods. One is 
the principal's oversight mechanism, which is used to monitor the agent’s 
behavior in pursuit of a more symmetric information. Apart from the principal’s 
efforts to rebalance any information asymmetry through surveillance, through 
which the level of agency transparency is increased, another method of ex-post 
control is the imposition of sanctions. As the other central element of oversight 
strategy, as described by Tallberg (2002, 612), sanctions work as a disincentive 
by raising the cost of non-compliance for the agent, so that the problem of 
evasive action by the agent can be improved accordingly.  
 
The principal has the legislative or regulatory power to issue control measures to 
avoid loss by the agent. The principal’s sanctions can include budgetary 
restrictions, personnel control, exercising the power of veto over the agent’s 
decisions, and so forth (Pollack 1997; Elgie 2002, 189; Tallberg 2006, 200). In 
practice, the SASAC has issued the Interim Measures for the Liabilities of Central 
Enterprises for Asset Losses (SASAC 2008 Order No.20), which give detailed 
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explanations of the various sanction methods against staff whose misconduct 
has caused the loss of state assets. McCubbins et al. (1989, 481) believe that 
ex-ante control is generally more efficient than ex-post supervision. Bureaucrats’ 
behavior can be controlled if a procedure is introduced to limit the decision-
making process. The ex-post legislative solution, however, is seen as 
burdensome and inefficient.  
 
Incompetence by the principal in the observation of its agent may cause adverse 
selection before the contractual relationship has settled, and moral hazard as an 
ex-post situation after the contractual relationship has settled. Accordingly, 
“Moral hazard and adverse selection are general problems whose potential is 
inherent in all contracting and hierarchical relationships” (Moe 1984, 754). Moral 
hazard, in particular, takes a central position in the discussion in the study of 
political science. The two primary issues that may cause moral hazard are 
evasive action by the agent and a failure by the agent to deliver which is 
institutionally induced (Elgie 2002, 188 and McCubbins and Page 1987: 411 in 
Elgie 2002, 188).  The adverse selection problem is associated with hidden 
information, and the moral hazard problem is related to unseen actions (Shepsle 
2006, 29). Adverse selection is caused by asymmetric information before the 
contract (delegation) has been accepted, which is ex-ante hidden information. As 
for moral hazard, if the information asymmetry occurs after the contract has been 
approved, this is ex-post hidden information (Laffont and Martimort 2001, 15-16). 
According to Pollack (1997, 108), the principal’s information deficiency needs to 
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be made up through all necessary means. Otherwise, the principal will be in a 
disadvantageous position, which may lead to massive loss by the agent.  From 
the agent’s perspective, the bureaucrat’s inadequacy in resource allocation, and 
bureaucratic inefficiency, provide opportunities for the agent to take advantage of 
bureaucratic inefficiency through its expertise (Waterman et al. 2004, 75).  
 
As noted above, the agent has an information advantage over its principal; so 
now the discussion moves to the central concern of the principal-agent theory: 
how can the principal best incentivize its agent to perform according to its 
preferences? The importance of incentives should not be underestimated: they 
play a vital role in bringing about an adequate ex-ante mechanism. McCubbins, 
Noll and Weingast (1987, 244) state that “The best available solution typically 
consists of a method for altering the incentives of the agent.” The ‘incentive’ 
should be considered in formulating both ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms. The 
agent may not behave in the way its principal would prefer unless proper 
incentives are given to it, so that it is crucial for the principal to design an 
effective incentive structure (Moe, 1984, 756).  
 
Gailmard (2014, 92) also comments on the importance of incentives in principal-
agent relations, and he looks at the incentive compatibility at the heart of both the 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. “Economic relationships in which 
one party (the principal) wishes to affect the actions of another (the agent) by 
means of incentives are ubiquitous” (Dixit 2002,697). Also, on the overall 
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structure of how to make the incentive mechanism work, it is worth noting that, in 
the research on the principal-agent theory, discussions focus not on the authority 
the principal has but on the incentive the principal imposes on the agents. The 
principal can reduce agency problems by imposing proper incentives that suit the 
agent’s interests, although moral hazard may limit the principal’s capacity to 
control the situation (Miller 2005, 204). Moe (1984, 756) lists an effective 
incentive structure, a well-structured oversight system, and mechanisms for 
encouraging the agent to reveal more information as being the three major 
solutions to the problems of the principal-agent model.   
 
When the ex-ante mechanism is presented in the form of administrative 
procedures, those procedures regulate the agent’s activity and define the 
procedures the agent must follow. They also provide the legal instruments 
available to the agent (Tallberg 2006, 201; Pollack 1997, 108). Miller (2005, 214) 
notes McCubbins et al.’s (1987) contribution in moving the principal-agent 
question from one of “congressionally imposed incentive” to one of 
“congressionally imposed procedures”. McCubbins et al. argue that Congress 
controls the bureaucracy through regulating ‘procedures’, so that the desirable 
outcome is likely to be achieved. Consequently, it is worth noting the importance 
of how the principal regulates the agent’s procedures in its activities. 
 
Ex-ante mechanisms include the law and administrative rules that can regulate 
central SOEs’ behavior and decision-making procedures in the principal-agent 
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discussion. For instance, the Law of the PRC on State-owned Assets of 
Enterprises (2009), Article 28, decrees that “The principal persons in charge of a 
wholly state-owned enterprise, a wholly state-owned company or a company in 
which the state has a controlling stake shall accept for their the term of office 
economic accountability audits conducted according to law.” Also, there are in 
total five revisions that have been made since 2003 to enable the SASAC to 
perform an evaluation of the management performance of senior executives of 
the central SOEs. The Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational 
Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises were adjusted and re-
issued four times before the final version of Measures for Assessment of the 
Operational Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises was 
issued in 2016. The Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational 
Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises were first published in 
2003, in SASAC Order No.2; they were later revised in 2006, in SASAC Order 
No.17; a third version was published in 2009, in SASAC Order No.22; and the 
fourth version was issued in 2012, in SASAC Order No.33. The Final version of 
the measures came into effect in December 2016. The two main criteria of these 
evaluation measures are profit and return on assets. The following part of this 
chapter will analyze in greater detail the administrative regulations issued by the 
SASAC from 2003 to 2017 April. Figure 3.2 illustrates the percentages assigned 
to each category of bureau in the SASAC’s policy papers, with the policy papers 
divided into 10 types covering nine classifications of bureau: property 
management; financial supervision and performance evaluation; policy and 
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regulation; Communist party and publicity; planning and development; enterprise 
remuneration; enterprise reform and enterprise restructuring; discipline 
supervision and inspection; and general affairs. The tenth category, ‘other’ 
consists of policies individually issued by bureaus other than the above ones. 
The graph shows as a percentage the weight each category contributes to the 
SASAC’s policymaking strategies. This analysis helps us to understand the 
SASAC’s work focus. It also indicates the magnitude of each of the SASAC’s 




Figure 3.2. Analysis of SASAC Policies (issued 2003-April 2017), organised and 
classified by the author. Source: policy paper publicity section on the SASAC 
official website. [online] http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85881/n85921/index.html 
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The 195 policy papers are divided into ten categories. To begin with, there are 34 
policies issued in relation to ‘property management’, which is the largest share of 
the total number of policies, and represents 17% of the total number. There are 
30 policies issued in the ‘financial supervision and performance evaluation’ 
category and 29 in the ‘policy and regulation’ category, with each contributing 15% 
of the total number. It can be seen clearly from the pie chart that the three 
sections add up to 47% of the total number. This indicates that the SASAC’s 
primary focus is on state assets, financial performance and also on the 
conducting of regulatory roles. In the Notice of the State Council on the 
Establishment of Institutions, which announced the SASAC’s functions as a 
ministerial level institution (State Council [2008] No.11), the second clause states 
that the SASAC is responsible for the value of state assets, supervising the value 
of the assets through statistical methods. As in the ‘property management’ 
category, policy papers have mainly related to asset appraisal, the transfer of 
shares, and dealings on state property. Examples of this are: the Notice on the 
Supervision of State-owned Property Transfers (SASAC PMB [2005] No.294); 
the Notice on Strengthening the Appraisal and Management of SOE Assets 
(SASAC PMB [2006] No.274); and the Interim Measures for Management Buy-
out of State-owned Property (SASAC PMB [2005] No.78).  
 
Moving on to the ‘financial supervision and performance evaluation’ section, this 
accounts for 15% of the total number of policies. The policies in this section are 
largely about accounting and finance regulations for CSOEs, as well as 
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evaluation of the operational performance of the enterprises and the persons in 
charge of them. Examples are the Interim Measure for the Audit Management of 
the Economic Liability of Central Enterprises (SASAC FSEB [2006] No.7) and the 
series of documents on the assessment of operational performance (both annual 
and over terms of office) of persons in charge of CSOEs, as noted in the earlier 
section of this chapter. There are another 29 documents about ‘policy and 
regulation’ that have been issued by the Bureau of Policies and Regulations, 
which is in charge of policymaking and revising administrative rules, as well as 
dealing with issues related to laws on the state asset management system. The 
‘Communist party and publicity’ category is in fourth place with 22 policies issued. 
Apart from policies related to ideological strengthening activities and propaganda, 
almost half of these policies are about checking whether CSOEs are following 
correct processes in their business activities, according to regulations, and about 
working ethics. One such case is the decree on the Strengthening of Efficiency 
Supervision for Central Enterprises (SASAC DC [2004] No.12), which monitors 
misconduct, non-standard business activities and corruption cases.  
 
Then, there are three categories that consist of: 19 policies issued on planning 
and development’, 14 on ‘enterprise remuneration’, and 11 on ‘enterprise reform 
and restructuring’. As for the ‘planning and development’ category, policies are 
mainly issued on major strategy for the future development of state ownership, 
as well as to define the main businesses of each central SOE. For example, 
there is a series of policies announcing the main business of each central SOE— 
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SASAC Planning and Development Bureau (2005 No.251); (2006 No.49); (2006 
No.126) (2007 No.40) and (2007 No.90). The category of ‘enterprise 
remuneration’ has more to do with salary management and shareholding 
management for central SOE staff. The policies under ‘Enterprise reform and 
restructuring’ are mainly about the establishment of modern corporate 
governance, for instance, the Interim Measure for Establishing the Board of 
Directors in a Wholly State-owned Company (SASAC ERB [2004] No.229). 
There are many policies on experimental projects and SOE shareholding reform 
as well. An example of these is the Opinion on Regulating the Shareholding and 
Investment Activities of SOE staff (SASAC ERB [2009] No.49) and the Notice of 
the Experimental Project on the Dividend Rights Incentive Mechanism in Some 
CSOEs (SASAC ERB [2010] No.148). These three categories indicate the 
SASAC’s role as a pilot agency that follows the developmental state path. There 
are 5% of policies on ‘discipline supervision and inspection’ and these include 
policies related to the activities of the Discipline Committee.  The ‘general affairs’ 
and ‘other’ categories include policies issued by other small SASAC bureaus and 
contribute 13% of the overall policies. Moving on to the study of the core set of 
SASAC policies, these consist of only 35 policies which were issued between 




Figure 3.3. Analysis of SASAC Orders (2003-April 2017), organized and 
classified by the author. Source: policy paper publicity section on the SASAC 
official website. [online] http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85881/n85921/index.html 
 
Overall, 35 out of the 195 policies are SASAC Orders [in Chinese] “国有资产监督
管理委员会令” and these form the core set of policies among all policies issued. 
There are SASAC Orders only in six categories, with 11 in ‘financial supervision 
and performance evaluation’, nine in ‘policy and regulation’, five in ‘asset 
ownership and management’, five in ‘assessment of the operational performance 
of persons in charge of central SOEs’ (five revisions), three in ‘planning and 
development’ and two in ‘general affairs’.  It can also be seen clearly from figure 
3.3 that enterprise operational performance, state assets management, and 
issuing regulations are at the core of the SASAC’s institutional aim and functions. 
According to Pollack (1997, 108), “Such administrative procedures may be more 
or less restrictive, and they may be altered in response to shirking or slippage, 
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but only at a cost to the flexibility and comprehensiveness of the agent’s 
activities.” In our exploration of the principal-agent relationship, this shows where 
the SASAC’s ex-ante administrative procedures lie. It also shows that the 
SASAC highlights its function as a principal that employs ex-post supervision 
mechanisms in order to have adequate oversight of its agents’ activities and 
performance.  
 
Thus, the principal puts an effort into making precise ex-ante mechanisms to 
direct the agents to follow the principal’s preferences. Miller (2005, 209) offered 
the idea that “The threat of ex post sanctions creates ex ante incentives for the 
bureau to serve a congressional clientele”. However, as McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast (1989) argue, in a principal-agent relationship, the principal 
manipulates the agent to do things that benefit the principal but are costly to the 
agent. It is impossible for the principal to generate a perfect and costless ex-ante 
to incentivize the agent. In Pollack’s (1997, 109) definition, the administrative 
procedures are the ex-ante mechanism, and the oversight procedures are the ex-
post mechanisms. Due to the information advantage on the agent’s side, ex-post 
mechanisms are conducted to help the principal to gain enough insight into agent 
behavior. The ex-post mechanisms include monitoring agents’ activities and 
influencing agent behavior through incentives and sanctions. From the principal’s 
perspective, the oversight mechanisms work best if they are very detailed and 
intensive, but costless, so that any agency loss can be minimized.  
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3.4.  Oversight Mechanism: Police Patrol and Fire Alarm   
 
The above section discussed the ex ante administrative mechanisms in the 
principal-agent relationship. That is to say, the SASAC as the principal seizes the 
initiative in the making of ex-ante regulations. The discussion here reaches the 
analysis of ex-post mechanisms, which require the principal to be more flexible 
and adaptable to CSOE activities. This is because the CSOEs are market actors 
and the marketplace is unpredictable. The principal-agent theory was initially 
generated in the study of economics and management, and was then adopted as 
a variant of rational choice institutionalism in its application to political science 
(Elgie 2002, 187). The principal-agent analysis of this research crosses the 
blurred line between state and the market, with the principal being the 
government institution while the agents are market actors. We now turn to the 
study of the oversight mechanism. Since information asymmetry and goal 
conflicts exist perpetually between the principal and the agent (Tallberg 2006, 
199), the problem is not whether the principal should watch its agent or not. 
Rather, it lies in the degree of effort devoted to the ex-post monitoring of agency 
behavior and decisions (Bawn 1997, 105). The oversight procedures consist of 
‘institutional mechanisms’ for monitoring agency behavior and impose potential 
sanctions for the agent’s non-compliance (Tallberg 2006, 201). This section now 
reaches the examination of the two ex-post oversight mechanisms: police patrol 
oversight and fire alarm oversight. It contributes to the understanding of how a 
government institution conducts sufficient oversight of market actors.  
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Police patrol oversight is the mechanisms where the principal is directly engaging 
in detailed, long-term monitoring activities. It can be seen as a centralized 
method that is expensive and time-consuming for the principal. At the same time, 
police patrol oversight allows the principal to keep a direct and continuous watch 
for the hidden message. It is an effective way for the principal to track the agent’s 
actions and procedures. Whereas, the fire alarm mechanism relies on third 
parties to raise the alarm about agents’ misconduct, having taken on the 
monitoring role based on their interests. It is an indirect way of surveillance and 
relatively more passive. (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 176; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1994, 97; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 244; McCubbins et al. 
1987, 244; Kassim and Menon 2003, 124) 
 
Fire-alarm oversight as a decentralized and incentive-based oversight 
mechanism is much more efficient and less costly than police patrol oversight 
(McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 176). The authors further extend the argument 
to suggest that police patrol oversight is time-consuming, and the principal is only 
able to cover a very limited sample of subjects. Fire-alarm oversight, on the other 
hand, may be costly, but at a third party’s expense (McCubbins and Schwartz 
1984, 168). However, this third party, which shares the principal’s costs for 
supervision mechanisms, may sometimes raise false alarms (Lupia and 
McCubbins (1994, 97). Bawn (1997, 104) provides a different point of view and 
argues that fire-alarm oversight does not mean less work needing to be done by 
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the principal. The principal should also get involved in the fire alarm oversight 
mechanism, rather than stay outside and wait for the fire alarm to ring. This 
section illustrates how the Chinese government uses different supervisory 
institutions to enforce both processes – fire-alarm oversight mechanisms and 
police patrol oversight mechanisms – in the management of state assets. 
However, over-reliance on fire alarm mechanisms may cause bias in the 
principal’s decisions taken in relation to those of the agent, and this may not 
provide an ideal policy outcome. As Hopenhayn and Lohmann (1996, 209) argue 
in an analysis of political representatives of society as the principal and 
regulatory agencies as the agent, “asymmetric fire-alarm signals give rise to 
asymmetric political control rules that introduce a bias into political decision-
making.”  
 
Oversight mechanisms can be classified into three broad categories. The first 
type is supervisory teams sent out by the SASAC which include, 1. Members of 
the Board of Supervisors sent by the SASAC to work in the central SOE 
headquarters to conduct long-term supervision, and 2. inspection teams 
dispatched by the SASAC, which occasionally appear as a supervision 
mechanism. The second category is supervisory teams sent by other central 
government institutions. This category includes 3. the Central Inspection Team 
“中央巡视组 ”, randomly dispatched the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection (CCDI), and 4. an audit team dispatched by the National Audit Office 
(NAO) to conduct random auditing inspections. The third category involves two 
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ministries, which are: 5. the Ministry of Finance, which regularly examines 
accounts, asking the agent (central SOEs) to revise its financial reports, and also 
evaluates the central SOEs’ financial performance and profitability every year, 
and 6. the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China, which has 
the ultimate appointment authority for the central SOEs’ senior executives. The 
two ministries in the third category do not directly impose police patrol or fire 
alarm mechanisms; but their outcome-based control also contributes to 
supervision efficiency. As Cook and Wood (1989, 974) suggest, “Principal-agent 
theory embodies a behavioral perspective that posits explicit stimulus-response 
relationships.” When the principal changes its political conduct, status, budgetary 
distribution or oversight mechanisms, it is very likely that the agent will alter its 
behavior in the principal-agent relationship as well. It is also possible that the 
agent will respond to different supervision mechanisms in different ways. All in all, 
the fundamental point is “all methods of agency control imply costs to the 
principal and cost trade-off against the benefits from limiting non-compliance” 
(MaCubbins et al.  1987, 1989) (Kassim and Menon 2003, 124).   
 
The Board of Supervisors  
 
In order to avoid ‘insider control’ and potential conflict, members of the Board of 
Supervisors are chosen by the SASAC. According to the Law of the PRC on 
State-owned Assets of Enterprises [Effective] (2009), also noted in Article 25 “No 
director or senior manager shall concurrently serve as a supervisor.” The SASAC 
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improved its institutional settings to effectuate the supervision mechanism better. 
In 2017, there are three newly created supervisory bureaus, enhancing and 
coordinating supervisory work with the Board of Supervisors. The supervisory 
board members dispatched to central SOEs are continuously intensifying their 
supervisory activities on current projects, and providing reports on individual 
issues that are submitted immediately. In the year 2016, the SASAC submitted 
26 reports on supervisory acts to the State Council. The SASAC has also issued, 
in total, 163 supervision reports, revision notices and reminder letters to the 
central SOEs (SASAC 2017, 10). However, Wang, Qi and Cao (2013, 70) 
provide a different understanding of the efficiency of the Supervisory Board. They 
argue that the external nature of the Board of Supervisors and the potential 
sanctions it can impose and the negative reports it can send to the SASAC limit 
its efficiency in oversight activities. An enterprise’s board of directors and 
managerial team can easily form an internal alliance to resist oversight from the 
Board of supervisors. 
 
Central inspection teams from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
(CCDI) 
 
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has become a 
prominent figure since Xi Jinping took office in 2012. The central inspection 
system was built on the Audit Ombudsman System “稽查特派员制度”, which was 
initiated by the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji in 1998. Under State Council Order 
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No.246, audit ombudsmen are sent to carry out oversight activities on behalf of 
the State Council. The central inspection teams are dispatched by the CCDI to 
local governments and SOEs to conduct inspections of the work of party leaders 
and party members. The central inspection teams are not law enforcement 
officers and they do not handle cases directly: problems discovered are 
transferred to relevant law-enforcement agencies. The CCDI holds a database of 
central inspection team leaders. Appointment of team leaders is made randomly 
and is a one-off appointment.  The central inspection teams work in a role that 
uses the fire alarm approach. Their job content includes “dealing with complaints 
from the general public through letters, telephone and visits”; “questionnaire 
distribution and collection” and “peer review evaluation of the institution” (CCDI 
2017). The detailed working regulations can be seen in the Provisions of the 
Chinese Communist Party Regarding On-site Inspections (CCDI 2015, No.20) 
The Discipline Committee has been given supervision strategies of “look back”– 
in Chinese ‘回头看’ – in their examination of local governments and SOEs. The 
“look back” strategy means a central inspection team conducts its inspection tour 
of a local government or SOE for a few months, finishes the tour, and leaves the 
location. Then, without warning, the inspection team makes an unexpected return 
to the same place. It aims to spot the corrupt officers who thought they were safe 





The National Audit Office (NAO) 
 
There are in total 17 local offices distributed by the NAO across China, each in 
charge of one or two provinces (NAO 2017). These offices have many 
responsibilities, including the auditing of central SOEs’ local operational branches’ 
assets, liabilities and profits. These local offices report directly back to the NAO, 
because China’s audit system follows a vertical line of administration. According 
to the Audit Law of the People’s Republic of China, which came into force in 
1995 (2006 Amendment), the audit office at local level is responsible to both the 
audit authority at a higher administrative level and to the local government. Since 
the central SOEs and their operational companies at local level are directly 
managed by the SASAC, when an audit office at local level conducts an 
examination of a central SOEs’ financial books, it directly reports to the NAO and 
the SASAC. Moreover, the staff of the National Audit Office, as technocrats, have 
taken a greater role in the whole political system of China since 2010. In 2010, 
the Audit of the Economic Accountability of Party Cadres and SOE Leaders was 
issued as an administration order, thus settling the legal ground for the 
technocrats to be involved in principal-agent relations.  
 
Organization Department, Nomenklatura System and Dangzu 
 
The Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Leading Cadres of the 
Party and State (2014 version) state that the selection and management of 
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cadres must comply with the principal of “the Party controlling the cadres 党管干
部原则” (Organization Department 2014). Central SOEs have integrated well into 
the market, and have adopted a corporate governance structure as the SASAC 
required. Decision-making rights for the personnel system of central SOEs have 
mostly been granted to individual central SOEs. The party does not want to lose 
its political control of these business groups on their way to marketization 
(Brødsgaard 2012, 640). The Central Organization Department is the institution 
that officially appoints the senior executives of the 53 vice-ministry-level group 
companies, leaving the executives of the central SOEs that do not belong to the 
group of 53 for the SASAC to appoint. However, the SASAC retains the power to 
evaluate the top-level executives of all these enterprises and will provide 
feedback on their performances to the Organization Department. The 
Organization Department is the most mysterious institution in China’s political 
system. It is the largest human resource center operated by the Chinese 
government and it selects and appoints party cadres. A nomenklatura system 
established the party’s leadership in China and this is as important in 
contemporary politics as it was previously, having been consolidated in the post-
Tiananmen regime. This research confirms Brødsgaard’s (2010, 28) view that, by 
bringing the largest SOEs under direct party control through the Organization 
Department, the state indicated the privileged status of these companies and 
their CEOs. Brødsgaard uses the term “integrated fragmentation” to describe “the 
contradictory forces of increasing enterprise autonomy and continued central 
control that characterise the evolving relationship between business groups and 
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the party-state” (Brødsgaard 2017, 39). He points out that through the 
nomenklatura system, the party controls the appointment and promotion of the 
heads of most SASAC companies. The rotation system allows the transfer of a 
CEO to another post in a different SOE or to be a senior government officer 
(Brødsgaard 2017, 52). However, whilst these opportunities have often been 
given to CEOs in the 53 central SOEs in the strategic sectors, other central 
SOEs operating in the free market do not have the same importance for the party 
[and their CEOs do not have the same opportunities].  
 
However, the party’s role should not be exaggerated and is often misinterpreted. 
Discussion on the party’s role and the nomenklatura system in the central SOEs 
tends to neglect an important fact: that is, the state, in promoting managerial 
autonomy and encouraging central SOEs to be more efficient and productive, 
aims to re-strengthen state power. Chan (2004, 704) sees the nomenklatura as a 
key, secretive instrument of the CCP’s control of the personnel system in SOEs, 
which is about using both political and market tools to clear up rent-seeking 
bureaucracies. It reflects the evolving characteristics of the party-state and 
shows the party-state’s contradictory desire for having “economic modernization 
through marketization in combination with continued political control”. Each 
central SOE has a CCP party committee--the Party Group (党组, Dangzu or 党委, 
Dangwei), but the definition of the dangzu’s role and function remains vague. 
Moreover, the party’s control over the appointment of SOE executives does not 
mean that the party can exercise direct control over the decisions, strategies and 
 138 
operations of these SOEs (Xu 2017, 102). This is important because the boards 
of directors of SOEs consist of external directors and independent directors, 
some of whom are professional accountants and lawyers from overseas. Thus, 
the board members’ decisions should not be directly interpreted as the party’s 
will. Further, it is a myth that the executives of SOEs are loyal party members 
and have to show their loyalty to the party over time. In fact, market indicators 
are the decisive factors in evaluating these executives’ performances. The 
party’s evaluation of these executives in fact reflects an understanding of 
governing through the market. Wang (2014, 658) sees SOEs as being under a 
twin governance structure: legal governance, which has learnt about the 
corporate management and laws of the Western free market economy; and 
political governance, which remains the party-state in control.  Certainly, the 
party’s importance should not to be underestimated, and it is clear that the party 
continues to strengthen its position on China’s path towards a market economy. 
The tentacles of the party extend into every nook of business entities. There are 
1.855 million enterprises with non-public ownership that the party organization 
has established, and these account for 67.9% of the total number (Organization 
Department 2017). 
 
As argued in the previous chapter, the SASAC’s economic governance of central 
SOEs follows a developmental state path for which it has partially adopted 
market mechanisms. Considering the principal-agent perspective, this research 
argues that the SASAC adopts market practices to conduct supervision of the 
 139 
central SOEs. The market serves as an oversight mechanism. McCubbins et al. 
(1989, 434) note that the fire alarm mechanism transfers the monitoring job of the 
principal (a political institution/officer) to a third party whose interests may be 
affected by the agent’s behavior. Given that the third party's interests may be 
affected by the agent’s misbehavior, the third party will voluntarily monitor the 
agent’s activities and report any non-compliance to the principal.  
 
The listing of Central SOEs’ assets on the stock market abroad and/or in the 
mainland China can be seen as an effort to further enhance SASAC’s 
supervision power in this principal-agent relations. It has two major implications. 
The first one is that listing can actually accelerate the establishment of modern 
corporate governance in a central SOE. The board of directors needs to be 
organized to comply with the requirements of the China Security Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). There must be more external directors than internal 
directors, which can be seen as a way of dealing with the possibility of ‘moral 
hazard’ due to insider control. Also, after listing on the stock market, a company 
needs to comply with both the SASAC’s regulations and the CSRC’s regulations. 
Howson (2015, 50) sees the CSRC’s role as to “protect minority shareholders 
against exploitation by the Party-state controlling shareholders.” Deng (2015, 19) 
also notes the CSRC’s role in protecting individual investors. This argument was 
confirmed in my interview with Ma (2015 Interview Beijing-1 CSCEC). Ma agreed 
that the CSRC’s role was to protect minority shareholders and confirmed that, 
because the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (SHA 601668) is 
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a company listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the standard of salaries and 
bonuses issued to its employees has to follow both the SASAC’s regulations and 
those of the CSRC.  
 
Also, the external directors usually have extensive professional experience 
and/or have worked as senior executives in other central SOEs, so they have the 
necessary ability to monitor the company’s operations. For example, the China 
State Construction Engineering Corporation has a specific external director to 
supervise the financial performance of the company — Mr Ruiming Zhong, who 
is a Hong-Kong-based professional accountant appointed by the SASAC 
(CSCEC 2017). It can be argued that the listing of central SOEs has created 
many different ‘third parties’ – namely the Security Regulatory Commission, the 
external directors on the board and, most importantly, the general public who 
bought shares, and these can  raise the alarm if needed.   
 
The second major implication has to do with the listing process itself. The central 
SOEs’ listing company choses internationally renowned investment banks and 
accounting firms to start the Initial Public Offering (IPO). For example, the China 
National Building Material’s (HK 3323) initial public offering was managed by 
Morgan Stanley, and the company's appointed accounting firm was Baker Tilly. 
Hu (2015 Beijing CNBM-9) introduced the listing process and said that before 
listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX), around two years were spent 
stripping the assets and getting hold of all the official documents required by the 
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HKEX, which included, but were not limited to, financial reports, tax reports, the 
land certificate of approval, government permission on production, a letter from 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection and a letter from the State 
Administration of Work Safety. The asset stripping before listing can be seen as 
a sorting process that pick out high-performing productive assets from the giant 
heritage of the planned economy. This change has certainly improved the 
institutional setting of the central SOEs and made their listing company work as a 
company in the real sense. The SASAC’s emphasis on managerial performance 
and profitability has made ‘how to improve the company’s core competence’ [in 
Chinese: 如何提高核心竞争力] become the central SOEs’ most troubling problem 
(SASAC 2017a). However, Qi and Wang’s (2016) research shows a non-listed 
central SOE is like a ‘black box’: that is, it has seriously low transparency, and it 
is likely to have shown no significant improvement since 2012. Deng and Chen 
(2010) note the positive impact of the comprehensive listing of central SOEs, 
especially cross-listing in both the A share and H share markets. The SASAC’s 
first director, Mr. Rongrong Li (2004 and 2006), clearly points out two reasons to 
explain the SASAC’s motivation in promoting central SOEs’ overseas listing. He 
states that, “the first motivation is to ensure that the central SOEs have a 
regulated shareholding system, while the second motivation is to encourage the 
SOEs to have a higher standard of corporate governance structure.” The listing 
process and the impact it has on both the SASAC and central SOEs will be 
further discussed in the next few chapters. All in all, the SASAC has adopted 
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various methods to conduct oversight of the central SOEs and has not hesitated 





The Chinese government has always held an ambiguous attitude towards market 
mechanisms. China’s market reform emphasis on liberal competition in the 
market sees market competition as an effective mechanism for resource 
allocation and “survival of the fittest”. (Li, Brødsgaard and Jacobsen 2010: 302) 
However, when crises or difficulties occur, the government’s hand visibly returns 
to the market and manipulates the part played by market functions. The state’s 
capacity in policy implementation is at the heart of making developmental state 
strategy work. Also, the legitimacy of China’s Communist Party has partly been 
built on the country’s fast economic growth. The Chinese government realizes 
that, in order to confirm the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule, better governance 
needs to be delivered and there needs to be clarification of governmental 
functions. There are principal-agent problems, such as responsibilities 
overlapping between ministries and central-local policy implementation 
differences. However, a study conducted by the Development Research Center 
of the State Council suggests that 70.7% of the enterprises surveyed in China 
believe that the core area for the next step in economic system reform is the 
clarification of government-business relations. Problems enterprises face during 
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business operations include overlapping policies in different governmental 
departments. Policy contradictions happen among the various ministries as well 
as between central and local government (DRC Enterprise Research Institute 
2013 No.147).  
 
The government’s direct control of its agents is considered to have been 
successful. Heilmann (2007, 18) explains that during the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997, the central government brought dealings with the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges back from municipal governments to the central government, 
making them fit in with SOE restructuring and comply with the government’s 
wishes, so as to achieve national industrial policy. Also, the government’s direct 
state control is getting stronger again, as Breslin (2011, 1331) suggests. The 
incomplete nature of China’s economic liberalization allows the state to support 
strategic industries through the state-owned banks, thus directing the state sector 
from the “commanding heights” of the national economy. Heilmann (2009, 450) 
believes that China’s political economy has a high adaptive capacity that 
combines with its “extensive policy experimentation with long-term policy 
prioritization”. He suggests that, instead of observational studies or theoretical 
analysis, China’s policy experimentation follows the idea of “implementation first 
and then drafting universal laws and regulations later” (Heilmann 2007, 4). The 
central government plays a significant role in the so-called policy experimentation 
process to coordinate and summarize local experiences, and turns the 
experiences into laws and regulations. It can also be seen in Breslin (2011) that 
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the reform strategy is nothing like shock therapy: it follows the gradual way of 
neo-liberal institutions reform.  
 
Having been used across various political contexts in different countries, the 
principal-agent theory may be applied to understanding relationships in a state 
ownership system, especially those among central government institutions and 
state-owned enterprises in China. Previously, SOEs’ inefficiency could be 
attributed to a lack of incentives and the heavy burden of providing social welfare 
in the pre-reform era (Li and Brødsgaard 2014). The establishment of the SASAC 
constituted a most important change in the dynamics of state and market 
interaction. Some claim that the SASAC is a puppet institution that does not wield 
real power and that the central SOEs, maintain autonomy in decision making and 
profit distribution, and are free to make managerial decisions whenever needed. 
Some believe that the SOEs are more likely to take political orders as their 
priority, rather than promoting their economic interests. Others believe that the 
enterprises are rational actors that will act to maximize their interests. How does 
the principal set up and use regulations and procedures to help agents share 
their goals with them? “Through the design of careful selection procedures, 
principals may succeed in hiring agents who share and so naturally pursue their 
interests.” Because it may be uneconomical to solve problems in the principal-
agent relationship (Hindmoor 2006b, 135), it is the principal that needs to align 
the agent’s self-interest with its own interests to minimize agency costs 
(Miller2005, 204).   
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As Hindmoor (2006a, 87) notes, state intervention creates both economic 
winners and losers, regardless of which one of the hundreds of forms it takes. 
When the state’s intervention fails, rent-seeking activities occur, causing damage 
to the economy, because state intervention distorts the market mechanism, so 
competition is reduced and prices increase. Also, the resources invested in 
gaining support from the state cannot be converted into resources that bring 
benefit to consumers. Some scholars argue that the autonomy granted to central 
SOEs has generated a business interest group. Brødsgaard (2012, 630) 
describes central SOEs as ‘small kingdoms’, and argues that “Rent-seeking 
takes place when firms or interest groups try to extract special privileges from 
government.” The crackdown on the “petroleum gang” in Xi Jinping’s anti-
corruption campaign triggered a discussion of rent-seeking behavior in state-
owned enterprises. Brødsgaard (2012) suggests that the SASAC may have only 
limited power in the supervision of central SOEs, arguing that the SASAC does 
not withhold dividends from the SOEs and does not have the power to appoint 
the senior executives of large companies. However, the increasing degree of 
control in principal-agent relations between the SASAC and the central SOEs 
limits the autonomy of the central SOEs regarding business activities and political 
freedom.  
 
The Central SOEs cannot simply be defined as rent-seeking, because the 
definition of rent-seeking relies on enterprises’ motivation in gaining privileges by 
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lobbying the government. According to Hindmoor (2006a, 87), rent seeking is 
“the investment of resources by firms and pressure groups in the expectation of 
securing economic privileges”. Hindmoor (2006) further argues that rent-seeking 
is damaging the country’s economy, because any forms of state intervention 
bring unfair competition and also break the normal operation of the market 
mechanism. Besides, the resources that enterprises invest in gaining support 
and privileges from the state cannot be used to benefit consumers in other ways. 
However, it is inaccurate to draw the conclusion that central SOEs have massive 
privileges, which are granted and protected by the SASAC. This argument will be 
further extended in the empirical chapters. On the contrary, central SOEs are 
under close supervision by the SASAC, as demonstrated in the analysis of both 
ex-ante administrative rules and ex-post oversight mechanisms in the earlier 
sections. Besides, as argued in the above section, the central government 
frequently modifies the measurement in supervision; and assessment of 
enterprises’ performance can be seen as the most significant character of the 
principal-agent relationship.  
 
3.6 Conclusion:  
 
This chapter has focused on the analytical theory of this thesis—the principal-
agent theory. It began with a theoretical literature review of the evolving process 
of principal-agent relations. It then moved the discussion to the principal-agent 
problems that have continuously occurred in the SASAC’s and central SOEs’ 
relations. The principal-agent theory is built on the assumption that the agent is 
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likely to avoid its responsibilities. This suggests that the agent is likely to take 
evasive action, even when no policy disagreement exists. Also, the agent is liable 
to produce products that are of a lower standard than the principal wants, or to 
set the production price higher than necessary (Waterman and Meier 1998, 176; 
Waterman and Meier 2004, 21). In order to direct the agent to follow the 
principal’s preferences, the principal sets up various mechanisms to monitor the 
agent’s activities. The oversight mechanisms include police patrol oversight, 
which directly monitors the agent’s activities, as well as fire alarm oversight, 
which views the agent’s behavior through complaints from a third party. The 
principal also offers incentives and sanctions to alter the agent’s motivation 
through ex ante and ex post mechanisms.  
 
China’s administrative system of central SOEs is structured as a chain of 
principal-agent relations. The Chinese people are the principal; the State Council 
is the agent; the State Council is the principal; the SASAC is its newly 
established agent; the SASAC is the principal; the central SOEs are their agents. 
The first two principal-agent relationships are based on legal decrees and state 
power. The latter one is different, and builds on a de facto ‘contract’: that is, the 
SASAC grants state assets to be managed by SOE employees. Here, the 
position and bonuses of employees, namely the executives and managers, will 
be greatly affected by company performance. Eisenhardt (1989, 60) also 
addresses the fact that the principal-agent literature focuses discussion on the 
principal’s and the agent’s optimal contract, agency behavior and the outcome. 
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After all, “the principal-agent model became the dominant framework for 
examining the difficulties that arise from contracting in any setting” (Kassim and 
Menon 2003, 122). Its central focus is the process of the principal structuring 
incentives for its agents (Gailmard 2014, 91). Apart from the principal’s efforts to 
create incentives for its agents to follow the principal’s will, what weighs more is 
the supervision mechanisms.  
 
As argued in the earlier sections, police patrol oversight mechanisms are 
expensive and time-consuming. It is also very costly for the Chinese government, 
which even sends inspection teams to the local area to look for fire alarm signals. 
Direct monitoring and sanctions as oversight mechanisms are expensive. The 
principal’s economic incentives to the agent are also limited, so that they cannot 
provide a perfect solution for perpetual principal-agent problems (McCubbins et 
al. 1987, 273). This may possibly be the reason that China’s “wheel war” style 
police patrol mechanisms function well in the management of central SOEs, but 
this experience cannot easily be transferred to local SOEs.  
 
The reason behind the Chinese government’s determination to keep a tight hold 
on central SOEs and make considerable efforts in the oversight mechanisms has 
legitimacy and ideological concerns as well, although, as Holbig and Gilley (2010, 
400) argue regarding economic performance, neither economic growth nor 
economic decline would directly challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese 
government. However, economic growth can be portrayed as beneficial to 
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citizens’ wellbeing. Zeng (2014, 622) echoes this argument and notes that 
Chinese domestic scholars have already realized the difficulties in basing the 
government’s legitimacy to rule on economic growth alone. It can also be seen 
from the SASAC’s official discourse how state-owned enterprises interlock with 
the wellbeing of the Chinese people. Central SOEs are seen as the pillar industry 
of the economy, and as directly affecting people’s livelihood. The Guideline for 
Deepening Reforms of State-owned Enterprises (State Council 2015 No.22) 
defines state-owned enterprises as being owned by the Chinese people, and as 
the defining force for achieving modernization and protecting people’s common 
interests.  
 
The developmental state is known to have been criticised as “government 
selecting winners”. Certainly, the state’s intervention in market activities can be 
presented in different forms and will create both winners and losers. Government 
intervention manipulates and disturbs the operation of the invisible hand, which 
raises questions as to why this industry, and not another industry; why this 
company, and not another? Moreover, intervention creates rent-seeking activities 
that involve state supported privileges being located in the wrong place or in a 
wrong way (Hindmoor 2006a, 87). This chapter examines the principal-agent 
relationship between the SASAC and the central SOE, as well as the supervisory 
roles other central government institutions play in monitoring the performance of 
central SOEs. It contributes to the argument that, given an adequate oversight 
mechanism, state-owned enterprises can also be competitive in the market. By 
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selectively use of market tools to develop the Chinese variant of the 
developmental state, the state maximizes the possibility of having vibrant market 
competition, while having the capacity to play a leading role in market activities. 
 
The principal-agent theory is the most appropriate to provide an analysis of the 
relations between the SASAC and central SOEs. It assists the understanding of 
the developmental state path China has taken in the management of central 
state assets. It is also helpful in explaining how central SOEs in China have been 
able to rise while SOEs in other developing countries have failed. The central 
SOEs’ success should not be solely attributed to the market mechanism and the 
competition it brings. The state’s innovative police patrol oversight mechanisms 
and the incentives and constraints ex ante and ex post should also be taken into 
account. However, the principal-agent relations in China’s state asset 
management are not flawless. Kassim and Menon (2003, 125) raise concerns 
about the effectiveness of delegation. For the principal, the choice is either to 
conduct close supervision and try to limit the agents’ losses, or to allow the agent 
more autonomy in the hope of obtaining high performance. China’s ‘wheel war’ of 
police patrol oversight draws in many different government institutions. It is, of 
course, expensive and time-consuming for the supervisory institutions. It is time-
consuming and troublesome for the agent as well. Although the central SOEs 
have most of their valuable assets listed on the stock exchange, there is a big 
part of their assets that is hidden from sight at the group level, which is an 
obscure area. This is particularly a problem with central SOEs in monopolistic 
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sectors, where only around 50% of their assets are listed, unlike central SOEs in 
competitive sectors, most of which list more than 90% of their total assets on the 
stock exchange.  
 
Although the principal-agent theory is a handy toolkit for examining the 
contractual relationship between the principal and the agent, it also has 
limitations. Tallberg (2006, 199) sees that principal-agent problems “exist 
inherently”. The principal-agent theory cannot provide a perfect solution for 
problems with agents and cannot guarantee an agent’s complete compliance 
with the principal’s order (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 244). Miller (2005, 
216) similarly argues that the principal-agent theory “has been structured as a 
form of ultimate game, and that this provides a clue to the empirical limitations of 
principal-agency models. I argue that an awareness of credible commitment 
problems and moral hazard call for paradoxical reformulations of the PAT”.  
 
The following chapter focuses the discussion on the SASAC as the key institution 
in the management of state-owned assets. It starts with a literature review of the 
SASAC’s historical background and an analysis of its internal institutional 
arrangements. It then moves to an examination of the relations between the 
SASAC and central SOEs, but not limited to the supervisory relations between 
them. It argues that there are many different roles the SASAC plays in its 
interaction with central SOEs. Their interactions are in the manner of ‘competition 
and cooperation’. The SASAC’s developmental state model of governance has 
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facilitated the expansion and growth of central state assets. The SASAC as a 
pilot agency has achieved its primary aim in maintaining and increasing the value 
of state assets. However, it also seeks to play different roles in the state assets 
management system. The next chapter studies the multiple roles the SASAC 
plays as the investor, a supervisor, a policymaker, a buffer area, a peacemaker 



















Chapter 4 The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
Thus far, the thesis has examined the macro-theoretical debate on whether 
China is a developmental state, how the market mechanism facilitates the 
country’s path as a differentiated developmental state, and how the analytical 
principal-agent theory assists the understanding of relations between the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and central 
SOEs. From this chapter on, the discussion moves to empirical studies, which 
present a vivid picture of how existing theories meet reality in contemporary 
China. The empirical work for this thesis consists of a study of the fundamental 
institution in China’s state assets management system—the SASAC, and two 
case studies of central SOEs under SASAC’s administration. It explores the 
under-researched field of centrally controlled SOEs through extensive interviews 
with policymakers in the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission in Beijing, with senior managers in the central SOEs’ headquarters 
in Beijing, and with their operational branches in Shanghai and Hangzhou. 
Triangulating the information from these sources with a review of laws and 
SASAC-issued policy papers will contribute rich qualitative data to answer the 
research questions, while providing a new understanding of centrally controlled 
SOEs in China. 
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In the previous chapters, the historical development of state ownership and the 
state’s role in the state ownership reform process were examined through the 
theoretical lens of the developmental state and its seesaw battle with 
international market influences. Also, the state’s efforts in promoting the 
development of state-owned enterprises in China, and the contradictious in 
ideological recognition, have been discussed through the theoretical lenses of 
the developmental state. As noted, “The key feature of China’s political economy 
model is the interplay between political and economic (sub-) systems. The two 
sub-systems have co-evolved, constantly interacting, so that each shapes, and is 
shaped by, the other,” (Chen and Naughton 2017,18). That is, the establishment 
of the SASAC, and the inherent need for modification of its function, role and 
political position, were shaped by the reform and development of state-owned 
enterprises. The SASAC’s institutional function, internal structure, and the focus 
of its work also show interaction with market fluctuations and the SOEs’ 
operational performances.  
 
As argued in Chapter 2, China’s state assets management system follows a 
developmental state model and the SASAC works as its pilot agency to promote 
the reform and development of the central SOEs. The SASAC uses market 
mechanism as its tools, adopting market criteria for promoting the central SOEs’ 
distinctive role, while rejecting complete marketization of its SOEs. As 
demonstrated in the principal-agent theory chapter, the government is also the 
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source of structural change in institutions. The principal-agent analysis, as 
described in this thesis, presents a different picture, which goes across, and 
combines, the principal in the political system and the agent in the market sphere. 
The SASAC, in this situation, is a multi-functional government institution that is 
the supervisor and the pilot agency, while acting as a facilitator to push the SOEs 
further towards market competition. Relations between the SASAC and central 
SOEs cannot be explained by the traditional, straightforward principal-agent 
theory. The SASAC’s role varies from monitor to facilitator, investor, supervisor 
and more. The SASAC has kept repositioning and adjusting its role as it has 
ridden the wave of China’s market reform, and it has maintained its legitimacy 
into the present. In this chapter, the discussion will focus on this key institution in 
China’s state ownership system. To be specific, the chapter will provide a 
detailed analysis based on the SASAC’s various roles, such as financer, 
manager, transmitting body and buffer area in China’s state ownership system. 
Starting with a review of the historical context, roles and functions, and intra-
governmental relations among the SASAC and other actors, which include 
ministries, bureaus, and government at local levels, the chapter will also serve as 
a bridge to the following two case study chapters in which two central SOEs – 
one in the free market sector and the other in the monopolistic industry sector – 
will be analyzed. 
 
An analysis of the SASAC based on the social and economic context of 
contemporary China helps us to answer the research questions.  
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1.  What is the SASAC? What kind of roles and functions does it play in the state 
ownership system?  
 
2.  How can the SASAC as a new government institution, established at a 
ministerial level, but not as a formal ministry, monitor the giant SOEs, which have 
been transformed from ministerial status?  
 
3.  To what extent can the SASAC be seen as an important actor, and how does 
it situate itself among all the other government ministries and institutions 
regarding the management and supervision of the SOEs’ operations?  
 
 
4.2. An overview of the SASAC  
 
This section starts with a general look at the social context within which the 
SASAC and SOEs operate, followed by an introduction of the SASAC’s function 
and its role in China’s political system. After this, a detailed analysis will be given 
of the SASAC’s institutional structure.  
 
The legitimacy of state ownership in China is based on the country’s 
Constitutional Law. In the first chapter of this, General Principles, Article 7, it is 
laid down that, “The state economy is the sector of the socialist economy that is 
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under the ownership of the whole people; it is the leading force in the national 
economy. The state ensures the consolidation and growth of the state economy.” 
The question is not about the legitimacy of state ownership but about recognizing 
which government departments represent the ownership of these assets and 
should take responsibility for the losses and gains related to them, since Kornai 
(1992, 75 in Xu and Gui 2016, 104) argues, “State property belongs to all and to 
none.” In theory, the state-owned enterprises of China belong to all the people, 
and the state exerts control on behalf of the people. However, in practice, state-
owned enterprises are monitored and owned by the government at both national 
and local levels (Breslin 2009, 48). The SASAC’s establishment was meant to 
define clear ownership of state-owned assets. The SASAC was not transformed 
from a single ministry; instead, it reassembled the responsibilities and duties that 
had previously rested in many different ministries (Pearson 2007, 305). Figure 
4.1 shows that, before 1998, there were nine ministries in the political hierarchy 
between the State Council and the SOEs. These included the State Planning 
Commission, the State Economic and Trade Commission, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Personnel, the Ministry of Foreign 
Economics and Trade, the Organizational Department of the Communist Party of 
China, the State Workers’ Union, and other industrial ministries. In the period 
1998 to 2003, the number of ministries and government institutions was revised, 
and the number of ministries between the State Council and the SOEs dropped 
to five (OECD 2006). This shows that before 2003 there were many government 
institutions that could give orders and to the SOEs and expect the SOEs to 
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respond. This multi-principal rule led to the dispersal of responsibility for the 
investment return on state assets. This system defect made it hard to clarify and 
locate responsibility within a single ministry (SASAC 2016,85). The complex 
network of central level ministries and the unclear power relations among the 
ministries did not provide a favorable internal environment in which the SOEs 





Figure 4.1, Organization of the ownership function within the state administration, 
as defined in SASAC officer Jia’s Speech at the OECD (2006).  
 
Therefore, the State Council simplified the government structure for the 
management of state-owned assets. The National People’s Congress approved 
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the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) in 2003. Agreement was reached to set up a special 
ministerial-level institution directly under the State Council’s administration to 
function as the shareholder for 193 central state-owned enterprises (NPC 2003). 
The SASAC is the institution that “undertakes investor’s responsibilities, 
supervises and manages the state-owned assets of enterprises under the 
supervision of the central government (excluding financial enterprises which are 
controlled by the Ministry of Finance), and enhances the management of the 
state-owned assets” (SASAC 2016). Since then, the task of managing state-
owned assets has been removed from nine ministries and concentrated in the 
SASAC. As Jung (2011, 132) suggests, the establishment of the SASAC and the 
adjustments made in the economic bureaucracy show the state’s efforts to build 
a more efficient mechanism to conduct a more focused method of intervention in 





Figure 4.2. SASAC organizational structure.  Adapted from SASAC information, 
modified and augmented by the author in May 2017. 
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The SASAC’s organizational structure follows a typical Chinese government 
structure rather than a modern enterprise structure. The bureaus and offices 
inside the SASAC can be divided into three broad categories. As seen from 
figure 4.2, it has 23 internal bureaus, each with different functions and 
responsibilities. The Supervisory Bureau, whose members are sent out to 
enterprises by the Central Discipline Committee, is a permanent bureau inside 
the SASAC, and though it has not been created by the SASAC, it can be seen as 
a de-facto bureau in the SASAC system. Each bureau is in charge of one aspect 
of SOEs’ management. There are newly organized bureaus which assist the 
SASAC’s role as a pilot agency in the developmental state framework:, for 
example, the Bureau of Planning and Development, which sets out grand 
strategic plans for the central SOEs. The newly formed Bureau of International 
Cooperation demonstrates the SASAC’s role as a pilot agency for leading SOEs 
to be globally competitive. The Bureau of Industrial Association is designed to 
work with industrial enterprises. As discussed in the previous chapter, central 
SOEs are in the leading positions in each industry. Therefore, they are able, in 
turn, to offer professional advice to the SASAC and other relevant governmental 
institutions concerning industry standards and difficulties in practice.  
 
Apart from the 29 officers of the Board of Supervisors who are sent to take up 
permanent positions in central SOEs, three new bureaus of supervision have 
been established. The adjustment of internal bureaus in this restructuring of the 
governance system has put an emphasis on the SASAC’s role as supervisor. 
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The three newly created bureaus have been designated the First, Second and 
Third Bureaus of Supervision. The First Bureau of Supervision is in charge of the 
work of the members of the Board of Supervisors who are dispatched to central 
SOEs; the Second Bureau of Supervision is responsible for 52 CSOEs in 10 
industries; while the Third Bureau of Supervision is in charge of the other 50 
CSOEs in 11 industries (SASAC 2016a). This adjustment shows the SASAC, as 
the principal, has been strengthening the ex post oversight mechanism. Apart 
from these two bureaus, there are also the Bureau of Financial Supervision, the 
Bureau of Evaluation and Distribution, and the Bureau of Capital Management 
and Returns which assist the SASAC in its oversight role in principal-agent 
relations. 
 
In the 2016 bureau readjustment, the SASAC also merged bureaus with similar 
functions. For example, the Bureau of Enterprise Restructure was merged into 
the Bureau of Enterprise Reform. The new bureau was created to direct and 
supervise the SOEs’ operations in merger and acquisition processes. It also 
aimed to improve corporate governance structures as well as to direct 
enterprises to separate their supplementary activities from their main business. 
The Bureau of International Cooperation is also newly created, and its work 
exemplifies the SASAC’s official discourse about building “globally competitive 
enterprises” and the Chinese government’s grand strategy of “One belt one road”. 
Regarding the Communist Party’s role in the SASAC, it is interesting to see that, 
although the SASAC’s official discourse calls for further “strengthening of the 
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Party’s leadership”, there are only three bureaus whose functions relate to party 
building and propaganda purposes, namely, the Bureau of Publicity, the Bureau 
of Party Building and the Party Committee of Key Sub-Units of SASAC, which 
are key subunits of the SASAC. This fact supports the argument in the theoretical 
chapter that China is, in fact, “ideologically light”. This new arrangement also 
supports the argument in the previous chapter that the SASAC’s political 
discourse of “strengthening the Party’s leadership” could be understood as a 
means of serious supervision of the central SOEs. When the SASAC called for 
stricter party control, and the merging of the two positions of CEO and party 
secretary so that they were held by one person (SASAC 2017), what the SASAC 
intended was to further reinforce the principal’s control over the agent’s activities. 
This can be seen as a way of preventing evasive conduct by the agent in the 
principal-agent relationship, because it simplifies the principal’s responsibility, 
thus strengthening the power of the principal. 
 
The second main category in the SASAC organizational structure is the 
Supervisory Board system. There are 29 supervisory board offices each 
consisting of around four or five ‘supervisors’ with high ranking as central 
governmental officials, most of them being minister-level or vice-minister level 
officers. Each one of the 29 supervisory board offices oversees around four or 
five central SOEs. The Supervisory Board sends a team of permanent officers to 
the central SOEs of which it is in charge. These supervisory officers are 
permanently based in the headquarters of the SOEs and have the right to audit 
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every conference and meeting, checking accounting documents or anything else 
when needed (  BJCNBM/04/2015). There is another set of institutions directly 
affiliated with the SASAC and these employ officers who support the SASAC’s 
administrative needs. The institutions include a research center (internal think 
tank), information center, training center, news center and the China Business 
Executive Academy. The total number of officials is unknown; however, it could 
reasonably be estimated to stand at around 1000 people. 
 
SASAC Directors: career path and term strategies 
 
From 2003 to 2017, the SASAC has had five directors. Li Rongrong, who is seen 
as the founding father of the SASAC, held the position for the longest term, from 
2003 to 2010. After Li, there were Wang Yong, from 2010 to 2013; Jiang Jiemin, 
from March 2013 to September 2013, Zhang Yi, from 2013 to 2015, and Xiao 
Yaqing, from 2015 until the present. Their common characteristic was that they 
had all had extensive experience of working in, and connections with, ministries 
that dealt with state-owned enterprises. The third director, Jiang Jiemin, had 
spent most of his career in the oil and petrol industry; but the other four directors 
had all had rich experience in local level government as well as in parallel central 
ministries. Their working experience reflected on the strategy each of them 
adopted when in office. Li Rongrong, the first director of the SASAC, from 2003 
to 2010, had had experience of working with both central and local governments. 
He started his career working for the Planned Economy Committee of Wuxi 
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Municipal Government, moved to the Planned Economy Committee of Jiangsu 
Provincial Government, and later went to the National Economic and Trade 
Commission. He aimed at reducing the number of central SOEs while enlarging 
the size of the enterprises. His successor, Wang Yong, had had abundant 
working experience in state-owned enterprises in different industries. Wang had 
spent his early career in the China Aerospace Corporation, and had then worked 
in national level ministries, including the Organization Department of the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Administration of Quality Supervision and 
Quarantine. Unlike Li, Wang focused on improving the efficiency and productivity 
of the central SOEs. Jiang Jiemin had previously worked for the Shandong 
Shengli Oilfield (SLOP), the Qinghai Petroleum Administration Bureau, the 
Qinghai Provincial Government and Petrol China. However, six months after 
taking the chair of the SASAC, Jiang was detained by the Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection and was put under investigation for corruption. Zhang Yi 
had followed a traditional career path, starting from working in county level 
government, then steadily moving up to municipal, provincial and national levels 
of government. Xiao Yaqing, the current SASAC director, was promoted from his 
position as CEO of a well-performing central SOE—the Aluminum Corporation of 
China. All the SASAC directors except Jiang had had abundant working 
experience in various kinds of government organization, including local 
authorities, the local levels of central bureaus, and different ministries, which 
gives them a clear picture of the complex relations and power struggles within 
China’s central-local government structure. Their past careers in SOEs had given 
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them first-hand experience of the difficult situation of having market competition 
and government intervention to deal with at the same time. 
 
When the SASAC was established, there were 196 SOEs under its 
administration. The first director, Li Rongrong, aimed at reducing the number of 
central SOEs, in order to enlarge the size of the enterprises. As illustrated in 
figure 4.3, during his administrative term, the number of central SOEs dropped 




Figure 4.3. Total number of central SOEs under the SASAC’s administration, 
2003-2016. Adapted from SASAC, modified and augmented by the author in May 
2017. 
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The linear graph in figure 4.3 shows that the number of central SOEs was 
reduced by 48 percent, from 196 in 2003, when the SASAC was established, to 
102 by the end of 2016. The graph reveals that there was a significant fall from 
2003 to 2011, followed by a plateau between 2011 and 2014. After that, in 2015 
and 2016, the SASAC became actively involved in regrouping and restructuring 
SOEs again. The target and strategy the SASAC adopted and carried out 
changed through the development period. When the SASAC was established, 
the central SOEs were located in various dispersed industries, distribution 
according to industry was unbalanced, and competition was commonly seen 
among central SOEs. The first director, Li Rongrong, who held the position of 
chair of the SASAC from 2003 to 2010, aimed to reduce the number of CSOEs to 
less than 100 in his term. Although this ambitious target was not fully achieved, 
the number of central SOEs was significantly reduced, to 122. “Li aimed at 
building up the size of the enterprises whereas his successor Wangyong focused 







Figure 4.4. Restructuring and reorganization of central SOEs under the SASAC’s 
administration from 2003 to the present. Adapted from SASAC information, 
modified and augmented by the author in May 2017.  
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After the SASAC had been founded, in 2003, it began the process of 
reorganizing and regrouping the central SOEs. Unlike in the 1960s, there were a 
large number of state-owned enterprises, but each of these had a relatively small 
scale of production. The SOEs remained relatively isolated from each other, even 
those within the same industry (Coase and Wang 2013). There were, in total, 102 
commercial activities being carried on among central SOEs in the period 2003 to 
May 2017. Figure 4.4 explains the changes in, and the business activities 
conducted by, these enterprises from 2003 till the end of 2016. As can be seen 
from the figure, merger and acquisition were the most common forms of business 
restructuring among central SOEs during that time, and 75 cases contributed 74 
per cent of the enterprise reform activities. Also, there were 19 cases of central 
SOEs regrouping and reorganizing, and these contributed 19 percent of the 
companies’ reform activities. Four central SOEs were newly created, and two 
were withdrawn from the list due to bankruptcy. The SASAC handed over one 
central SOE to the Ministry of Water Resources in 2006 and took over one from 
the State Council, which was merged into the China National Cereals, Oils and 
Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) in 2013. 
 
SASAC officers continuously encourage and support mergers and regrouping of 
central SOEs so as to build a stronger group of central SOEs to compete in the 
global market. There are certain advantages for the SASAC in maintaining a 
small group of well-performing big businesses. Zhao (2015) argues that the 
grouping of central SOEs avoids competition between SOEs when it comes to 
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bidding on overseas projects, which maximizes the interests of the central SOEs. 
Li (2015) realized that the central bureaucracy’s strategy in narrowing the range 
of direct interventions in SOEs, especially central SOEs, could make the state’s 
control more efficient and focused. He further pointed out that the central 
government and relevant political institutions could improve their connections 
with the SOEs and strategic sectors. However, Yu (2014, 182) raised concerns 
about the central SOEs’ monopolistic status being strengthened and inter-
industrial mergers consolidating the monopoly power of the newly formed big 
businesses and the accumulation of their assets and profits under the control of 
elite members of the CCP system. Sheng (2015) supported Yu’s argument and 
pointed out that the rise of large SOE groups based on the government’s 
preferential policies and loans would upset the domestic market mechanism, thus 
leaving enterprises with other types of ownership at a disadvantage that would 
harm the entire market environment in which business was done in China.  
 
 
4.3. The SASAC and central SOEs   
 
This section will be divided into three parts. It starts with an examination of the 
SASAC’s role as a shareholder and facilitator, which will be discussed based on 
the developmental state theory this thesis has adopted. This will be followed by 
an analysis of the SASAC as a transmitting agency that also serves as a buffer in 
China’s partial practice of marketization in guiding the growth of central SOEs in 
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the market. After this, there will be continued analysis of the SASAC as a 
supervisor that frequently finds a way to conquer the problem of asymmetric 
information and to provide better oversight in the principal-agent relationship 
between itself, central SOEs and their second-tier companies.   
 
4.3.1 The SASAC as an investor and facilitator 
 
This section studies the SASAC’s role as an investor and facilitator. The SASAC 
acts as an investor in central SOEs on behalf of all the Chinese people; and it 
facilitates the growth of central SOEs and, most importantly, facilitates the reform 
of the state assets management system. As seen in a significant number of 
official documents, the SASAC defines itself as the investor, and as representing 
the State Council in the conduct of its duties and obligations (SASAC 2016). 
Although China has been labelled a communist country for years, its economy 
takes the form of government-lead economic development rather than a Soviet-
style planned economy (Wu 2013:31). From the developmental state perspective, 
the SASAC is the institution that leads the SOEs’ reform and development. It is 
the central SASAC’s duty to push forward the reform and restructuring of SOEs, 
advance the establishment of a modern enterprise system, improve corporate 
governance, and promote strategic adjustment of the layout and structure of the 
state economy (SASAC 2016.). Since the SASAC was established, it has been 
actively pushing forward and guiding the reform of central SOEs. As illustrated in 
figure 4.4, there are five main measures the SASAC has adopted in reforming 
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the SOEs, and through merger and acquisition, and reorganization and/or 
regrouping, central SOEs have had their size dramatically enlarged within a short 
period. As a result, the SASAC holds assets with a value of over 10 billion RMB, 
and “It aims to achieve the goal of a growth in central SOEs’ annual profits of 
around 10 percent, which has to be higher than the country’s annual GDP growth” 
(  BJSASAC/02/2015). The centrally administrated SOEs have reported 
substantial increases in production rates, profits and taxes paid since 2007.  
 
Integrating the Industrial Chain:  
 
This chapter argues that the SASAC has a strategic plan and a grand goal for 
central SOEs, as its position as a pilot agency in a developmental state enables it 
to do. It focuses mainly on profit, and the returns rate on the assets of the central 
SOEs, when evaluating the enterprises’ market performance. The SASAC’s 
project of separating SOEs into different categories based on their functions and 
main business is a continuation of developmental state thinking in managing 
SOEs.  (BJSASAC/19/2015), director of the SASAC research institute, 
explains “We are working on the layout and the structural adjustment of state 
ownership in the whole economic framework. Horizontally, we encourage the 
merger of central SOEs with similar businesses; vertically, we promote the 
integration of the industrial chain.” The merger of central SOEs in similar 
businesses is a reflection of the SASAC’s famous slogan about making central 
SOEs “bigger, better and stronger”. The merger of the China South Locomotive 
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and Rolling Stock Corporation (CSR Corp) and the China North Locomotive and 
Rolling Stock Industry Corporation (China CNR) to create the CRRC Corporation 
Limited can be seen as an example. It shows the SASAC’s efforts to merge 
central SOEs in similar industries to build a stronger national team, while 
reducing the situation of intra-enterprise competition between the CSOEs. The 
new CRRC is the largest supplier of rail transit equipment, and is listed on the 
Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges (CRRC 2017). 
 
The strategy of integrating the industrial chain can be seen in the central SOEs’ 
efforts to acquire small and medium size companies and factories, in order to 
create for themselves a coherent production chain. Another well-known case of a 
merger between central SOEs in a strategic sector is the merger of the China 
National Cotton Reserves Corporation (CNCRC) with SinoGrain in 2016. The 
regrouping of the CRRC demonstrates the SASAC’s aim to have central SOEs 
that are globally competitive in the free market, since the CSR Corp and the 
China CNR are in a competitive market and are aiming to do business in the 
global market; whereas, the merger of the CNCRC into SinoGrain illustrates the 
SASAC’s political role in protecting China’s strategic material reserves, since the 
primary goal for these two companies is not to be profitable in the market but to 
protect the country’s food security and cotton reserves. The merger and 
acquisition activities of the central SOEs are also subject to constraint. The 
Bureau of Planning and Development has issued a Notice on Strengthening 
Supervision Over the Merger and Acquisition Activities of Central Enterprises 
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(SASACBPD 2004 No.720), and this rules that the merger and acquisition 
activities of CSOEs must take place according to national industrial policy. For 
overcapacity industries such as steel, electrolytic aluminum and cement, central 
SOEs have to report to the SASAC before they merge. Also, the central SOEs 
should, in principle, conduct merger and acquisition activities in their main 
business. 
 
The idea of holding state ownership tightly in the hands of the government 
demonstrates that the SASAC believes in classical developmental state ideas on 
having the government lead industrialization in order to catch up with the western 
advanced economy.  (BJSASAC/02/2015) notes, “It is important for China to 
maintain the state ownership system. After all, there is a long way to go for China 
to catch up with the developed economies.” Xiang (BJDRC/15/15) echoes Zhao’s 
ideas and believes that the central SOEs’ existence gives the central government 
the flexibility and ability to direct the country’s economy growth. Xiang argues 
that, “The centralization of resources allows the central government to have high 
proficiency in completing major national projects, thus achieving its strategic 
goals.” The central SOEs controlled by the SASAC include China’s largest three 
petroleum companies. The petroleum industry is seen as a crucial strategic 
sector for the national economy.  (BJSASAC/20/2015) believes that “The 
state’s monopoly of the oil industry allows it to adjust and mobilize petrol 
resources whenever needed. Petrol and other natural resources are essential 
goods needed for most of the industrial sectors in China.” He further maintains, 
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“Marketisation is the ultimate goal, but some valuable resources are monopolies 
by nature. The rarer the resources is, the more control will be applied by the 
central government.” The above arguments are typical developmental state 
thoughts which recognize the government’s leading role in achieving industrial 
growth. Therefore, it can be argued that the SASAC puts an emphasis on the 
ownership and control of central SOEs so that it can have the power to adjust the 
national economy when necessary. 
 
Grasping the Big, Let go the Small  
 
There has been an ongoing debate on the privatization of SOEs since the 1980s. 
At that time, when the Chinese government conducted a state ownership reform 
plan to maintain government ownership of big SOEs and to privatize small and 
medium sized SOEs, this was known as a policy of “grasp the big and let go the 
small” (in Chinese: 抓大放小 ). During the reform period, when China was 
determined to praise marketization and ask for further reform, the massive 
privatization of small and medium size enterprises was heavily influenced by the 
neoliberal trend, whereas such action was rarely seen in the large state-owned 
enterprises. Huang (2012) and Zhang (2009) supported the privatization 
measures and argued that could improve efficiency and increase creativity. 
Huang (2011) suggested that China should adopt a more liberal economic and 
political environment – one such as Deng Xiaoping sought to create in his 
“reform and opening up” – to further boost economic growth. Mao (2015) 
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criticized SOEs for using a significant amount of resources, in terms of capital, 
land resources and other benefits, while having relatively low productivity. He 
thought the SOEs should leave more market space for other types of ownership 
to operate in.  Although, Holz (2002) argued against the opinion that SOEs were 
inefficient and unproductive, he held an optimistic view of the future development 
of Chinese SOEs because statistics showed that SOEs in industrial sectors 
performed better compared to their privatized counterparts. Sheng (2015) 
echoed Mao’s criticism and pointed out the problems regarding the redundant 
staff in China’s two oligopoly oil companies, the CNPC and Sinopec. He believed 
that the central SOEs’ profit growth was significant, but if the per capital 
productivity of these central SOEs were calculated, the result would not be ideal. 
Royal Dutch Shell’s per capital productivity is 10.5 times of that of Sinopec and 
18.5 times of that of the CNPC.  
 
The SASAC does not conduct a massive program of privatization of central 
SOEs, and their sub companies have far more complicated reasons for their 
activities. Apart from the obvious advantage of being owned by the state, central 
SOEs have shouldered heavy historical burdens and social security burdens that 
cannot be simply ignored.  (BJSASAC/20/2015) uses the example of a 
serious problem of redundant workers in the China National Petroleum Group’s 
sub-company in Jizhong City, Liaoning Province, to explain. It is impossible for 
the CNPC to conduct a massive layoff of its redundant staff, which is 
approximately one-third of the employees, because the local government cannot 
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afford the potential social turmoil, and does not have the ability to solve the 
problem of unemployment among local residents. It is true that the CNPC’s per 
capita productivity could be improved significantly if it got rid of its 
superabundance of employees across the country. However, it is unrealistic to do 
since the government does not have the ability to take responsibility for a high 
unemployment rate among local residents. Therefore, for national security 
reasons, a massive layoff of SOE workers cannot easily be accomplished. Also, 
the government depends on the central SOEs’ efforts and investment in disaster 
relief work as well as in environmental protection projects. When an earthquake 
happens, the Chinese government can easily give an order to the SOEs to 
devote themselves to disaster relief work, regardless of the cost. Enterprises with 
other ownership pay more attention to their shareholders’ interests, but SOEs are 
owned by the state (Zhao BJSASAC/02/15). Clearly, the SASAC is the central 
SOEs’ investor, but it is an investor that is not only keen on economic returns but 
also on getting central SOEs to take on social responsibilities, since the building 
of China’s social security system is not completed yet. 
 
Apart from that, the central government’s interest in fostering large-scale 
enterprises also lies in making regulatory rules for different industries. “The 
SASAC’s expectations for central SOEs include having the ability to lay down 
rules for industry while having a more global impact” (  BJSASAC/14/2015). 
This opinion is echoed by  (BJSASAC/02/2015), who argues that “Domestic 
China is experiencing industrial transformation and updating, and we hope to 
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upgrade industry while exporting our over-capacity products to other countries 
through the One Belt One Road plan.” The SASAC encourages the central SOEs 
to become industry leaders, increasing their size and profitability so that they can 
be involved in rule-making activities in their industry associations. In 
implementing China’s “outward-looking policy”, this export of overcapacity 
products helps to optimize the industrial structure in mainland China. It is 
conceded that the SASAC not only plays the role of an investor, as part of 
developmental state thinking, but also works as a facilitator that adopts the 




4.3.2. The SASAC as a transmitting agency and a buffer area  
 
China’s state-owned enterprises have long been subject to constraints. The 
businesses lack operational autonomy, and are generally subject to the control 
and restraint of various national institutions and administrative policies. 
Traditional SOEs were organizations that were created as work units in the 
planned economy period to serve social and political purposes rather than to 
achieve economic gains (Hua, Miesing & Li 2006, 403). In the year 
1993,amendments to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China were 
issued. Article 16, which used to say, “state-owned enterprises, under the unified 
leadership of the country to obey and fulfil the whole of the national plan, within 
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the limits prescribed by law, have management autonomy” was amended to say, 
“state-owned enterprises within the limits prescribed by law have the right to 
make their own decisions.” The phrase “obey and fulfil the whole of the national 
plan” was eliminated, which gave the SOEs more autonomy in business 
operations. From 1993 onwards, SOEs changed from being business units in a 
planned economy to being enterprises that could compete in the market 
economy but retained the basic SOE organizational form (Li and Putterman 
2008). “The ultimate goal for the SASAC is promoting marketization and the 
overall listing of the central SOEs. However, what distinguish Chinese SOEs 
from those of western countries is that the enterprises’ motivation comes from 
the will of the state” (Zhao BJSASAC/02/15). Even though the constitution was 
modified to ensure the SOEs’ rights and autonomy, the nature of SOEs has not 
experienced a dramatic change.  
 
From the previous discussion, it can be seen that the debate on SOEs also deals 
with their profit earning ability. Xu and Gui (2016) point out that the significant 
growth Chinese SOEs have achieved in recent years can be partly attributed to 
the Chinese government’s marketization strategies. However, the more 
significant driving force lies in distorted policies that favor SOEs. Pei in 
Fukuyama (2014: 379) argues that the subunits include giant enterprises — for 
example, China Telecom and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation – 
which, during the 2000s, gained in relative power over their private-sector rivals 
and foreign investors, and have been able to use their political clout to avoid 
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competitive threats to their position. The impressive performance of SOEs, 
especially the central SOEs, is due to subsidies and other forms of preferential 
treatment from the Chinese government (Xu and Gui 2016; Sheng 2015). The 
above discussion shows one side of the view that SOEs’ profitability is primarily 
based on the nature of their ownership. However, the actual total of subsidies 
received by central SOEs remains unknown. Wang and Du (BJSASAC/07/2015) 
partially agree with the idea that central SOEs are recipients of various kinds of 
subsidies, but they have been unable to obtain an accurate amount for the 
subsidies central SOEs are given. This is due to a number of government 
institutions other than the SASAC being involved, for example, banks, industrial 
organizations and local governments. 
 
China’s strong government capacity allows the SASAC to manage and adjust its 
position in conducting state-ownership reform and the development of central 
SOEs. Yang and Zhao (2015, 66) argue that China’s market-oriented reform 
does not weaken state intervention in the economy. It combines the two 
contradictory characteristics and conducts continuous policy experimentation, 
adjusting subsequent experiments according to the results. Besides, Chinese 
developmental state bureaucrats have the ability to implement and execute 
strategic planning without being interrupted by democracy (Zhao 2010, 423). The 
government’s strong state capacity allows it to undertake policy experimentation 
(Heilmann 2008), making policy shifts, as well as adjusting policy based on 
previous consequences, both intended and unintended (Yang and Zhao 2010). 
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This can be described as “experience first, law later”. Heilmann, in his most 
prominent work on policy experimentation (Heilmann 2011, 99), points out that 
China’s policy experimentation in its economic reform is implemented and 
institutionalized to a high degree. The SASAC conducts “experimental items” 
also known as “pilot projects” [试点]: that is the pilot policy is tried out by selected 
central SOEs before being issued as a policy that will be applied to all the 
companies in the state ownership system. 
 
Introducing Market Standard to the SOEs  
 
In the SASAC’s search to create corporate governance in the central SOEs, 
policy documents of an experimental nature have been issued. As Heilmann 
(2011, 99) argues, the trialing of policies has helped the government to avoid 
policy deadlock and to gain experience of policy implementation. An example of 
this is the Interim Measures for the Standard Operation of the Board of Directors 
of a Central Enterprise in the Pilot Program for the Board of Directors (SASAC 
reform bureau [2009] No. 45), which regulate the establishment, responsibilities, 
working procedures, etc. of the Board of Directors. See also the Administrative 
Measures for the Full-time External Director of Pilot Central Enterprises for the 
Work on the Board of Directors (SASAC SBACE [2009] No. 301) which further 
emphasize the importance of external directors’ roles in accelerating the creation 
of standard corporate governance in central SOEs. Another example is the 
Interim Measures for the ‘Worker Director’ as a Member of the Board of Directors 
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in Wholly State-owned Companies (SASACMWB [2006] No. 21), which decree 
that the board of directors should have a ‘worker director’ who is elected by the 
enterprise workforce. The government also has the autonomy and capacity to 
free itself from ideological restrictions and interest group politics and to 
implement new policies when the negative consequences of earlier policies loom 
large (Yang and Zhao 2015: 68). Hence, the SASAC can supervise the central 
SOEs and adjust policies when necessary. This is an active example of the way 
the government deals with the central SOEs’ business operations. On the other 
hand, the SASAC pushes the central SOEs in market competition, either in non-
monopolistic industries or in monopolistic industries, to compete among 
themselves.    
 
From the time when the SASAC was established, it has adopted an international 
standard to evaluate its central SOEs’ performance. The first director, Li 
Rongrong, took the Global Fortune 500 list as the norm for central SOEs from 
2003 on. “Li aimed to have 30-50 central SOEs in the Global Fortune 500. The 
SASAC adopted the Global Fortune 500 list—a published business listing – very 
seriously, because it was the international standard for evaluating large 
enterprises’ performance. This has been helpful when central SOEs have wanted 
to expand their businesses in the global area. It has also served as a method of 
external evaluation in monitoring central SOEs’ performances” (  
BJSASAC/02/2015). Due to the SASAC’s aim of building global companies, it is 
supposed to be interested in further marketizing the central SOEs. The market 
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strategy the SASAC has proposed to improve the efficiency and profitability of 
central SOEs may sound as though it contradicts the SASAC’s primary 
responsibility and claim: to maintain and increase the value of state assets. 
However, no market activity is without risk. Mixed ownership requires market 
activities such as equity transfers and asset sales. Therefore, the Bureau of 
Property Rights Management of the SASAC has issued a series of policies to 
regulate activities such as equity exchange, assets appraisal and property 
disposal. For instance, the Notice on the Issuing of Guiding Opinions on Actively 
Introducing Private Investment in the Restructuring and Reorganization of SOEs 
(SASACBPRM 2012 No. 80), in which the SASAC encourages the investment of 
private capital in the SOEs, so as to develop mixed-ownership, building a modern 
property rights system and further promoting the growth of SOEs. It can be seen 
from the above discussion that the SASAC and the central SOEs are actively 
involved in the market and in seeking global competitiveness. As I argued in the 
theoretical chapters, the SASAC adopts market criteria to improve performance 
and promote the growth of central SOEs. 
 
Listing the State Assets on the Stock Exchange 
 
What does the SASAC expect from the central SOEs according to a globally 
recognized market standard? The evaluation of central SOEs’ performance 
focuses on the enterprises’ economic performance. As noted in the principal-
agent chapter, profit and return on assets are the two key aspects of the 
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evaluation of senior executives.  (BJSASAC/13/2015) notes, “The current 
assessment system adopts the Economic Value Added (EVA) index. Not only the 
revenue is important but also the net profit less the economic cost of the 
enterprise”. In the Measures for the Assessment of the Operational Performance 
of Persons in Charge of Central SOEs (SASAC [2016] No. 33), chapter 5 clause 
25 decrees that an annual assessment will be conducted every year while a 
more long-term assessment will be conducted every three years. According to 
chapter 6 clauses 34 and 35, the salary of the assessed person consists of three 
parts: one is the guaranteed basic annual salary; but the annual performance 
wage and the long-term performance bonus are subject to the central SOE’s 
performance. This system puts pressure on senior executives, since the 
performance of central SOEs both in the short term and in the long run can 
immediately affect their personal income. The SASAC’s expectation for central 
SOEs to be profitable makes it possible for the latter to gain more autonomy in 
business conduct.  (BJSASAC/19/2015) believes that “Central SOEs enjoy 
considerable autonomy in their daily operational business, and are not disturbed 
by the SASAC. Concerning production and management, the SOEs have a high 
degree of autonomy. But when it comes to salary and bonuses, the SASAC 
maintains very tight control over these. Total wages, including the payment of 
executives, need to be reviewed and approved by the SASAC”.  
(SHPDSASAC/33/2015) agrees with this comment and says that “The SASAC 
tends to make sensible regulations, at the same time granting more autonomy to 
the SOEs in order to increase enterprise vitality. After all, the enterprise’s market 
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performance matters”. Hence, the SASAC performs a supportive role in making 
central SOEs profitable. From the principal-agent perspective, the goal of conflict 
can be understood as being that the SASAC needs more control while the central 
SOEs need more autonomy, but they share the same interest, which is the sound 
performance of the enterprises. 
 
In order to push central SOEs forward in market competition, the SASAC started 
the process of listing central SOEs on the stock exchange. This requires a 
process of selecting well-performing assets from the central SOE group of 
companies and forming them into new stock companies. There are many 
benefits that listing can bring to both the SASAC and the SOEs. The listing of a 
company can be seen as a way to improve the SASAC’s supervision mechanism 
and to reduce the degree of insider control. Also, by involving more productive 
private ownership, SOEs can increasingly adapt to market activities (  
SHPDSASAC/32/2015). Chen (SHPDSASAAC/33/2015) agrees with Wang, and 
further suggests that public listing is a very decisive action for both the SASAC 
and the enterprises. There are many benefits that public listing has brought to the 
SOEs, such as the possibility of raising capital, market value appreciation and 
increased mobility. When companies are listed on the stock exchange, the 
Security Regulatory Committee becomes another principal to regulate and 
monitor the SOEs in the market. Also, more attention will be paid by the general 
public and the media. As argued in the previous chapter, in the principal-agent 
relationship, the principal (SASAC) introduces third parties to monitor the agents’ 
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behavior and this can reduce the level of information asymmetry so to avoid 
evasive action by the agent. However, the SASAC does not give an order for the 
listing of an SOE on the stock exchange. This is done on the SOEs’ own initiative. 
 (SHPDSASAC/33/2015) further notes, “The SASAC does not force the 
SOEs to list themselves on the stock exchange but it does encourage them to do 
so. There are many SOEs submitting applications to the Shanghai stock 
exchange, and there is always a long queue.”  
 
The asset-stripping process cannot avoid dealing with historical burdens. From 
1995 to 2005, two-thirds of SOEs were downsized and privatized. Unlike what 
happened in Eastern European socialist states, the privatization process did not 
lead to political turmoil but to the earning of profit. However, a large number of 
small and medium size firms were transformed into fully private entities and 
‘management buy-outs’ resulted in the creation of rich capitalists and the 
corruption of local government officers. The experience raised the government’s 
confidence in corporate reform and restructuring, and it did not increase the 
unemployment rate significantly. Harvey (2005) sees China’s significant 
economic development after the 1980s as an “unintended consequence of the 
neoliberal turn in the advanced capitalist world.” The Chinese government made 
great efforts to minimize layoffs and unemployment, and to make sure there was 
no link between its actions and a layoff of SOE workers. Oi (2010:11) explains 
that 75 percent of Chinese SOEs were reconstructed without layoffs. It is argued 
that, although reforms were carried out in the state ownership system, the state 
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kept control of the major state-owned enterprises because of the complex social 
network and variety of interests involved (Heilmann 2008, Zhao 2006; Wang et al. 
2011). “The state ownership system left many burdens from the planned 
economy system. These are hard to eliminate, but further steps need to be 
made.” (  BJDRC/16/2015). The central SOEs, as a large group of companies, 
planned to get together their valuable assets to be listed on their behalf, and to 
have the kindergartens, schools, hospitals and other social functions they were 
previously responsible for eliminated or maintained by the group as a whole. The 
asset shedding process also varied, due to the complexity of these central SOEs’ 
local branches in local areas.  (BJSASAC/14/2015) notes that “some SOEs 
divested the kindergarten and hospital from the enterprise, but the local county 
did not have a well-functioning education system, so this made employees’ lives 
harder than before. Some of these SOEs’ tax contributions to local government 
were higher than 95 percent of the local annual taxation; and these practical 
issues needed to be considered before action was taken.” 
 
The centralization of state-owned assets and the more rigorous requirement for 
profit-delivery started after 2010. Yu (2013) sees it as strengthening the state’s 
monopoly in strategic industries and as leading to the resurgence of the state in 
China. The SASAC started to push the CSOEs from partial listing to overall 
listing from 2010 on. In 2011, the SASAC named 11 central SOEs to become 
overall listed companies for both A and H shares (SASAC 2011). A shares are 
issued in mainland China, H shares are issued on the Hong Kong Stock 
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Exchange.  In the past, the state has had a strong hand in deciding which part of 
the group will be a spin-off for the IPO. Usually, the strongest part of a company 
will be listed on the stock market, while any loss-making or heavily indebted part 
of the assets will remain unknown (Wang et al. 2011: 257). There is also a place 
for discussion of relations between the group company and its stock company. 
 (BJDRC/15/2015) believes that if the group parent company level were 
eliminated, the market mechanism might work even better. But the government 
and the central SOEs both need this level to deal with some political 
responsibilities during the reform period.  (SHPDSASAC/32/2015) offers a 
similar argument:  that the listed company should be separate from the group 
company. Otherwise, some of the group company’s activities can damage the 
interests of public shareholders. The group company conducts government 
functions while the stock company is a market player. Therefore, it can be seen 
from the above that the central SOEs as the group company have a heritage of 
post-soviet state assets and at the same time the listed company is a profit-
earning company in the global market. Discussion of the relationship between the 
group company and its stock company will be further dealt with in the following 
chapter. Nevertheless, the central SOEs should be understood as a combination 
of the old system and a new system, which sometimes takes on government 





4.3.3. The SASAC as the Supervisor (Principal-Agent) 
 
The institutional reform of the 2000s clarified and specified the duties and 
responsibilities of the SASAC. It reassembled responsibilities that were 
previously assigned to other ministries, for example, the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, the Ministry of Industry, and so on (Pearson 2007: 305). 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the central government created an 
active principal and supervised its agents carefully, as can also be seen from the 
government’s efforts in recentralizing political power. In order to minimize the 
negative influence of asymmetric information in the relationship between the 
SASAC and central SOEs, the SASAC conducted different types of supervision 
and evaluation methods.   
 
Decision-making rights for the personnel system of the central SOEs have mostly 
been granted to individual central SOEs. The SASAC maintains the power to 
appoint and evaluate the top-level senior executives of enterprises, while leaving 
the appointment of middle-level managers and the rest of the employees to the 
company itself. In the SASAC, there are two bureaus in charge of personnel, 
namely the First Bureau of Personnel and the Second Bureau of Personnel. The 
two bureaus have different functions and are in charge of different sets of central 
SOEs. The First Bureau of Personnel is responsible for appointing all the senior 
executives of the 53 vice-ministry-level group companies and has the right to 
evaluate recommendations for the post of CEO of the group companies. 
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Candidates for the post of CEO of the group company will then be discussed and 
appointed by the Central Organization Department of the Communist Party of 
China. The Second Bureau of Personnel is in charge of appointing the senior 
executives of central SOEs which are not on the 53 vice-ministry-level list (  
BJSASAC/02/2015). Thus, it can be seen from these working procedures that 
although the Central Organization Department is the institution that officially 
appoints the senior executives of the 53 vice-ministry-level group companies, the 
SASAC’s First Bureau of Personnel has equal importance, because the 
candidates are nominated by the First Bureau of Personnel and the Bureau is 
also in charge of the future evaluation of the senior executives’ operational 
performance. The SASAC’s Second Bureau of Personnel, on the other hand, has 
full power over the personnel systems of the rest of the central SOEs. Even so, a 
report needs to be sent to the Central Organization Department for approval. 
 
The SASAC, as the main principal of the state ownership system, in its 
evaluation of central SOEs operations, emphasizes on the financial perspective. 
In the tenure of office of Zhu Rongji (Chinese Premier 1998-2003), an audit 
ombudsman system was set up. According to State Council Order No. 246, the 
audit ombudsman would be sent by the State Council to carry out oversight 
powers on behalf of the State Council. The audit ombudsman would be a ministry 
level or vice-ministry level government officer (State Council 1998). According to 
 (BJSASAC/02/2015), the audit ombudsman system was then transformed 
into the supervisory office system of the SASAC. Each supervisory office has 
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central government bureau-level status, and each is in charge of five to six 
central SOEs. The supervisors on the supervisory committee also have senior 
central government officer status, from minister to vice-minister, and bureau-level 
to department level, with deputy department level as the lowest. Sending out 
senior officers with minister-level rank allows the supervisory committee to exert 
its power in examining central SOEs. The ombudsman system thus represented 
the starting point for the government to identify and try to conquer the principal-
agent problems occurring between themselves and state-owned enterprises. It 
later evolved to become the current system of the Supervisory Board of the 
SASAC whose members are dispatched to central SOE headquarters. 
 
Central SOEs also consistently receive supervision and inspection from other 
ministries apart from the SASAC. The Central Discipline Committee is an outside 
supervisory institution, and the SASAC’s former director, Mr Jiang Jiemin, six 
months after taking office, came under investigation by this committee for 
corruption during his time at the China National Petroleum Company. After that, 
the inspection team went to different central SOEs and their sub-companies for 
extensive inspection work. The SASAC’s supervisory committee focuses on the 
supervision of SOEs’ operations and performance, while the Central Discipline 
Inspection Committee pays attention to individual officers’ corrupt behavior or 
misconduct. “As seen in the media, there are many corruption cases occurring at 
different levels of the central SOEs, as a consequence of the years during which 
the SASAC delegated powers to them. The higher degree of marketisation leads 
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to a higher level of autonomy for the SOEs. Consequently, the SASAC 
increasingly tightens its supervision over central SOEs to prevent the loss of 
state-owned assets” (  BJSASAC/19/2015). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the SASAC’s new strategy of using a ‘wheel war’ police patrol oversight 
mechanism and the dual procedures of ‘resident inspectors on-site’ and ‘short-
term inspection tours’ serve as different means of oversight.  
 
SASAC’s Political Status and Capacity in Governing the CSOEs 
 
We shall move on now to discuss the SASAC’s political status in the Chinese 
government system and its power to issue government regulations and policies, 
as well as the extent to which these policies are important. According to 
Constitutional Law Article 90, “The ministries and commissions issue orders, 
directives and regulations within the jurisdiction of their respective departments 
and in accordance with the laws, the administrative rules and regulations, the 
decisions and the orders issued by the State Council”. Article 71 of the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China reads “The various ministries, commissions, the 
People’s Bank of China, the Audit Agency, and a body directly under the State 
Council exercising regulatory functions, may enact administrative rules within the 
scope of their authority in accordance with national law and administrative 
regulations, as well as the decisions and orders of the State Council”. The 
SASAC, as a ministry-level commission directly under the State Council, can 
issue administrative rulings, such as opinions and measures, to regulate SOEs. 
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Therefore, it can impose both positive and negative incentives on central SOEs. 
As explained in the previous chapter, that there were in total five revisions of the 
Measures for Assessment of the Operational Performance of Persons in charge 
of Central Enterprises between 2003 and 2016. There are also Interim Measures 
for the Administration of Comprehensive Performance Evaluation of Central 
Enterprises (SASAC 2006) to evaluate the economic performance of enterprises 
and adjust the salary of the executives accordingly.  (BJSASAC/20/2015) 
agrees with the argument that profit is seen as the most important indicator in the 
evaluation of SOE performance, because profit is measurable. The SASAC also 
imposes negative incentives on central SOEs. It is the SASAC’s duty to reduce 
the amount of corruption taking place in central SOEs. “Central SOEs are 
involved in business activities which provide opportunities for the managers to 
become involved in corruption and tradeoffs of money and power”  
(BJSASAC/02/2015). For this reason, apart from being a facilitator, the SASAC 
also pays attention to increasing the effectiveness of its supervisory activities.   
 
There are two important external supervisory powers that need to be analyzed: 
the Central Discipline Committee, as mentioned in the previous section, and the 
National Bureau of Statistics, which conducts audits of central SOEs and their 
local branches. The SASAC is continuously working to classify SOEs into 
different categories and evaluate them accordingly. The SOEs are divided into 
two main categories—the commercial category and the public welfare category. 
The commercial category sees the financial performance of the SOEs as their 
 194 
primary responsibility, whereas the public welfare category’s main aim is to 
provide public goods and promote public welfare (SASACRC 2015 No.170). The 
categorization can not only help to clarify different strategies and development 
goals for different SOEs, but also helps the SASAC to improve its supervision 
mechanism by tailoring detailed assessment to suit both types of SOE 
(SASACRC 2015). However, in practice, it is not easy to categorize the central 
SOEs because they can belong to both categories or neither at the same time. 
 (BJSASAC/20/2015) further notes that “In fact, most of the central SOEs 
have a mixed operational status. Take the China National Petroleum Corporation, 
for example. Its oil concession business is in a monopoly industry, but the 
refinery enterprise and gas station business can be categorized as being in 
competitive industry.”   
 
It is a myth that as long as the managers of the SOEs do not hold shares, they 
lack the incentive to run the SOEs well. Hart and Moore (in Xu and Gui 2016, 104) 
argue that bureaucrats who control enterprises and other assets have no 
incentive to make good decisions because their personal income and wealth is 
not connected with the revenue and profit of the SOE they manage. In other 
words, there is a “mismatch between residual claims and residual control”. The 
ownership school of scholars believes that SOEs are intrinsically inefficient 
because the government is the owner and incompetent in running SOEs, due to 
the multiple objectives they have, such as social efficiency and social welfare, 
taxation, and unemployment rate control. Thus, the ownership school believes 
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that privatization is the best way to solve SOEs’ problems, making the enterprise 
free from bureaucratic control and political influence. However, the SASAC’s 
presence and the effective developmental state model it applies suggest that 
SOEs can be efficient as long as a proper principal-agent mechanism is set. 
 
According to Li and Wu (2002b, 95), there is no clear evidence that there are any 
crossover-effects of autonomy and profit incentives on SOEs. Their quantitative 
research has shown that strategies of management reform, including granting 
autonomy to the enterprises and profit incentives, cannot guarantee a positive 
effect on enterprise performance. Putterman and Dong (2000) argues that the 
official definition of SOEs means they are ‘owned by the whole people’, that is, 
there is control by state jurisdiction. The increasing autonomy of local authorities, 
and the managerial autonomy granted to SOE managers, have made them a ‘de 
facto private companies’, with declining discipline as well as increasing corruption. 
Using profit-sharing and linking bonuses to the financial performance of the 
enterprise as an incentive works better than granting autonomy to the managers. 
According to  (BJSASAC/13/2015) “From 2003 onwards, the evaluation 
system was changed about three or four times. It has become stricter but also 
more customized.  Senior executives of central SOEs will be examined annually, 
and their long-term evaluation will be of equal importance.” By stretching the time 
frame, central SOEs’ executives have to focus on the long-term performance of 
their enterprise rather than seeking to promote their short-term interests. Wang 
and Zhang (BJSASAC/20.21/15) both note that the SASAC is working on how to 
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impose a long-term incentive awards system. Methods of deferred payment for 
senior executives and awards of stocks and shares to raise staffs’ motivation 
have been discussed. This comment is echoed by  (SHPDSASAC/33/2015) 
and  (SHCG/29/2015), who note that an evaluation of enterprises will be 
conducted every year. Increasing attention is paid to long-term performance 
rather than annual financial results. As seen from the above interview, the 
SASAC’s evaluation of central SOEs’ work has moved from focusing on the 
ability to earn short-term profits to the ability to ensure long-term development of 
the company. 
 
Lin (2010) sees both the economic and the political aspects of SOE managers’ 
motivation. He believes that SOE managers’ motivation for creating a better 
economic performance by their company is to obtain a higher position in China’s 
political system. Profitability is the main criterion for the SASAC’s supervision of 
central SOEs, however, and more constraints and rules are imposed for this 
reason. The SASAC, in 2009, regulated the main businesses that each central 
SOE operated in.  (BJSASAC/20/2015) further notes “Each central SOE 
has its own main businesses, and the SASAC has the responsibility to ensure 
the central SOEs operate within their businesses and industries. For example, 
even if it is highly profitable for an aviation company to invest in real estate 
development, that is not allowed.” From 2004 to 2007, the SASAC Bureau of 
Planning and Development issued seven administrative rules dealing with the 
regulation of the main businesses of the central SOEs: SASACBPD 2004 No. 
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324; SASACBPD 2005 No. 80; SASACBPD 2005 No. 251; SASACBPD 2006 No. 
49;  SASACBPD 2006 No.126; SASACBPD 2007 No. 40 and SASACBPD 2007 
No. 90.   
 
Thus far, this thesis has argued that the SASAC can be seen as a powerful 
principal that has the ability to conduct adequate supervision of central SOEs. 
Central SOEs’ headquarter have to maintain their position as wholly state-owned 
enterprises, because the SASAC holds nearly 100 percent of the shares of the 
central SOEs’ group companies (Chu 2014). Central SOEs set up their joint-
stock companies primarily to provide a high return to shareholders. The SASAC 
confirmed and approved the reform plan for state-owned enterprises because it 
was in its interests to further the reform of SOEs. Apart from its economic 
interests, the SASAC sees the Security Regulatory Committee and the general 
public shareholders as external principals for the central SOEs, due to the 
asymmetric information problem that inherently exists.  (BJSASAC/20/2015) 
notes that “the SASAC’s capability does not allow us to monitor every detail of 
SOEs. After all, we are outsiders.” This argument is echoed by  
(SHPDSASAC/32/2015), who says that it is very difficult for the SASAC to figure 
out everything that happens inside SOEs because they are distributed across 
different industries. Moreover, it is impossible for the SASAC to be an expert in 
every sector and monitor every detail of the enterprise’s operation closely. As a 
result, the SASAC has introduced corporate governance and delegated 
managerial power to the board of directors. It can also be argued that the 
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SASAC’s efforts in transforming SOEs into market-oriented corporations is to 
further enhance the state’s strength in the management of state-owned assets. 
Through being listed on the stock market while carrying out merger and 
acquisition projects, the central SOEs expand in size and increase their total 
assets and revenues. The SASAC has institutionalized the supervision and 
direction of central SOEs to increase the state’s capacity in economic activities. 
This empirical study argues against Brødsgaard (2012, 626), who labels the 
SASAC an institute that has lost control of central SOEs and sees central SOEs 
as small kingdoms that operate according to their own will and keep the profits in 
their pockets. The CEOs hold ministerial or vice-ministerial status so that the 
central SOEs can work on their own and contact relevant ministries directly 
without passing the message through the SASAC. This chapter argues that the 
SASAC is the most important principal for central SOEs. The SASAC carries out 
multiple roles in promoting the growth of central SOEs as an investor, supervisor 
and facilitator, and sometimes also works as a transmitting body and buffer area 







4.4. Organizational Interactions between the SASAC and other 




Figure 4.5. Interactions among the SASAC, central SOEs and relevant 
government institutions. Source: created by the author in 2017. 
 
Although the structure of state ownership becomes more straightforward and 
clear after 2003, in practice there are still many institutions and ministries 
involved in the activities of central SOEs. According to Pearson (2010), the 
authorities placed over China’s state firms are highly fragmented. In other words, 
the state-owned enterprises need to negotiate and report to many different 
government institutions other than the SASAC. Tsai’s (2014) research in the 
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electricity industry shows that electricity producers need to deal with various 
ministries, local government bodies and sometimes the National People’s 
Congress as well as the State Electricity Regulatory Committee (SERC). 
Admittedly, there are many different governmental institutions that are involved in 
the actual business operation. As stated earlier, the Organization Department of 
the Communist Party of China is involved in the appointment of the senior 
executives of central SOEs; it is the Ministry of Finance to which central SOEs 
have to deliver profits; it is the National Development and Reform Committee 
which is in charge of developing new projects; and there are also inspections 
conducted by the Discipline Committee and the National Audit Office. 
 
We shall now turn to the discussion of two vital central agencies that are related 
to the personnel and money of the CSOEs— the Organization Department of the 
Communist Party of China and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). It seems that 
Brødsgaard’s (2012, 630) argument about the SASAC’s limited power over 
central SOEs is problematic. As he understands it, the SASAC neither receives 
dividends from the SOEs nor does it have the right to appoint their CEOs and top 
senior managers; so its control over the CSOEs is restricted. Xu (2012, 10) also 
notes that it is the Organization Department that has the right to appoint top SOE 
managers, not the SASAC. However, this understanding of the SASAC’s role is 
flawed, because it only focuses on the seal on the appointment letter. It makes 
no attempt to acknowledge the nomination and negotiation processes before the 
appointment, as well as all performance assessment after the appointment. Apart 
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from that, there are differences between the 53 CSOEs in the strategic sector 
and the rest of the CSOEs in fully competitive industries. Even for CSOEs in the 
strategic sector, the Organization Department usually appoints the top three 
positions in the company, namely, chairman of the board, party secretary and the 
general manager, leaving the rest for the SASAC (  BJCSCEC/01/2015). 
 
For Central SOEs in fully competitive sectors, the Organization Department’s role 
is less significant.  (BJCNBM/08/2015) notes that the Organization 
Department of the CCP works more closely with the 53 CSOEs in the strategic 
sector. Although the CNBM’s size and its total assets are larger than those of 
some of the 53 CSOEs, the Organization Department does not usually contact it 
directly.  (BJCNBM/03/2015) is also of the view that the Organization 
Department of the CCP is rarely seen in the CNBM. The senior executives in the 
rest of the CSOEs are nominated, appointed and evaluated by the SASAC. 
Although the Organization Department gives these appointments the final stamp 
of approval, is does not regularly participate in the process. During the fieldwork 
interviews for this research, we found that the Organization Department of the 
CCP was an important power in the appointment of the senior executives of the 
53 CSOEs in the strategic sector. However, it does not follow from this that the 
SASAC’s work in this area is less significant. The SASAC’s First Bureau for the 
Administration of Corporate Executives is in charge of the senior managers of the 
53 COSEs, while its Second Bureau for the Management of Corporate 
Executives is in charge of the senior managers of the rest of the CSOEs. The 
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SASAC is also responsible for the assessment of both the annual and the long-
term (three-year) performance of CSOE senior executives, granting rewards or 
imposing penalties (SASAC 2016 No. 33). All in all, the SASAC can be seen as 
the crucial actor that take charge of personnel matters in the CSOEs, because it 
participates in the full process of selection and assessment. 
 
The role of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in CSOE-related issues is also widely 
discussed. The MoF is the ministry in charge of the operating budget for state 
capital and the collection of dividends from SOEs. This is decreed in the 
Measures for the Administration of the Collection of Proceeds from the State-
owned Capital of Central Enterprises (MOFAMB 2016 No. 32), which also notes 
the MoF’s right, in its supervisory function, to compile, verify and hand in reports.  
Besides, the MoF and local-level financial departments are responsible for the 
utilization of the state capital operating budget (State Council 2007 No. 26). The 
Ministry of Finance also issues some policy documents to give professional 
guidance to the CSOEs. For example, the Notice on the Auditing of Firms, which 
covers the final accounting and auditing work for central SOEs (MoF Audit 
Bureau [2011] No. 24), gives the instruction that CSOEs have to change their 
auditors after hiring the same company for ten consecutive years. If the MoF is 
involved in the finance-related activities of CSOEs, then can we take it that this 
ministry occupies what would otherwise be a crucial role for the SASAC in the 




The MoF should be seen as providing professional guidance and serving as a 
regulator in a broader sense, while the SASAC is the principal that is involved in 
very specific activities in the CSOEs’ financial supervision. For instance, the 
MoF’s Implementation of the Central State Capital Operating Budget is issued as 
a regulatory document to not only the 102 CSOEs under the SASAC’s 
administration, but also to enterprises overseen by other ministries (MoF Budget 
Bureau 2017), while the SASAC’s regulatory publications are more detailed and 
are focused on CSOEs. The Interim Measures for the Management of Financial 
Budgets of Central Enterprises have 50 clauses that give detailed instruction to 
CSOEs on how to report on their budgets to the SASAC (SASAC 2007 No.18). 
This comparison is supported by empirical evidence. According to  
(BJCNBM/08/2015), the CNBM group consults the MoF when dealing with 
finance-related technical work; but the SASAC is the body that oversees the 
detailed financial activities of CSOEs.  (BJCNBM/10/2015) agrees with Xu 
and refers to the SASAC’s supervision of the CNBM’s financial report as intense 
and strict. In summary, the SASAC holds the principal’s responsibility in closely 
monitoring CSOEs’ financial activities, while the MoF provides general 
professional guidance on the use of state capital in the broad sense. 
 
Nevertheless, the overlapping of government functions is less likely to happen 
now. The competent administrative department of the SASAC carries out its role 
as the main principal, while other parallel relevant administrative departments 
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and line ministries are in charge of fragmented technical issues.  
(BJSASAC/19/2015) uses an example to explain the relations among central 
governmental institutions. “For example, a major industrial production accident 
happens in one of the central SOE’s factories. The State Administration of Work 
Safety is there to handle the accident, clarify the liabilities and report to the public. 
Based on the report provided by the Administration of Work Safety, the SASAC 
will impose a penalty on the central SOE. The penalty might include, but is not 
limited to, downgrading the enterprise in the annual performance review. The 
direct consequence is that the salary bonus for the senior executives of the 
CSOE will be eliminated”. It can be seen from the above fieldwork interview 
material that although other ministries are involved in dealing with technical 
issues in relation to the central SOEs’ operation, the competent authority that 
holds the principal responsibility for CSOEs is the SASAC. Likewise, the Ministry 
of Finance is important in the state ownership system, but is mainly concerned 
about central SOEs’ reports on their operating budgets and delivery of profits. It 
is not involved in central SOEs’ operations. The Central Discipline Committee 
sends inspection teams to SOEs regularly, but will not maintain a permanent 
presence in the enterprises, unlike the supervisory committee sent by the 
SASAC. It is the SASAC that holds the main control of central SOE-related 




Also, listing central SOEs not only introduces more regulators, like the Security 
Regulatory committee, but also leads to problems such as businesses that 
overlap between the group level and the listed company. The SASAC issues 
Advice on Pushing Forward the Adjustment of State-owned Assets and the 
Reorganization of State-owned Enterprises (State Council [2006] No. 97). In 
Section 2, Major Policy Guidance Article 4 clearly states that the SASAC should 
firmly press ahead with shareholding reform of state-owned enterprises. All large 
SOEs, excluding SOEs in national security industries, should be institutionalized 
step-by-step into diversified shareholding companies. The government’s support 
for SOEs to be on the stock exchange can also be seen in Article 5, which states 
that it should vigorously advance the reform and the listing on the stock market of 
SOEs, raising the quality of listed companies. However, the SASAC’s intention in 
supporting SOEs in seeking listing on the stock exchange, and encouraging 
already listed SOEs to transfer their main business funds into their listed 
company, may produce problems of conflict of interests, which will be discussed 
in detail in the next two chapters. 
 
 
4.5 Summary and Discussion  
 
This chapter redefines the SASAC’s role in China’s political and economic 
system by arguing that it is not just the financier and the facilitator but also acts 
as a transmitting body and a buffer area for central SOEs. The SASAC, as a pilot 
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agent in the developmental state context, adopts a market mechanism to 
promote the growth of central SOEs. In return, these central SOEs can further 
strengthen and push forward the growth of a functional developmental state 
model.  
 
In theory, the SASAC is the government institution that central SOEs relate to; 
but in practice, there are other ministries and institutions involved as well. The 
Commission has to apply for approval for new start-up projects from the National 
Development and Reform Committee, to apply for research funding from the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, to report tax to the State Administration of 
Taxation, to apply for stock market entrance permits from the Security Regulatory 
Committee, and so on. Its autonomy and the rule that central SOEs’ daily 
business should not be interfered with allow central SOEs flexibility in their 
enterprises’ operation. This situation puts the SASAC in a dilemma, because 
allowing SOEs more autonomy not only decreases its own capacity in the 
principal-agent game but also reduces its power and lowers its status in China’s 
political system, thus making it an institution that is not indispensable.  However, 
it is also not feasible for the SASAC to monitor and control central SOEs too 
closely.  
 
This thesis argues that China’s development processes in the management of 
state-owned assets follow a developmental state path but use large central-
government-owned SOEs instead of supporting an oligopoly of private 
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enterprises based on Japan’s and Korea’s previous development experiences. 
“The Chinese government and the Chinese tradition of centralized rule have 
never disappeared” (Fukuyama 2014, 356). The SASAC is the important 
institution that motivates and promotes the processes, although it is not as 
powerful as the Ministry of International Trade and Information in Japan’s 
developmental state period. The SASAC plays multiple roles, as the financier, 
coordinator and supervisor, and also serves as a transmitting body and a buffer 
area that adjust policies in ways that will promote the growth of state assets. In 
other words, it is the main facilitator of SOEs’ development. It is the crucial 
government institution because it is the financier and supervisor of central SOEs, 
which can conduct inspections, examinations, and annual evaluations of central 
SOEs’ performance. It can also regulate the total wage bills of individual central 
SOEs. Members of the Board of Supervisors are permanently resident in the 
central SOEs and audit any meetings and discussions, allowing the SASAC to 
keep itself informed. Fukuyama (2014,335) notes that there are two polarized 
interpretations of the region’s successes. One side stresses the importance of 
market-friendly policies; the other side attributes success to state intervention 
and functional industrial policies. The SASAC, as the institution that provides 
state intervention to promote China’s economic growth, also has limitations. 
Although it holds control over personnel matters, the Central Organization 
Department retains approval power. The SASAC also has the right to audit each 
central SOE’s financial performance at any time, but the Ministry of Finance 
retains the ultimate control over state-owned capital operation budgets and 
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delivery of profits. The SASAC is the authority that approves major business 
mergers and acquisitions. However, it does not have the right to issue licenses, a 
right for which responsibility lies with the National Development and Reform 
Committee. Central SOEs have autonomy in dealing with most of their business, 
while other ministries and government institutions are in charge of functional 
problems. Central SOEs have to deal not only with the SASAC but also with 
different functional departments in charge of matters such as issuing licenses 
and giving permissions. However, the complexity of the administrative formalities 
in a way lowers the efficiency of the SOEs. Zhang (2010) points out that in a free 
market world, enterprises have to face the uncertain turbulence of the market, 
which promotes innovation. In China, enterprises have to deal with the frequent 
and unpredictable policy adjustments made by the Chinese government, which is 
a waste of time and efficiency. The complexity of administrative formalities also 
leaves plenty of space for the SOEs to play among different institutions, thus 
creating more asymmetric information. 
 
The SASAC’s latest 2016 version of Measures for Assessment of the Operational 
Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises presents the SASAC’s 
requirements for central SOEs. Chapter 1, General Principals, Article 3 appeared 
for the first time in the latest version of the measures of SASAC Order No. 33 in 
2016. It lists four principals the assessment has to follow. The first principle is to 
comply with the laws and regulations strictly. The second principal is to adhere to 
market reform, based on the requirements of the market economy. This supports 
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the argument of this thesis that market criteria have been adopted in the 
promotion of central SOEs’ development. The third principal calls for the 
combination of incentives and constraints in assessment, which means that it is 
reasonable to study SASAC-central-SOE relations through the theoretical lens of 
principal-agent theory. The fourth principle emphasizes both short-term goals 
and long-term development plans, taking into consideration international 
standards and industrial standards. This principle takes into account both ‘long-
term development’ and ‘international standards’. It shows the developmental 
state logic in the SASAC’s management of central SOEs. 
 
In conclusion, the SASAC’s presence in China’s state ownership reform shows 
the government’s determination to further strengthen its control over strategic 
sectors and key enterprises, while leaving marketplaces for private enterprise. As 
Breslin (2012:29) notes, “China retains control of key industries and resources 
and thus shapes the nature of the market that non-state actors operate in." The 
Chinese government’s visible hand in market activities promotes the economic 
growth of the country. It has selectively adopted the market mechanism in 
managing state-owned assets, and it not only motivates SOEs to be profitable 
but also consolidates the assets and power of the state. However, the state 
ownership reform process is constrained by historical developments as well as 
social stability pressures. Walder (2010: 6) believes that “China’s reform remains 
trapped by the fundamental contradictions between market liberalization and 
single-party dictatorship”. The contradictions have hindered the state ownership 
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reform process and prevented central SOEs from developing their market 
potential unfettered by political and historical burdens and pressures. 
Nevertheless, central SOEs have a degree of autonomy, and listing on the stock 
exchange separates the stock company from the group company and further 
strengthens their role as a market actor. The following two case study chapters 
will provide a detailed analysis of two central SOEs, one in a fully competitive 
industry and another that has monopoly status.  The SOE reform has been 
driven, and will be driven, by institutional change. All in all, as the SASAC’s first 
director, Mr Rongrong Li (2004), argues, “We are moving from ‘promoting the 
reform of the state asset management system through SOE reform’ to ‘promoting 
SOE reform through the reform of the state asset management system’.” The 
SASAC will continue to play a crucial role in the state’s strategy of governing 
through the market, and to lead forward the reform of central SOEs along a 









Chapter 5 The China National Building Material Group Corporation—Three 
Layers of Organizational Power   
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
So far, this thesis has discussed the use of developmental state theory and 
market tools to assist growth. Our analysis of principal-agent theory has 
supported the argument that, with proper oversight mechanisms, state-owned 
enterprises can be efficient and competitive. In the previous chapter, the 
SASAC’s role, function and responsibility in managing central SOEs were 
analyzed through the lenses of developmental state theory and principal-agent 
theory. The chapter argued that the SASAC was a pilot agency for the promotion 
of a developmental state model in the management of state assets. It also 
suggested that the SASAC played multiple roles in its relationship with central 
SOEs, a relationship that is both pragmatic and flexible. The SASAC chapter 
provided an understanding of the situation from the principal’s side. The two case 
study chapters will give views from the agent’s side. This thesis straddles the 
boundary between the political system and the market environment in China. The 
principal, the SASAC, has to regulate and oversee not sub-level government 
entities but enterprises that are involved in global market activities. As for the 
agents, the central SOEs, they have to confront market fluctuations while 
responding to their largest shareholder—the government. 
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The SASAC has roughly categorized central SOEs into two categories based on 
personnel management thinking: there are 53 central SOEs in the strategic 
sector whose senior executives have been approved by the Organization 
Department of the CCP; and there are the rest of the central SOEs – those in the 
competitive sector – whose senior executives are managed by the SASAC. 
Although the SASAC and the MoF (2016 No. 252) had issued policy customizing 
the assessment of central SOEs into three categories – commercial central 
SOEs in fully competitive industries; central SOEs in the strategic sector; and 
central SOEs in public welfare and public services – until 2017, the work of 
positioning central SOEs in precisely detailed categories had not been finished. 
So this thesis follows the current SASAC arrangement and chooses two of the 
central SOEs under the SASAC’s administration as cases for analysis: the China 
National Building Material Group Corporation (CNBM), in a fully competitive 
industry; and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), in a 
monopolistic industry. 
 
Drawing on first-hand interview data, the companies’ annual reports, government 
regulations and stock exchange reports, this chapter provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the operation of central SOEs. Furthermore, this chapter 
focuses on discussion of this thesis’s research question: How can enterprises in 
competitive industry operate in the free market while being owned by the state? 
Can SOEs be profitable without privatization? This chapter adopts the CNBM as 
the main case, with supplementary material from other central SOEs in a 
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competitive industry to support the argument. It provides an empirically based 
understanding of modern central SOEs and their interaction with the SASAC, as 
well as with other government institutions. The empirical chapters aim to answer 
the following sub-questions of the research.  
 
1. How do central SOEs in a fully competitive industry work? Are they market 
actors, or arms of the government, or both?  
 
2. Why does the SASAC encourage central SOEs to get listed on the stock 
exchange? Why is listing important?  
 
3. How do central SOEs maintain state ownership while presenting excellent 
market performance? How do they operate as an enterprise while being 
constrained by the SASAC?  
 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the China National Building Material 
Corporation and its listed company, the China National Building Material Co., Ltd. 
This will be followed by a discussion of this company’s interaction with the 
SASAC and other relevant government institutions. The three layers of the 
CNBM’s operating structure will then be discussed, as well as the difficulties and 
dilemmas it faces as a central SOE. In this chapter, the parent company, the 
China National Building Material Corporation, is abbreviated to ‘the CNBM group’ 
and its listed company, the China National Building Material Co., Ltd, is 
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abbreviated to ‘the CNBM listed company’. The findings of this chapter suggest 
that the state takes a back seat in terms of its role as manager. However, the 
state takes an active role as the principal that uses market mechanisms to 
supervise central SOEs in competitive industries. The Party focuses its role as 
the supervisor in the principal-agent relationship on conducting oversight and, at 
the same time, maintaining its ideological influence. This chapter also suggests 
that the three layers of the CSOE group structure tactically block government 
administrative-related work at the group level, leaving the listed company to 
focus on business practices, which is the key to answering the question of how 
Chinese central SOEs can be efficient and successful in the market while being 
owned by the state.   
 
 
5.2. The China National Building Material Group Corporation (CNBM) 
 
5.2.1. Company Overview 
 
The China National Building Material Group Corporation was established in 1984, 
with the leadership and approval of the State Council. Its main products include 
cement, lightweight building materials, glass fiber, flame resistant (FR) products, 
and engineering services. In 2003, it became one of the central SOEs under the 
SASAC’s administration. It has been assigned and committed to following the 
market path since its establishment. After the CNBM was created, the growth of 
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the group corporation was over 40 percent per year for ten consecutive years. 
The assets of the group corporation total 410 billion RMB, and it has 180,000 
employees (CNBM group 2014). The CNBM group company was reformed and 
transformed into the largest building materials producer in China, with 17 wholly-
owned subsidiaries and six listed companies, of which two are listed on an 
overseas stock market. The CNBM listed company is the group company’s listed 
company. It was established on 28 March 2005 and was listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange on 23 March 2006, under the stock code HK 3323 (CNBM Co. 
Ltd., 2017). It was listed in the Morgan Stanley Index as constituent stock, in the 
Hang Seng Index as constituent stock, and in the Dow Jones China Offshore 50 
Price Index. Concerning the market status of the company, by the end of 2014, 
the CNBM was the largest cement producer, the largest commercial concrete 
producer, the largest gypsum board producer and the largest rotor blade 
producer in the world (CNBM 2016 Annual Report). 
 
The CNBM group is the type of traditional SOE under the government’s direct 
control that does not issue financial reports or reveal its operational performance 
to the general public. However, the CNBM listed company issues an annual 
report according to the requirement of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The 
listed company is the business operational company, earning a profit based on 
market share and brand development. According to the SASAC Bureau of 
Planning and Development, the CNBM’s main businesses are 1. Manufacture of 
building materials and equipment; 2. Relevant engineering and technological 
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research and services；3. Trade in building materials and logistics. The SASAC 
urges CSOEs to adjust their development strategy to focus on their businesses, 
according to the regulations. The CSOEs should aim to make their main 
businesses, as overseen by the SASAC, stronger and bigger (SASACBPD [2005] 
No. 251). So the CNBM chose its best-performing assets to be listed on the stock 
exchange, so that the company could receive financing from the capital market. It 
can be seen from the above analysis that the CNBM group is a central SOE that, 
whilst owned by the SASAC, has its listed firm, the CNBM, on the Hong Kong 
stock exchange. The listed company aims for profit and market competitiveness; 
but at the same time, it has to conduct production activities in its three main 
business areas, as regulated by the SASAC.  The structure of the CNBM group 




Figure 5.1 CNBM shareholding structure. Source: The China National Building 
Material Company Limited Annual Report, 2016. Note: percentages are rounded 
to two decimal places.  
 
The above figure shows the shareholding structure of the CNBM Company 
Limited. The cross-boundary shareholding structure can be understood as the 
CNBM group operates 100 percent of CNBM Trading, and it also holds 69.45 
percent of the Beijing New Building Materials Group Company (BNBMG). The 
China National Building Material Import and Export Company (CNBM Trading) 
holds another 30.55% of the BNBMG. BNBMG and CNBM Trading hold 27.52% 
and 4.22% of the CNBM listed company respectively. The CNBM group holds 
100 percent of the China Building Materials Academy (Building Materials 
Academy) and the Building Materials Academy holds 0.02% of the CNBM listed 
company. The CNBM group directly holds 12.35% of the CNBM listed company. 
In brief, the figure can be interpreted as showing that 44.11% of CNBM listing is 
held by the CNBM Group through cross-shareholding. The other 2.56% of shares 
come from the China Cinda Asset Management Co., Ltd. Cinda was the first 
financial asset management company approved by the State Council, when it 
was established in 1999. Its responsibilities include defusing financial risk, 
maintaining the stability of the financial system, and promoting the reform and 
development of state-owned banks and enterprises. In 2010, the China Cinda 
Asset Management Co., Ltd was transformed into a joint-stock company listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Cinda 2017). The largest group of shareholders 
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of the CNBM listed company are the public investors who purchased shares on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Public investors hold over half (53.33%) of 




Figure 5.2. CNBM Shareholding Ratios from 2006-2016. Source: China National 
Building Material Company Limited Annual Report 2006-2016. Analyzed and 
presented by the author.  
 
The above figure shows the evolving stream of shareholding ratios since the 
company was listed on the stock exchange in 2006. In the Interim Measures for 
the Management of State-owned Stocks in Limited Liability Companies (NABSP 
1994[81]), Clause 11 decrees that state-owned shareholdings should include 
‘absolute holdings’ and ‘relative holdings’. Absolute shareholdings refers to a 
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ratio of state-owned shares above 50%; while relative shareholdings refers to a 
ratio of state-owned shares between 30% and 50%. Due to the decentralization 
of stocks, the state retains the controlling power in the company. Although the 
above interim measures have expired, the definition of state-owned shareholding 
remains valid and can be found in the documents of the National Statistics 
Bureau (2003 No. 44). In this sense, the CNBM listed company can be defined 
as a state-owned enterprise in which the CNBM group has a relative 
shareholding. 
 
There has been a marked change in the shareholding ratio for the company over 
the years. The CNBM group’s share in the CNBM company dropped from 60.35% 
to 44.11% between the years 2006 and 2010. From 2010, it remained at 44.11% 
until 2016. The Cinda investment company, as a financial company affiliated to 
the State Council, slightly decreased its share in the CNBM company from 3.34% 
to 2.56% between 2006 and 2010, and has since kept its share at this level. By 
contrast, non-states investors, in other words, the general public and companies 
with other types of ownership that purchased the shares of the CNBM company 
on the Hong Kong stock exchange, increased their share from 36.31% to 53.33% 
between 2006 and 2010 – a ratio that also remained the same until 2016.  The 
graph shows that there was a marked increase in the percentage of shares 
released to the general public between 2006 and 2010. This coincides with the 
early years of the SASAC’s operation and shows the state’s capacity for carrying 
out its reform plan for the marketization of central SOEs.    
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After our discussion of the shareholding structure of the CNBM listed company, 
we turn now to an analysis of the company’s financial performance over the 
years since it was listed in 2006. Drawing on the 2006-2016 annual reports for 
the CNBM Co., Ltd, the next section will present a detailed analysis of the 
financial performance of the company over the years. 
 
Currency: CNY ¥   Unit of measurement: 1000.  
Exchange Rate: 1 GBP = 8.9 CNY (2016) 
 
                            CNBM Company Limited: Financial Performance 
                             
 
Figure 5.3 CNBM total assets, revenue and profit after tax. Source: China 
National Building Material, Annual Reports from 2005-2016. Analyzed and 





Figure 5.4 CNBM total assets from 2005-2016. Source: China National Building 
Material Company Limited, Annual Reports 2006-2016. Analyzed and presented 
by the Author.  
 
Figure 5.4 shows that the total assets of the CNBM company increased steadily 
from 2007 and have risen dramatically since 2010. There are two main reasons 
that might explain the significant increase in the total assets of the CNBM. The 
company’s listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange generated a large volume 
of funds, and this money enabled the CNBM to undertake a series of 
restructuring and reorganization initiatives, while thousands of private enterprises 
have been merged into the CNBM group since then.  According to State Council 
Document No. 97 (SCGO 2006), Section 2 Article 5, the SASAC is expected to 
“Vigorously promote the organization by transforming and listing......Encourage 
listed SOE firms to inject all their main business assets into the listed firm 
through methods like increasing capital and accumulating shares, acquisition of 
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assets, etc.” Section 2 Article 8 of the State Council document instructs the 
SASAC to “accelerate the restructuring and regrouping of large 
SOEs......promoting the combination of powerful large SOEs...... forming 
reasonable industrial concentrations, cultivating giant group corporations that 
have global competitiveness.” This policy guidance, driven by developmental 
state logic, has encouraged and supported the remarkable growth of the CNBM 
company’s total assets from ¥13.99 billion in 2006 to ¥158.40 billion in 2011, the 
latter figure being more than 11 times of the original assets. The company has 




Figure 5.5 CNBM total revenue and profit after taxation, from 2005 to 2016. 
Source: China National Building Material Company Limited Annual Reports 
2006-2016. Analyzed and presented by the Author.  
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The comparison of the total revenue and profit after taxation in figure 5.5 shows 
the operational performance of the company. The revenue is important not only 
because it shows the amount of money the CNBM received from its business 
every year, but also because the SASAC sees the Fortune 500 ranking as an 
indicator of central SOEs’ global competitiveness, and the Fortune 500 listing 
ranks enterprises based on their revenue. Profit after taxation is also crucial to an 
understanding of a company’s achievement in its business. The total revenue of 
the CNBM rose sharply from ¥6.45 billion in 2006 to ¥122.01 billion in 2014. 
However, it showed a drop to ¥100.36 billion in 2015, though there was a slight 
return to growth, with ¥101.55 billion, in 2016. Profit after taxation, on the other 
hand, does not seem to be positive. It showed a dramatic growth from 2006 on, 
and reached a peak, at ¥10.75 billion, in 2011; but this was followed by a decline 
to ¥7.74 billion in 2012. After further steady growth to ¥8.67 billion in 2014, it 
experienced a steep fall to ¥2.79 billion in 2015. Finally, there was a slight 
increase to ¥2.82 billion in 2016, but this was still lower than the ¥3.08 billion in 
2009, and profit after taxation remains poor. 
 
The above data shows that the CNBM’s total assets increased gradually, year by 
year, while the revenue rose as well, until it started to drop in 2014. Profit after 
taxation, however, has not been ideal since 2011. These data demonstrate that 
the company’s profitability was excellent from 2006 until 2011; but starting from 
2011, the company grew in size and revenue but not profit. Even though the total 
assets doubled from 2011 to 2016, there was a sharp drop in the profit. A 
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possible explanation is that the building materials industry was in recession after 
2011. In particular, the cement industry suffered from excess capacity. This 
probably offers an explanation for the CNBM’s acquisition of the China National 
Materials Group (Sinoma), which was announced by the SASAC, and later 
approved by the Ministry of Commerce Anti-monopoly Bureau, in 2017. This 
acquisition case is a reflection of developmental state thinking, as discussed in 
the policy document issued by the State Council and the SASAC (SCGO 2016 
No. 56). In chapter 3, section 3, it rules that some CSOEs should be regrouped 
to “promote the combining of CSOEs......through the centralization of resources, 
reduce the disruption of competition......and effectively deal with the excess 
capacity of related industries such as construction, steel, building materials.....” If 
Fligstein and Zhang (2010, 47) are correct in arguing that China’s development is 
not through a bottom-up approach, but rather shows the continuing presence of 
the country’s all powerful government as a coordinator, then does this lead to the 
conclusion that the strong position of the Chinese state can ensure that the 
developmental state model can be enforced properly without being disrupted by 
any other political or economic factors? The previous chapter presented the 
perspective of the principal—the SASAC. Drawing on fieldwork interview data, 
SASAC policies, and regulations issued by other regulatory agencies, the 
following section gives the view of the agent—the CSOE. In practice, how does 
the CNBM deal with a developmental state type of bureaucratic control while 
competing in both domestic and international market? 
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5.2.2 The CNBM’s Interaction with Government Institutions  
 
The unusual characteristic of the Chinese economy is the state’s powerful and 
assertive presence in the market economy, in which it owns a substantial number 
of assets in large-scale companies in strategic industries (Naughton 2017, 5). 
The SASAC, as the largest shareholder, has an interest in making the CNBM 
profitable. As the principal, it issues ex ante administrative policies to regulate the 
CNBM and also operates an ex post oversight mechanism by sending members 
of the Supervisory Board to the head office of the CNBM to monitor meetings and 
financial performance. It also worked with company to get it listed on the stock 
exchange and has cooperated with inspection teams sent by the Central 
Discipline Committee and the National Audit Office. So, from the perspective of 
the agent, the CNBM, is the SASAC a powerful principal? Or it is just a 
government institution that gives formal validity to the company’s existence? Are 
there other government institutions that are equally or even more important than 
the SASAC? With which other government departments do central SOEs have 
frequent contact? 
 
As we have seen, the agent holds more information than the principal in any 
principal-agent relationship. This puts the principal at a disadvantage in finding 
out about and supervising performance (Pollack 1997, 108). Miller (2005, 204) 
further extends Max Weber’s identification of the asymmetric relationship in 
politics in which authority is located on one side and an information advantage on 
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the other. The asymmetric distribution of information between the principal and 
the agent may lead to evasive behavior and the incurring of extra cost by the 
agent. In the context of this research, the SASAC is the principal that is assumed 
to be disadvantaged in terms of information when compared with its agents, the 
central SOEs. Chapters 3 and 4 examined the SASAC’s way of solving the 
problem of its information disadvantage and we analyzed both police patrol 
oversight and fire alarm oversight. As can be seen from Jensen’s (2007, 454) 
argument, the police patrol strategy is a top-down supervision mechanism which 
puts more emphasis on administrative means, while the fire alarm oversight 
depends more on bottom-up information-sharing based on mutual interests and 




Figure 4.5 Interactions among the SASAC, central SOEs and relevant 
governmental institutions. Note: Created by the author in 2017. (The same figure 
is presented in chapter 4.) 
 
The fieldwork interviews confirmed the argument that the SASAC is the primary 
and the only principal that all central SOEs have dealings with. However, other 
government institutions have an equal importance in different areas of business. 
This section will be divided into two parts: it starts with the perspective of the 
CNBM group, a group that is a traditional SOE still influenced by its planned-
economy past, and we shall look at its interactions with the SASAC and other 
ministries. It then moves to discussion of the CNBM listed company, which is the 
operating company of the CNBM group, and which has new corporate 
governance and all the other characteristics that fit the standards of the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. 
 
The CNBM group was established in 1984 under the leadership of the State 
Council. The group, as the head office, does not itself conduct business. Instead, 
it works as the strategic center of the business.  (BJCNBM/08/2015), 
former vice-president and board member of the CNBM group, notes that the 
government department he contacted most frequently was the SASAC, which 
conducted general supervision and oversight of the details of the group’s 
operations and performance.  (BJCNBM/12/2015) agrees with Xu, and he 
describes the group’s work as acting as a coordinating center that reports to 
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government institutions while relaying the government’s guidance and 
regulations down to the operational branches.  (BJCNBM/10/2015) provides a 
similar view. She sees the SASAC as a very strict supervisor that examines 
every detail of the group’s annual financial report and asks for revisions, while 
the ministry of finance only asks for the main forms. Accordingly, the SASAC is 
the principal of the CNBM group. Are there any other ministries or institutions 
relevant to the operation of the CNBM group? 
 
Based on the empirical evidence given by staff interviewed, as seen in figure 4.5, 
for CSOEs, after the SASAC, the Ministry of Finance and the Organization 
Department of the CCP are the two of the most important central agencies. The 
Organization Department of the CCP controls appointments to the 53 CSOEs in 
strategic industries. The Ministry of Finance is another influential organization 
and it is in charge of delivering profit from the CSOEs to the state and allocating 
finance to the CSOEs. There are also other ministries that are essential to the 
CNBM group’s work. Which are the relevant ministries or administrative 
departments for a CSOE depends on which is its competent operational authority, 
and this varies for the different industries. For example, the China State 
Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) is a construction CSOE, which 
reports to the SASAC as its boss, while the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development (MOHURD) is its competent operational authority, because the 
MOHURD is in charge of issuing qualifications, national construction standards 
and so on (  BJCSCEC/01/2015). As for the CNBM, it reports to the Ministry of 
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Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) as its competent operational 
authority. 
 
The five government institutions and regulatory committees, as seen on the right 
side of figure 5.4, are the most frequently contacted government entities for the 
CSOEs, as was learned from the fieldwork data. The first institution is the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which is known, 
because of its powerful position in the government system, as the “mini-state 
council”. Its core functions range from monitoring macroeconomic trends to 
issuing licenses and regulating oil price. It was described as the ministry that 
CSOEs contacted very frequently. Members of the National Audit Office (NAO) 
are sent to CSOEs as an oversight mechanism, and the CSOEs do not take the 
initiative and approach the NAO. The China Security Regulatory Committee 
(CSRC) is an important actor because most of the CSOEs are listed companies. 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection and the State Administration of Work 
Safety Protection have to do with the technical issues during the business 
operation of the CSOEs. 
 
As noted in the previous chapters, in theory, the SASAC, as the principal, is 
involved in all activities related to CSOEs. In practice, the SASAC’s internal 
bureaus are connected to the CNBM’s functional departments in relation to 
issues such as financial supervision, planning and development, work safety, 
party related activities, etc. In practice, how do we understand the overlapping of 
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responsibilities among the SASAC and other functional ministries?  
(BJCNBM/12/2015) uses an example to explain the different roles these 
government institutions play in CSOE businesses. In this example, in one of a 
CSOE’s factories an industrial accident takes place. The State Administration of 
Work Safety will be on site to handle and investigate the accident while clarifying 
responsibilities. The SASAC will issue a penalty to the enterprise and lower the 
grade of the senior executives in their annual performance review (SASAC 2008 
No. 21). It is easy to clarify the relationship between the SASAC and the 
technical-issue-related ministries. The SASAC acts as the investor to supervise 
the SOEs, while the relevant government department serves as a professional 
administrative authority in dealing with particular issues.  
 
Assessing the Performances based on a Market Standard 
 
As the principal that conducts all-round supervision of CSOEs, the SASAC uses 
various ex ante administrative regulations and ex post oversight mechanisms. It 
also has a coordinating role, with the Organization Department of the CCP, in 
personnel management, and with the Ministry of Finance in the supervision of 
financial activities. The Board of Supervisors, which is unique to China’s state 
assets management system, carries out on-site monitoring of the agents, the 
CSOEs. Members of the Board of Supervisors are sent by the SASAC to 
permanent positions in companies and keep a regular watch on the enterprises’ 
management (  BJCNBM/08/2015). These supervisors attend monthly 
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meetings and have the right to review all company documents. They provide their 
annual examination report to the SASAC based on their observation of the CSOE 
(  BJCNBM/03/2015). The Supervisory Board is under pressure to make sure 
CSOEs’ activities are following the SASAC’s regulations. As  
(BJSASAC/13/2015) notes, the SASAC increasingly raises its standard for 
CSOEs’ information disclosure, drawing on Sweden’s experience. The SASAC’s 
ex ante administrative rules do guarantee the correct process is followed by its 
agent, but at the same time, they lower the efficiency of business activities. The 
SASAC sometimes oversteps its authority as the largest investor in the company 
and involves itself and the CSOEs in tedious administrative work. 
 
So far, this section has focused on interaction with the government at the CNBM 
group level. The following section will move on to the CNBM listed company. As 
we asked in an earlier chapter, what does the SASAC expect from CSOEs in 
competitive industries? The answer is revenue, profit and return on assets. 
CSOEs in competitive sectors, as listed companies, put their highperforming 
assets on the stock exchange. After that, the listed company becomes the 
‘normal’ enterprise and seeks to conduct its business profitably. The CNBM listed 
company’s profit contributes more than 90% of the CNBM group’s overall profit 
(the precise figure is not publically available) (  BJCNBM/08/2015). The 
SASAC aims to restructure all the operating companies into transparent and 
focused joint-stock corporations in the long run. By doing so, the SOEs will be 
able to operate without being disturbed by the semi-bureaucratic and opaque 
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holding companies (Naughton 2008,25). The CNBM listed company has as its 
primary goal the guaranteeing of shareholders’ equity, which indicates profit. 
Thus, the goal of the CNBM listed company suits the SASAC’s requirement for 
CSOEs in competitive sectors. 
 
As a listed company, the CNBM’s primary goal is to make a profit. By earning 
enough profit, the CNBM listed company can guarantee shareholders’ return on 
equity, as well as employees’ bonuses and welfare. However, as a listed 
company, the CNBM still has to comply with SASAC regulations, because the 
SASAC holds 44.11% of shares and is the largest shareholder in the listed 
company. The SASAC’s evaluation of the company’s performance not only pays 
attention to profit and social responsibility but also to work safety. The SASAC’s 
attention to work safety can be seen in its annual evaluation of CSOE senior 
executives, which rules that the company is not qualified to be selected as one of 
the “advanced units” if any serious work accident has happened (SASAC 2016 
No. 33). 
 
The SASAC’s assessment of central SOEs ranks them at ABC and D levels and 
this affects the salary standards of senior executives, but not those of ordinary 
staff. The SASAC (2016) also discloses the annual salaries of the top executives 
of all CSOEs, so that these can be viewed by the general public; and the wage 
levels of the whole group, including ordinary staff, have to be adjusted according 
to the SASAC’s regulations.  (BJCNBM/07/2015) notes that the SASAC 
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regulates the gross payroll of the whole company. The total payroll fluctuates 
alongside the company’s yearly profit. For example, if the profits of the company 
increase by 10% from the previous year, the growth of the gross payroll has to be 
lower than 10%, at around 7% to 8%. The SASAC is in charge of examining and 
approving the CSOEs’ gross payroll. It (SASACBED 2005 No. 303) sees creating 
a link between gross payroll and economic benefit as the state’s main tool in 
adjusting total wages and growth in pay levels in the CSOEs. 
 
Apart from money, the SASAC also has other expectations of the CNBM listed 
company. The company is also in contact with the SASAC and other relevant 
ministries, working as a megaphone that passes on information about the 
difficulties of the industry it operates in.  (BJCNBM/04/2015) notes that the 
CNBM listed company works with the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology in closing down outdated production facilities. Communication 
between central SOEs and the government works very well. The CNBM listed 
company’s technology department sends staff to work and be based at the MIIT; 
and it facilitate the exchange of information between central SOEs and the 
government. The company also sends teams to government-held meetings with 
industrial associations to discuss the creation industrial standards, and to 
seminars to discuss how to control excess production capacity. The CNBM listed 
company not only attends the meetings held by different ministries and industrial 
associations, but it also holds meetings that invite relevant ministries to 
participate.  (BJCNBM/03/2015) notes that when the CNBM held meetings to 
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discuss its grand strategy for the merger and acquisition of businesses, the MoF, 
the State Administration of Taxation, the People’s Bank of China, and the 
Banking Regulatory Committee were invited to discuss the extension of loans.  
 
To conclude, both the CNBM group and the CNBM listed company see the 
SASAC as their principal. They do interact with other relevant ministries for 
professional guidance and cooperation; but the SASAC’s comprehensive 
supervision of them remains strong. 
 
 
5.3 Surviving the Market  
 
5.3.1. Competing in the free market  
 
The accession of China to the WTO in 2001 made it impossible for the Chinese 
state to avoid opening up more of its market to companies with private and 
foreign ownership. However, the companies that are in the strategic sector 
remain in a state monopoly. The government has opened some parts of the 
industrial chain for private and foreign investment; but the key resources and 
licenses are held by Chinese CSOEs. This means that central SOEs usually get 
hold of the most profitable business areas, which guarantee their monopolistic 
market status. As Chen and Li (2015, 6) point out in their discussion of the 
thermal power industry, the coal retail business and entrance to the energy 
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market are open to public investors, while access to electricity generation and the 
electricity network are to some extent restricted. Therefore, although a large 
number of non-SOEs in the thermal power industry have been closed down, 
profitability in the electric power industry remains high for SOEs. As noted in an 
earlier section, the CNBM is doing business in a fully competitive industry. It does 
not enjoy privileges in terms of natural resources, licensing or market protection 
policies. Jacques (2012, 229) notes the hybrid nature of Chinese SOEs, which 
combines characteristics from both private and state enterprises. The CNBM is, 
in fact, like any other company in the world in seeking business, revenue and – 
most importantly—profit. 
 
As noted in the principal-agent theory chapter, the SASAC’s requirement for 
CSOEs lies in profit and return on assets. The latest version of Assessment of 
CSOEs further clarifies that, for CSOEs in competitive industries, the primary 
requirement is the maintenance and growth of state assets, which focuses 
assessment on Economic Value Added (EVA) and profit, taking mid- to long-term 
growth capacity into consideration. The CSOEs are encouraged to accept social 
responsibilities on the premise that this fits with the rules of the market economy 
(SASAC and MoF 2016 No. 252). How does the CNBM, as a CSOE in a 
competitive industry, see its primary goal and target? In practice,  
(BJCNBM/08/2015) agrees that the most important goal for the CNBM is profit. 
Firstly, this is because being profitable is the major part of the SASAC’s 
requirement for the CNBM. Apart from the profitability of the company as an 
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essential criterion, the total revenue is equally important, because the Global 
Fortune 500 list is based on an evaluation of the annual revenue of a company. It 
can be seen from the interview that the CNBM (both at group and listed company 
level) takes profit and revenue as its primary goals. By linking the salary levels of 
senior executives with the total payroll of the entire company, the SASAC 
successfully incentivizes CSOEs to follow the SASAC’s goal: that is to be 
profitable and competitive in the market.  (BJCNBM/07/2015) agrees with Xu 
that the CNBM’s primary goal is to make a profit. Unlike CSOEs in monopoly 
industries, which accept a government function, but at the same time hold natural 
resources or rare operational permits, the CNBM is a CSOE in name, but the 
government barely allocates any resources to the company. The building 
material industry is fully competitive, so that the business has to survive the 
market by itself. 
 
Having discussed the CNBM as a market actor that takes profit and revenue as 
its primary goals, in accordance with the SASAC’s requirement, we turn to look at 
how the CNBM achieves these profoundly market standard goals while dealing 
with government-related administrative work at the same time. The findings of 
this case-study chapter suggest that the CNBM has a relatively high level of 
autonomy in its business operation. The SASAC is more like an authority that 
makes a grand framework for state assets management, as well as regulating 
working procedures. After all, it is the CNBM, not the SASAC, that is the expert in 
building material industries.  (BJCNBM/08/2015) notes that before he retired 
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from his position as vice-president of the CNBM group, most of his time at work 
was spent dealing with the government. There used to be countless meetings on 
supervisions, inspections and reports. After Xi Jinping had taken office, in 2012, 
the number of government meetings, conferences and reports was reduced 
significantly. Xu also points to the SASAC’s efforts in simplifying administrative 
procedures and delegating more power to CSOEs in the competitive market. 
 
In summary, the CSOEs in fully competitive industries are becoming more like 
market actors, aiming to increase of their profitability and competitiveness rather 
than behaving as a governmental bureau. This trend suits the SASAC’s goal and 
the requirement for CSOEs in a competitive market as well; so that the problem 
has become: what makes the transformation of Chinese CSOEs from a soviet 
planned economy legacy to modern corporations go smoothly and well? The 
most likely explanation is the SASAC’s reform plan for listing the CSOEs’ best-
performing assets on the stock exchange. After an asset-stripping process, the 
CSOE listed companies can get rid of their junk assets and social welfare 







5.3.2. Becoming a listed company 
 
The SASAC supports the reform and overall listing of SOEs and promotes the 
growth of competitiveness among listed companies (SASACBPR 2009 No. 123). 
It also encourages the SOEs that are already listed on the stock market to 
transfer their central business funds from the group to the listed company (SCGO 
[2006] No. 97). In particular, the SASAC encourages the CSOEs to become 
listed on foreign stock exchanges to meet international standards. As Li (2004) 
adds, “We (SASAC) want the central SOEs to have a normative corporate 
governance structure and to follow the right path in the joint-stock system from 
the very beginning”. As noted earlier in the principal-agent discussion, apart from 
the SASAC’s various kinds of oversight activities based on its own internal 
bureaucratic system as well as on working with other ministries, the SASAC has 
also introduced the Security Regulatory Committee and the stock exchanges as 
external supervision agents to monitor the CSOEs’ performances. 
 
Under the SASAC’s guidance, the CNBM, as a central SOE in the fully 
competitive market, established its listed company in 2004 and was on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange in 2005. The listing of CSOEs is something that needs to 
be approved by the China Security Regulatory Commission (HKEX 2017 HKEX-
GL55-13). In order to support Chinese enterprises (including SOEs) in raising 
capital on the international market, the CSRC (1999 No. 83) issued the Notice on 
Relevant Issues Relating to Enterprises Applying for Overseas Listing, which 
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noted that SOEs could be reformed into joint stock companies and apply for 
overseas listing. In 2012, the CSRC (2012 No. 45) issued the new version of the 
above 1999 No. 83 notice, which simplified the application process and 
shortened the review procedure. 
 
By listing the CNBM’s quality assets on the stock exchange, the SASAC created 
the same goal for the CNBM listed company as its public shareholders had for it: 
that of being profitable in the marketplace. Wang, Guthrie and Xiao’s (2012, 253) 
research suggests that the SASAC and concentration of the ownership of SOEs 
has had a positive impact on companies’ performance.  (BJCNBM/04/2015) 
notes that the SASAC’s assessment and evaluation of the CNBM group focuses 
on key performance indicators (KPIs) like total revenue and total profit. The 
CNBM listed company is on the stock exchange, which means it takes the 
interests of the shareholders as its top priority. Since the SASAC is the largest 
shareholder, it shares this goal with the CNBM listed company. Zeng further 
points out that the CNBM listed company enjoys a high level of autonomy 
concerning business activities. After all, it is the CNBM that best understands the 
business and the market situation. 
 
Recognizing the failure of shock therapy that advances political reform before 
economic reform, the Chinese government took the opposite route. China sees a 
stable political environment as a precondition for economic development (Li, 
Brødsgaard and Jacobsen 2010, 305). Listing CSOEs’ best-performing assets on 
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the stock exchange can bring many benefits. The listed company can focus on 
meeting market competition, while leaving historical burdens, like issues related 
to redundant staff, to the group level. The listing of central SOEs helps the 
government to avoid discussions of ownership and privatization. Consequently, 
the government can advance its reform through changes to competition and 
incentives within the structure of the state ownership system (Xu 2000,94). This 
argument is supported by Yang and Zhao (2014, 67), who correctly state that 
“China’s market-oriented reform does not weaken state intervention in the 
economy but only changes the form of intervention.” Indeed, as argued in the 
previous chapters, the Chinese state’s strong capacity in economic activities 
allows it to adjust its policies when needed. China is ideologically free in making 
policies for economic development purposes.  
 
The CNBM was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on 23 March 2006 
under the stock code HK 3323 (CNBM Co. Ltd., 2017). The process included 
cooperation with professional accounting and legal firms and a firm of 
consultants, as well as intermediary organizations.  (BJCNBM/10/2015) 
disagrees with Wang, Guthrie and Xiao’s (2012, 257) view, and argues that it is 
not the state that has a strong hand in deciding which parts of a group’s assets 
should be on the stock exchange. It was the CNBM preparation team that made 
the decisions and reported to the SASAC for final approval.  
(BJCNBM/09/2015) notes that the listing process was managed in accordance 
with the HKEX regulations, and it was the CNBM preparation team that decided 
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which parts of the firm’s assets should be stripped. The company produced a 
“mock financial statement” for a three-year term as part of the preparation 
process before the final listing in 2007. The strongest performing assets in the 
CNBM were selected to be included in the listed company because shareholders 
valued the return on their investment the most. 
 
The shareholding structure of the CNBM was in the form of a cross holding by 
three of the CNBM group’s subsidiaries. Two of the group’s subsidiaries, namely 
the Beijing New Building Material (Group) Co., Ltd (SHE: 000786) and the 
Luoyang Glass Co., Ltd (SHA: 600876) were already listed.  
(BJCNBM/09/2015) notes that the asset stripping process was carried out again 
in the CNBM listing preparation. The required documents for listing also had to 
be obtained from the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the State 
Administration of Work Safety. The central government’s stringent requirements 
on matters related to environmental protection led to an increasing cost to this 
CSOE. The cost to the CNBM of environmental protection activities is high, due 
to its five cement subsidiaries’ annual spending on the purchase of carbon 
emission credits, which in total exceeds more than 90 million RMB (9.2 million 
GBP). The CNBM listed company drew on the cooperation of firms of consultants 
in Hong Kong for suggestions such as which businesses were more popular on 
the stock market. The CNBM worked with about 12 companies that had expertise 
in accounting, assets appraisal, the law and so on. The CNBM listing took around 
one to two years from the asset stripping to the stock listing. 
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Apart from having to get a large number of documents approved by different 
central ministries, the company also had to interact with many different local 
government departments for various kinds of proof: for instance, local land 
resource bureaus for land warrants and local taxation offices for proof of tax paid. 
The CNBM’s operating companies and building materials factories are located in 
different provinces. China started its system of tax division between central and 
local governments in 1994 (State Council 1993 No. 85). According to Bardhan 
and Mookherjee (2016, 25), decentralization in China lies in the administrative 
and economic field, and was the central government’s tool in motivating local 
governments to develop the economy actively. Under this system, even though 
the CNBM’s headquarters building is located in Beijing, it does not pay income 
tax or tax on its turnover to the local authorities in Beijing, only a small amount of 
business tax. The CNBM’s operating subsidiaries’ taxation is incurred by its 
business operations and has to be handed to the local governments where the 
operating companies or factories are registered. 
 
This section explains the listing process of the CNBM, which supports the 
argument of this thesis that through having their assets listed on the stock 
exchange, the CSOE listed companies become market actors that are set up to 
take their shareholders’ interests as their top priority. This profit-oriented 
marketization of central SOEs in competitive industries suits the SASAC’s market 
criteria in assessing the central SOEs’ performance. The listing also assists 
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supervision by the principal—the SASAC – of its agents’—the central SOEs’ – 
performance. As argued in an earlier chapter, the SASAC’s developmental state 
model of governance lies in the creation of a broad framework and the regulating 
of work processes. As part of SOE reform, the SASAC is the institution that 
promotes the moving of CSOEs onto the stock exchange. This leads to the 
question of how CSOEs can be market actors while dealing with countless 
reports and supervision inspections from central ministries and, even more 
importantly, being asked to provide public goods and achieve political goals. If 
the SASAC is going to grant more autonomy to these enterprises through 
strengthening its overall supervision of CSOE groups, while leaving their 
subsidiaries to be directed by the groups (State Council 2015 No. 63), what will 
be the nature of the interaction between the group and the listed companies? 
The following section presents the pyramidal operational structure found inside 
the CSOEs. It explains the functions, roles and interactions of the CNBM group, 













Figure 5.6: The three layers of the organizational structure of a CSOE. Drawn up 
by the author (May 2017).    
 
The company has, maybe unconsciously, generated three layers of operation 
inside the group corporation, which presents a certain form of ‘division of labor’. 
In the CNBM group corporation, there is the highest level—the CNBM group 
corporation as the parent company, which is 100% (no publicly available data) 
owned by the SASAC. In the second level is the CNBM listed company, which is 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and has more than 90% of the group’s 
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best-performing assets. The third level is made up of the CNBM listed company’s 
secondtier operating companies, such as China United Cement (100%), South 
Cement (80%), CNBM Investment (100%), etc. The CNBM group, as the parent 
company, works as a strategic center that cooperates closely with the SASAC 
and other relevant ministries. The CNBM listed company’s main duties include 
financing, capital raising and investing. The second-tier companies, as the 
operating subsidiaries, are business entities that compete in the market. The 
‘division of labor’ among these three layers means that each is in charge of 
different kinds of work that guarantee the company’s efficiency and profitability. 
 
This draws on Sutherland and Ning’s (2015, 231) analysis of the pyramidal form 
of enterprise structure used in China’s state-controlled business groups. 
However, this thesis only half agrees with Sutherland and Ning’s argument that 
the capacity of large SOE groups may undermine the party state's broader 
objectives in building global competitive firms, as some groups have developed 
pyramidal structures that are driven by the interests of managers. The complex 
structure of the SOE group may indeed increase the problem of insider control 
and their personal benefits. The complex inside structure of the company, in 
particular the second-tier companies and their subsidiaries, makes it difficult for 
the state to conduct effective oversight. However, the three layers of operation 
also help to increase CSOEs’ efficiency. 
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In this research, the CNBM group, the CNBM listed company and the second tier 
subsidiaries form a pyramidal division of labor. The CNBM group takes the 
administrative roles and leaves the listed company to focus on the business 
operation relatively free from administrative activity.  (BJCNBM/10/2015) 
shared her working experience of the CNBM group, where her daily work was to 
write reports to the SASAC and the Ministry of Finance, and frequently to revise 
the group’s financial reports according to the SASAC’s advice. The SASAC’s 
supervision of the CNBM group was very strict and detailed. After moving to a 
position in the CNBM listed company, she usually interacted with tax offices, 
banks, and the security regulatory committee when issues of refinancing 
occurred. Pei further notes that the SASAC held many meetings to examine 
meticulously the details of every accounting statement of the group. The group 
spent lots of energy and time on SASAC-administrative-related jobs. The 
members of the Board of Supervisors located in the CNBM group by the SASAC 
also examined and checked the work often. The SASAC has very detailed and 
strict regulations for the central SOEs.  (BJCNBM/11/2015) sees the CNBM 
group’s work as, on the one hand, dealing with most of the administrative jobs 
and leaving the CNBM listed company to focus on profit earning, and on the 
other, helping the CNBM listed company to apply for more support, like research 
funding and other preferential treatment from the government. It can be seen 
from the above that the SASAC conducts strict supervision at the group level. As 
for the listed company, the SASAC introduces professional regulators, such as 
members of the Security Regulatory Committee and personnel from the Hong 
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Kong Stock Exchange, as well as public shareholders, to conduct supervisory 
roles. The three layers of the business operation structure and the division of 
labor make the listed company and its subsidiaries more efficient, but in a way, it 
also blocks the SASAC’s oversight at the group level, because members of the 
Board of Supervisors (from the SASAC) are in the CNBM group. 
 
This section presents the three layers of operational structure and shows that this 
structure brings more good than bad to the management of CSOEs in 
competitive industries, based on the understanding that the SASAC’s 
assessment of CSOEs in competitive industries focuses mainly on revenue, profit 
and return on assets. These evaluation criteria can easily be passed down 
through the layers from the listed company to second, third and fourth tier 
businesses and the factories of each. Since the CNBM is located in a competitive 
industry, unlike CSOEs in petroleum or electricity, it follows a vertical line of 
administration. The CNBM subsidiaries do not need to report to, or listen to, the 
local SASAC. However, the downside of this is that the many layers inside the 
group decrease the efficiency of the company and make it difficult for the 
principal—the SASAC – to monitor the operations of the lower end of the 
enterprise’s operations. Moreover, is it necessary to have the group level if the 
listed company is efficient enough to direct the business of running of the entire 
group? The China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) is a 
wholly listed CSOE in which the group and the listed company are the same 
company and are managed by the same team. The CSOE group-level reform is 
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the toughest part of China’s state assets reform. The SASAC has tried to pass its 
reform plan on to the group level. The central authority’s latest guide for 
deepening the reform of SOEs suggests that, for all commercial SOEs in fully 
competitive industries, reform should be undertaken by introducing a corporate 
and shareholding system to the company...... to further promote the reform and 
listing of the SOEs...... and the aim is to have overall listing of the entire group of 
companies (CCP and State Council 2015). 
 
 
5.4. The Fictitious Crown as a Central SOE 
 
What does the title of CSOE bring to the CNBM? How does it benefit from being 
owned by the state? Does it have any subsidies, preferential loans and 
development funds from the government? What about the historical burdens 
handed down from its planned economy past? As Walder (2010, 34) suggests, 
ownership has been highly diversified in China’s large-scale corporate sector. 
The CNBM’s competitors in the building materials industry include not only other 
SOEs but also private and foreign enterprises. The CNBM operates a fully 
competitive company, which means the government is unlikely to invest more 
funds in it. The CNBM rarely has any, or has very little, subsidy from the 
government (Pei BJCNBM/10/205).  (BJCNBM/08/2015) sees the CNBM’s 
advantages as coming not from state subsidies but from the company’s large 
number of professional managers and technical experts. The company has been 
 249 
in the building materials industry for a long time, so it can better understand and 
analyze industrial development in this area.  The SASAC works on reducing 
administrative procedures and delegating more power to central SOEs.  
(BJCNBM/08/2015) notes that in the past, the administrative power was highly 
centralized, which made the company less flexible than now.   
(BJCNBM/12/2015) agrees, and points out that, in the past, the SASAC had very 
detailed regulations stipulating what could and should be done. After years of 
reform, the SASAC published a ‘negative list’ to regulate CSOEs and this stated 
what could not be done. This change significantly increased the company’s 
autonomy in its business activities. 
 
However, central SOEs and SOEs in general are, at the same time, bound by 
historical legacies inherited from the period of planned economy. Li and 
Brødsgaard (2013, 56) assert that SOEs’ inefficiency can be attributed to two 
major factors: the lack of incentives for the SOEs’ workforce; and the heavy 
social burdens SOEs used to carry. Since 1979, the State Council and the 
Ministry of Finance have issued a series of policy papers to create incentives for 
the SOE workforce. These started with the reform that allowed the SOE to retain 
part of its profit as funds for the company’s development (State Council 1979, 
State Council 1983 No. 75; MoF 1984). These policies were issued to provide 
economic incentives for the managers and the staff to work hard for better 
progress. After 30 years of letting SOEs retain their profit, the Ministry of Finance 
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and the SASAC (2007 No. 309) recentralized the power and requested that the 
CSOEs hand - their proceeds back to the central state.   
 
The social burdens, including overstaffing, were due to the SOEs’ incapacity to 
lay off redundant workers, in case they upset social stability. This was due to the 
social functions the SOEs (mostly local government owned SOEs and some local 
branches of Central SOEs) inherited from the planned-economy past. The 
problem of overstaffing can be widely seen in the northeastern provinces, which 
used to be the center of heavy industry in China. According to Wen and Song 
(2015, 13), there are a number of bankrupt local SOEs with outstanding debts. 
Therefore, they are unable to put their retired employees through a retirement 
procedure that would give them a pension and medical insurance. Apart from 
that, the local government controlled SOEs have a historical responsibility for 
paying water bills, electricity bills, gas bills and housing management fees for 
current and retired employees. The financial cost of solving the “three bills and 
one fee 三供一业” problem based on the relevant regulation (SCGO 2016 No. 45) 
is very high. For the three northeastern provinces alone the cost is around 19.5 
billion RMB (1.95 billion GBP). 
 
So, the reforms brought huge costs, and both the SOEs and the local 
governments are unable to pay these. Chan (2009, 46) points out that the social 
burdens SOEs carry run counter to the primary goals – to be competitive and 
profitable.  (BJCNBM/03/2015) notes that the government effectively 
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subsidizes the central SOEs by releasing them from the social burdens they 
carried. In the past, SOE workers were paid relatively low wages but were 
allocated areas of housing and had their water, gas and electricity bills linked to 
and paid by the factory. The reform process includes separating welfare from 
factory operation, and for this, government subsidies are needed. It is also 
correct for Chan (2009, 53) to argue that the governance structure of SOEs can 
bring various agency problems. The SOEs’ problems – like price distortion, 
policy-induced profit or loss, and policy-driven welfare burdens – have provided 
enough excuse for the SOEs to ask for soft budget constraints, state subsidies 
and many other examples of adverse selection and moral hazard.  
 
The CNBM, as the leading company in the building materials industry, is involved 
in creating quality standards for the industry. This can be seen as a benefit of the 
SASAC’s developmental state model of governance for CSOEs. This thesis 
suggests that the CSOEs can, therefore, work with the relevant ministries in the 
making of a more executable industrial policy that suits the market condition of 
the industry. By holding seminars with CSOEs, the SASAC can have a more in-
depth understanding of the development, challenges and difficulties of the 
industries its CSOEs operate in. This may also be a possible explanation of why 
the SASAC does not eliminate the CSOEs and create a fully competitive industry. 
 
The CNBM’s interaction and cooperation with relevant government institutions 
are positive and frequent. The government often receives reports and 
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suggestions regarding policy implementation and industrial development from the 
CNBM.  (BJCNBM/03/2015) notes that the government consults the CNBM 
when making policies related to building materials industries. The CNBM also 
has the chance to provide feedback on difficulties and problems during policy 
implementation. For example, the CNBM and the China Building Materials 
Federation (industrial association) jointly proposed to the MIIT that the production 
of ordinary Portland cement 32.5 (PC 32.5) should be stopped, and this 
suggestion was approved in 2015. The CNBM believed that the removal of the 
low-end PC 32.5 cement could raise the quality of building and would be 
beneficial for the industry’s future development, even though the rise in quality 
might not be beneficial to the CNBM, which was the largest cement producer 
(  BJCNBM/04/2015). In summary, the CNBM as a central SOE in a 
competitive industry does not enjoy many policy favors and subsidies directly 
from the government; but its large size and years of experiences give it an 
advantageous position in the building materials industry as a whole. As a CSOE 
in a leading position in the industry, the company has better opportunities than its 
competitors to interact with the government in terms of policy making and 
consultation about quality standards. 
 
Thus far, this chapter has examined the business performance, shareholding 
structure, operational structure, listing process and government relations of the 
CNBM. It argues that although the CNBM, as a market actor, works through the 
three layers of a pyramidal structure, its listed company and its operating 
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companies and factories are capable of engaging in market competition that 
prioritizes profitability and competitiveness. And for the CNBM as a CSOE, where 
is the Party in all this? The Party maintains a high-profile presence among 
CSOEs for two main reasons. One is that, as argued in the previous chapters, 
the Party Organization Committee and the Party Discipline Committee in the 
CSOE serve as an oversight mechanism in the supervision of the CSOE. The 
other is more important: the Party seeks to maintain its ideological influence and 
to remind the marketed CSOEs repeatedly of the Party’s leading role. 
 
As for the Party’s disciplinary work in strengthening the oversight mechanism in 
the principal-agent relationship, the SASAC Discipline Committee conducts 
annual performance checks on the CSOEs as part of the Commission’s 
supervisory role. Its main responsibilities include supervising the implementation 
of laws, policies and regulations in CSOEs and also undertaking corruption 
investigations of individual CSOE staff (SASACDC 2004 No. 12). A more detailed 
list of measures can be seen in SASACDC 2006 No. 139. Apart from the annual 
inspection, the SASAC Discipline Committee also issues special measures 
targeted at different business activities. For example, the SASAC (SASACDC 
2006 No. 46) issued a special implementation plan for the control of bribery 
during property transactions undertaken by CSOEs.   
 
How can the Party achieve its goals without sacrificing the efficiency of CSOEs? 
As Chen and Li (2015, 5) argue, party organization follows a vertical line of 
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administration, but each SOE has different characteristics. Party organization 
emphasizes the importance of political ideology control, while a CSOE’s board of 
directors focuses on the profitability of the company. These contrary goals leave 
the Party in a dilemma. It refuses to settle for a less important position; so it has 
to defeat the neoliberal ideology that the market and global capitalism are 
bringing into the CSOEs. At the same time, it is not interested in interfering too 
much in CSOEs and lowering the efficiency of the business operation.  
 
It is hard to define the role of the Party in the CSOEs, since each CSOE is 
required to be an independently operated market entity. Furthermore, in general, 
CSOE board members and senior managers are members of the party 
committee of the company; and the SASAC’s assessment focuses on 
quantifiable outcomes, as shown in the company’s financial report, rather than on 
the abstract concept of party building. Therefore, we can make the assumption 
that for the senior executive of a CSOE, their managerial role is much more 
important than any formal position as party secretary that he or she might hold. 
The Party understands the dilemma; but it has issued a regulation that states, 
“the party secretary and the chairman of the board positions should be held by 
one person (SCGO 2017),” as a reminder to CSOEs that the Party is still in 
control. Taken together, these observations suggest that the party compromises 
and blends its role as ideological guardian into the CSOEs’ marketization.  
 
 255 
All in all, it is important to distinguish the Party as a broad concept from the Party 
as an individual organization located inside the company. The Party as a broad 
concept has been intangibly involved in all aspects of central SOEs’ development 
at every historical stage. A company’s discipline committee is a party 
organization. The Central Discipline Inspection Committee and the SASAC 
Discipline Committee are both part of the administrative system of the 
Communist Party. In this sense, the Party’s importance can never be over-
emphasized. However, when it comes to discussion of an individual party 
organization inside the company, the practical influence of party ideology is 
seeing a diminishing trend. The Party’s ideological control is not emphasized at 





In the previous chapter, we looked at the SASAC’s role and power in managing 
central SOEs as the principal in a principal-agent relationship. In this chapter, we 
have looked at the relationship from the point of view of the agent. Central SOEs 
in competitive industry take profitability and total revenue as their priority, while 
central SOEs in monopolistic industry put more emphasis on policy 
implementation. However, the two categories have many characteristics and 
goals in common: for example, to prove the superiority of the state ownership 
system, make profits, maintain a socialist ideology, boost economic growth and 
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lead the development of their industry in China, while competing with other giant 
enterprises in the global market. Drawing on the annual reports of the CNBM 
listed company from 2006 to 2016, relevant policy documents and extensive 
fieldwork interviews, this chapter has argued that central SOEs can be 
competitive and successful in the market while having the state as their largest 
shareholder.  
 
This chapter was organized to analyze four key themes: first, the three layers of 
the operational structure of central SOEs; second, the importance of getting 
state-owned assets listed; third, details of the oversight conducted by different 
ministries; and finally, the Party’s role in central SOEs, which included discussion 
of social burdens. Starting from the three layers of the operational structure 
inside the CNBM – that is, the CNBM group, the CNBM listed company, and the 
second-tier operating companies – we saw that most of the administrative 
government-related work was taken care of at group level. Historical burdens and 
loss-making assets were dealt with at group level as well. The group level 
interacts with its principal, the SASAC, most often; but it also has frequent 
contact with the Ministry of Finance in matters of state capital management 
(State Council [2007] No. 26). Listing high-performing assets to establish the 
CNBM listed company puts the listed company in a flexible position that enables 
it to focus its efforts on market competition. The CNBM listed company can 
operate the high-quality assets of the entire group, at the same time minimizing 
the time spent on government-related administrative work. The subsidiaries, 
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namely the subsidiaries under the CNBM listed company, are thus focused on 
businesses and production. Through the three layers of its operational structure, 
the CNBM manages to find a balanced area between being owned by the state 
and based on the developmental state model, while surviving in a market based 
on market criteria. The CNBM listed company is the area that sits between the 
developmental state and the market.  
 
CSOEs in competitive industry have a high percentage of their total assets listed 
on the stock market in China; and there are wholly listed CSOEs like the China 
State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) that are listed overseas. 
Capitalism’s demand for profit has turned CSOEs into market actors that 
prioritize the profitability of the company. As Chang (2007, 120) notes, the three 
keys to improving SOE performance without privatization are: clarifying priorities 
among the multiple goals SOEs take on; improving the monitoring system; and 
increasing competition, whether in the domestic market with private counterparts 
or in the international market. This thesis shows that the SASAC sets good 
business performance and market competitiveness as its primary goals for 
central SOEs in a competitive industry. The listing of these central SOEs on 
stock exchanges illustrates the government’s intention to clarify the main goal of 
CSOEs as profitability. Therefore, the government expects central SOEs to 
achieve multiple goals; but only if they achieve the target of being competitive 
can central SOEs be mobilized by the government to achieve other goals, and 
the profit can be put to good use by the government. Certainly, when we see 
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central SOEs which are the leading enterprises in each industry agitating for a 
free market and advocating a global market and fewer trade barriers, it is 
important to remember that their competitiveness and the necessary capital they 
were supplied with came from the SASAC’s years of policy support to make 
central SOEs bigger, better and stronger. It can seem ironic that central SOEs 
call for a free market since they grew under a developmental state model.  
 
As we have seen in this chapter, the government’s influence on companies’ 
business operations certainly exists. The members of the Board of Supervisors 
dispatched by the SASAC and based in the CNBM headquarter will check if the 
CSOEs’ merger and acquisition activities comply with national industrial policy 
and the state’s macroeconomic plan, and whether these activities fit in with the 
CSOEs’ main business areas, as regulated by the SASAC (SASACBPD [2004] 
No. 720; SASASCBPD [2004] No. 63). The SASAC’s ex ante administrative rules 
set frames for CSOEs’ business activities, from the main business areas the 
CSOEs should operate in to overseas investment plans. The CSOEs also have 
to respond to a rotating multi-team police patrol oversight mechanism that comes 
from a dual-track application of both “resident on-site” and “short-term inspection 
tours”. The Party’s role can never be over emphasized, but it is present more in 
an intangible way than as obvious direct control.  
 
Consequently, this chapter has suggested that central SOEs in fully competitive 
sectors have been given great autonomy and freedom to operate as market 
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actors. Drawing on the principal-agent understanding, this chapter has confirmed 
the circumstances in which the SASAC is the principal that central SOEs refer to, 
and there is no clear sign of a multi-principal situation in the Chinese state’s 
governance of central state assets, although central SOEs do need to interact 
and communicate with many different government offices, including functional 
ministries and various local government institutions. We have seen that the 
government’s role in competitive CSOEs is not very disruptive, because the 
regulations that define the SASAC’s responsibility are not clear, and the 
delineation of the SASAC’s authority is quite blurred. Consequently, the SASAC, 
in order to be responsible to its principal—the State Council – worries about its 
responsibility as the guardian of the value of state-owned assets. However, more 
regulations from the SASAC will lead to more constraints and less flexibility in 
CSOEs’ market activities. The uncertainties and unpredictable nature of a market 
leave no place for more control of CSOEs. 
 
This leads to the main argument of the chapter: that central SOEs can be 
efficient and profitable, while being owned by the state. This thesis disagrees 
with the argument that central SOEs are not market actors and cannot be 
competitive in the market without state support. After all, central SOEs are found 
either in competitive industries where they face serious market challenges; or 
they are in monopolistic industries where they compete with their central SOE 
counterparts. It is impossible to have a central SOE that is completely isolated 
from all kinds of market competition, even for central SOEs in the defense 
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industry that produce munitions. For example, the China Electronics Technology 
Group Corporation (CETC 2017), apart from its military products, also engages in 
various kinds of engineering and construction of civil information technology and 
electronic products. Although it is not a listed firm, eight of its sub-companies are 
listed.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter suggests the Chinese central government, in its 
management of CSOEs, follows a developmental state model that uses the 
SASAC as its pilot agency. The Chinese government has a high state capacity to 
impose methods of control as a principal. In 2015, the government had direct and 
indirect control of around 38% of the GDP, which enabled it to stress collective 
goals and give top-down orders (Naughton 2017, 7). The State Council serves as 
a coordination center that mobilizes and coordinates different ministries and 
financial institutions to provide help to the SASAC, so that the SASAC can 
implement its strategy to enlarge CSOEs in terms of total assets. It is the 
government’s goal to use successful central SOEs to maximize the capacity of 
the state, so as to achieve the Party’s legitimacy and social harmony (Chan 2009, 
53). It also relies on central SOEs to be a major actor in the global market, 
especially in sectors that relate to natural resources, to fuel economic growth. In 
order to create a successful developmental state, the SASAC assesses CSOEs 
based on a market standard. Therefore, both the SASAC and the CSOEs are 
continuously adjusting their functions and positions to find a balance between the 
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seemingly contradictory concept of having a developmental state model of 
governance and winning in the face of competition in the global market.   
 
In the next chapter, the discussion will move to central SOEs in monopoly 
sectors or, more accurately, those which have oligopoly status. The China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will be examined as a case of a CSOE 
in a strategic area that is the backbone of the national economy. This will suggest 
that, when we compare them with the CNBM in the fully competitive market, we 
shall see that CSOEs in strategic sectors have more goals to fulfill than just being 
profitable in the market. 
 
Final Remark:  
 
26 August 2016. It is announced that the China National Building Material Group 
Corporation (CNBM) and the China National Materials Corporation (Sinoma) are 
being merged into a new China National Building Materials Group Corporation.  
 
27 February 2017. The Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
Anti-Monopoly Bureau issues a Notice on Decisions (MoCAMB 2017 No. 10) 




Chapter 6. Case Study: China National Petroleum Corporation—CSOEs in 
Monopolistic Industries  
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Now that we have discussed the one-party-state’s developmental state 
governance model, and the principal-agent relationship between the SASAC and 
those central SOEs that are in competitive industries, this chapter moves on to 
an analysis of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its listed 
company, PetroChina, which are situated in the state-monopolized petroleum 
industry. The CNPC is one of 53 CSOEs in the strategic sector and is the biggest 
National Oil Company (NOC) in China and in the world. In looking at this 
company, we shall discuss two important themes, the first of which is the 
importance of the stock market. Even though the CNPC is a strategic SOE in the 
monopolistic sector of the Chinese economy, where the state holds more than 85% 
of shares in enterprises, the importance of the stock market to the enterprise 
should not be underestimated. Although the securitization of the CNPC is 
relatively low, the process has brought more transparency to this party-controlled 
old-style SOE. Secondly, its monopolistic status brings the CNPC more 
constraints than other central SOEs, because of the strength of the state’s visible 
and invisible hand in the energy sector. Examples of this range from state-
regulation of the refined petroleum price to the demands of social justice, and of 
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a massive workforce left to it by the old structure. Furthermore, the Party is under 
real pressure: on the one hand, it must manipulate the CNPC to achieve state 
goals; and on the other, it must make the CNPC profitable and competitive in the 
global market. It also has difficulties in overcoming the asymmetric information 
problem and conducting an adequate principal-agent relationship with the CNPC.  
 
Drawing on CNPC group annual reports, PetroChina annual reports, government 
regulations, and interviews, this chapter presents the results of research into how 
monopolistic CSOEs operate in the market and their interactions with the state. 
Being seen as shouldering more social responsibilities, and as a market actor 
that holds a quasi-governmental role, the CNPC and its listed company, 
PetroChina, play various and contradictory roles. They are pursuing business 
interests and profit maximization to suit the interests of their shareholders on the 
stock exchange; but at the same time they must prioritize political and social 
aims to suit the state’s expectations. And we shall extend this discussion to look 
at the interaction between Chinese central SOEs and the global energy market. 
How do central SOEs fit into the global market; and how does the global oil 
market affect the performance of Chinese central SOEs and the development of 




1. Is a central SOE in a monopolistic industry a ministry or a company? How and 
to what extent can a CSOE in a monopolistic sector be seen as a modern 
corporation?  
 
2. How and to what extent can the SASAC exert its administrative power in 
monitoring and directing monopolistic central SOEs? How do the latter compete 
while co-operating with their state-owned counterparts?  
 
3. How does the global energy market affect the operation of central SOEs, and 
how do central SOEs’ international business activities affect the global market?  
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of China’s petroleum industry, and the 
three Chinese NOCs, which are all central SOEs operating on the global oil 
market under the SASAC’s supervision. It then provides a comparison of the 
business performance of China’s three NOCs with that of their international 
counterparts Shell, Exxon and British Petroleum. This is followed by a look at the 
CNPC’s listed company, PetroChina, with an examination of the company’s 
financial performance and shareholding structure. We shall also look at the 
visible and the invisible hand the government takes in the supervision of the 
petroleum industry. We shall conclude with a comparison of the CNPC and 
PetroChina in the monopolistic category with the CNBM group and the CNBM 
listed company in the competitive category. 
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6.2. Petroleum Industry Overview  
 
China’s big three national oil companies (NOCs) are the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(Sinopec), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). The 
CNPC is China’s largest oil and gas producer and supplier, and is 100% owned 
by the Chinese government. It produces 52% of China’s total crude oil and 71% 
of China’s total natural gas (CNPC 2017).  The CNPC holds 86.17% of its listed 
company, PetroChina, which is listed in New York (PTR), Hong Kong (857) and 
Shanghai (601857) (PetroChina 2016; PetroChina 2017). Like all the other 
central SOEs under the SASAC’s administration, these NOCs have to comply 
with the SASAC’s regulation governing the three main sectors in which their 
businesses operate. According to the SASACBPD (2004 No. 324), the CNPC, 
Sinopec and the CNOOC can operate in three main businesses: 1. the 
exploration and development of crude oil and natural gas; 2. petroleum refining; 
petrochemicals, and the production of other chemical products; reserve 
maintenance; and the pipeline transportation of, and trade in, oil and natural gas; 
3. relevant engineering technology research and services. There is another 
CSOE – the Sinochem Group – that has its main business in the petroleum 
refining industry and conducts trade and other retail activities in petrol, crude oil 
and fuel oil. It can conduct oil exploration and the development of oil and gas 
overseas (SASACBPD 2005 No. 80). 
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From a historical perspective, the monopolistic central SOEs shouldered many 
different kinds of responsibility from the past planned-economy system. Tracing 
their histories back to the planned economy era, the CNPC was transformed 
from the former Ministry of Petroleum, while Sinopec was transformed from the 
Ministry for Chemical Industries. The huge assets and vague subsidies, as well 
as the strong government influences they have inherited and carry with them, 
have made the three NOCs’ function and business performance the subject of 
debate. The petrol price is adjusted according to the NDRC’s guidance, and the 
petrol price and GDP growth have an effect on each other. The CNPC has to 
guarantee oil supply, and at a government regulated price, to support economic 
growth. Compared with central SOEs in competitive industry, the CNPC must 
undertake more government functions alongside its monopolistic status. It has a 
responsibility for maintaining a stable oil supply to assist the continuous growth of 
GDP.  (ZJCNPC/30/2015) see central SOEs’ priority as the 
maintenance of social stability and energy supply. Zhejiang province is one of the 
top five tax contributors in mainland China. From 2007 to 2008, Zhejiang’s GDP 
growth was higher than 10%, which required an enormous supply of refined oil. 
PetroChina had to maintain a stable supply of oil products despite high prices on 
the international oil market.  
 
Figure 6.1 shows China’s oil production and consumption from 1993 to 2016. 
Production increased slightly during these years, but consumption rose 
significantly, and oil production in China is not currently sufficient to satisfy 
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domestic demand. According to a British Petroleum report (2016), China has 
remained the world’s largest growth market for energy for 15 consecutive years. 
In 2016, China’s increase in demand of 6.3% was the largest of any net oil 
importing country. In that year, the CNPC and its listed company, PetroChina, 
accounted for an estimated 54% and 77% of China’s crude oil and natural gas 
production (FACTS Global Energy in EIA 2015). Figure 6.2 shows China’s 
energy consumption structure by fuel type in 2012. Coal occupied 66% of 
China’s total primary energy consumption and oil occupied 20%, with natural gas 
occupying only 5% of energy consumption (EIA 2015). China’s forecast primary 
energy structure for 2020 shows that consumption of natural gas will rise to 8.6%, 
and petroleum consumption will account for 16.8% of consumption. Non-
petrochemical energy will rise to 15%, while the use of coal will go down to 59.6% 
(PetroChina 2016/04/28). China’s energy consumption mainly relies on coal, but 
coal is highly polluting, and has been widely decentralized to small-sized private 
enterprises. The oil industry, as the second largest supplier of fuel for energy 





Figure 6.1. (left) China’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1993-2016. Source: 
EIA report 2015. 
Figure 6.2. (right) Total Primary Energy Consumption in China by Fuel Types, 
2012. Source: EIA report 2015 
 
The Chinese government’s search for energy has both an economic aspect and 
a security aspect. The country needs energy resources to maintain its economic 
growth. As Chen and Lees (2016, 6) argue, “China focuses on deploying state-
owned enterprises as the gatekeepers of energy security”. For this reason, the 
Chinese government also assists the NOCs to acquire more natural resources 
overseas. So as to secure an adequate energy supply for the country, the 
Chinese government uses foreign aid and financial loans to consolidate the 
NOCs’ status in their globalization processes (Gao 2017, 318). In 2012, Chinese 
NOCs’ investment contributed more than half of the total investment in oil fields 
in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. China’s foreign affairs strategies 
follow the interests of energy security. Chinese diplomats have taken advantage 
of China’s position in international organizations to promote energy cooperation 
with resource-rich countries. Zhao (2008, 210) defines this as a state-centered 
approach to energy security leading to a mercantilist strategy. 
 
Caceres and Ear (2013, 7%) discuss the Chinese government’s global hunt for 
strategic resources to secure energy and materials in a peaceful and non-
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hegemonic way. However, China is not very dependent on imported oil, though it 
continues to raise its consumption. China’s state-led promotion of renewable 
energy development also contributes to the reduction of the country’s reliance on 
oil and oil imports (Lai 2007, 533). Chinese NOCs’ global quest for energy, and 
the Chinese government’s political and diplomatic strategy, influence each other 
(Gao 2017, 313). Chinese NOCs have gone into oil-rich countries from which 
IOCs have retreated for high-risk reasons. Sudan is China’s largest overseas oil 
production base. The CNPC’s massive investment in the Sudan oilfield was 
made in conjunction with a commitment to improving the lives of local 
communities, including making donations for education and providing drinking 
water, free medical services and so on. The civil war in Sudan did not lead to the 
CNPC pulling out. Instead, it not only continued its production but also helped 
with post-conflict management from the UN by building a refugee camp for the 
homeless in 2014 (CNPC 2010 and 2014). Therefore, the government supports 
the NOCs’ global expansion through diplomatic methods aimed at guaranteeing 
a sufficient supply of energy. Apart from indicating China’s energy security 
concerns, the NOCS’ market activities in resource-rich countries are also highly 
oriented towards China’s economic interests. 
  
The CNPC and Sinopec have dominated onshore oil exploration, while the 
CNOOC has been in charge of Chinese offshore oilfields. The Ministry for Fuel 
Industries, created in 1949, was the predecessor of both the CNPC and Sinopec 
(Sinopec 2017). In the 1980s, responsibilities for upstream operations and 
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downstream operations were divided. Upstream operations were dominated by 
the predecessor of the CNPC—the China Petroleum Corporation (CPC) – under 
the administration of the Ministry for Petroleum Industries. Sinopec dominated 
downstream operations under the Ministry for Chemical Industries (Kambara and 
Howe 2007, 46). In 1983, Sinopec was established, and later, in 1988, the 
government restructured the CNPC and Sinopec into vertically integrated firms 
that operated both upstream and downstream in the onshore oil industry. The 
CNOOC was responsible for offshore oil and gas exploration and production. It 
has been actively expanding its business influence overseas and has also 
started to step into the downstream of the petroleum market by selling refinery oil 
on the domestic market. The CNOOC is seen as a growing competitor of the 










Figure 6.3. Comparison of the Key Indicators of the Top Oil Companies in the 
World. Source: Global Fortune 500, 2016. Analyzed by the Author.  
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Figure 6.3 compares the key indicators of China’s three NOCs with those of the 
world’s three largest IOCs. Drawing on the Global Fortune 500 list for 2016, there 
were five companies in the petroleum industry in the top 10. China’s largest oil 
company—the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) – was in third 
place, while the country’s second largest oil company—the Sinopec Group – was 
in fourth place. Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil and British Petroleum were 
ranked at fifth, sixth and tenth place, respectively. China’s third largest oil 
company—the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), which is also 
in mining and crude oil production – was ranked at 109. In 2016, these six 
enterprises in the oil industry all experienced a significant drop in both revenue 
and profit. Among them, British Petroleum presented the worst performance, with 
a 37% drop in its revenue and a 271.5% drop in its profit. Sinopec only 
experienced a 30.6% decrease in its profit, but the CNPC’s profit fell by more 
than half compared to the previous year and the CNOOC also had a 46.4% 
decline in profit. According to the CNPC’s listed company, PetroChina 
(2016/03/29), low oil prices in the international oil market largely affected the 
performances of both PetroChina and Sinopec. PetroChina’s main business lies 
upstream in the oil industry, with outstanding advantages in exploration and 
production, so that the profit that should have accumulated through exploration 
and production was severely reduced by the low oil price. On the other hand, 
Sinopec’s main business lies downstream in the oil industry, with a focus on oil 
refining and chemical engineering, as well as the sale of refined oil products, and 
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so it still had a certain profit margin in this climate. The average OPEC crude oil 
price experienced a dramatic decline from $96.29 per barrel in 2014 to $49.49 
per barrel in 2015 and then dropped slightly to $40.68 per barrel in 2016. Both 
the CNPC and the CNOOC had their focus upstream in the oil industry, and so 
their business performance was easily affected by the low international oil price.  
 
It can be seen from Figure 6.3 that, in terms of number of employees, Sinopec 
has 810,537 while the CNOOC, as China’s third largest NOC, has only 110,200, 
showing little difference when compared with Shell, Exxon and BP. The CNPC 
has 1,589,508 employees, which is a much higher figure than the total numbers 
of employees of the other five companies added together. However, it would be 
unfair to draw the conclusion that the CNPC has low efficiency and abundant 
employees. According to the CNPC group’s annual report, employees aged 56 
and above were slightly over one-third of the total number, at 35.84%, and the 
age group 46-55 represented 28.49% of the total employees (CNPC 2016, 19). 
China’s retirement age is 60 for male and 55 for female cadres, and 50 for 
women workers, which means more than half of the CNPC’s employees will 
retire or be close to retiring in the next few years. The data helps to indicate the 
CNPC’s inability to lay off any of its redundant employees, more than half of 
whom were initially employed under a planned economy background.    
 
We shall now turn to an analysis of the business performance of China’s three 
NOCs. Profit as a percentage of assets is also known as the return on assets, 
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and shows a company’s profitability. The CNPC and Sinopec achieve the same 
return on assets of 1.1%, while the CNOOC reaches 2.6%. It can also be seen 
from the figure that the CNOOC has the highest profit as a percentage of 
revenue, at 6.8%, the CNPC has 2.4%, and Sinopec only has 1.2%. This shows 
that although, in 2016, the international oil price was at its lowest point since 
2005, upstream in the oil industry was more profitable than downstream. It also 
indicates that the CNOOC did well in 2016 compared to its domestic and 
international counterparts. The CNPC and Sinopec, although both experienced a 
dramatic decrease in revenue and profit, fared better than Shell and BP. 
 
 
6.3. Son of the Communist State—From Ministry to Central SOE 
 
6.3.1. The China National Petroleum Corporation 
 
Since the market reforms of 1978, China has experienced rapid social changes 
and economic development. It has maintained GDP growth at an average of 10% 
a year, which is the fastest sustainable growth in history (World Bank 2016). 
China’s energy consumption has increased significantly to support this economic 
growth. It is the fourth largest petroleum-producing country and the largest 
consumer of oil products. Petroleum, as the key energy source, has been 
categorized as a pillar industry of the national economy. The SASAC has 
promoted the growth of state assets in the strategic sector and in major 
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industries in order to enhance the controlling power of the state over assets and 
exercise a leading role in the economy (SCGO 2006 No.97). The state maintains 
absolute holdings in seven pillar industries that are at the core of national 
security and are also seen as the lifeline of the national economy: military 
Armaments, electricity and the electricity grid, petroleum and petrochemicals, 
telecoms, coal, civil aviation, and shipping (Xinhua News Agency 2006). Chinese 
central SOEs in the strategic sector are often portrayed, in an extremist 
interpretation, as being the arms of the Communist Party of China and its 
bureaucratic structure, and their business activities as being highly politically 
oriented. 
 
Among these CSOEs, the three National Oil Companies, namely the China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the Sinopec Group (Sinopec) and the 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) are often criticized as being 
profitable due to their monopolistic status. China’s three NOCs’, with their 
monopolistic status, have an annual profit that is estimated at 637.6-689.3 billion 
Yuan (Zhou, Xie and Huang 2015, 199). It is further argued that the National 
Development and Reform Committee’s (NDRC’s) refined oil price-control 
mechanism maintains a monopoly of the petrol refinery stage, but fails to keep 
the NOCs’s prices down due to the latter’s monopolistic status in the upstream 
activities of exploration and production. As illustrated in Figure 6.1, China’s 
petroleum consumption increased significantly from 1980 to 2015 and this trend 
is thought likely to continue. There is no doubt that China’s three NOCS are 
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crucial central SOEs in the pillar industries, being responsible for the country’s 
energy supply and, at the same time, profitable.   
 
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was founded in 1998 and is 
China’s largest oil and gas producer and supplier, with a presence in 70 other 
countries (CNPC 2016). Its business activities include petroleum exploration and 
production, natural gas and pipeline construction, refining and marketing, oilfield 
services, engineering construction, petroleum equipment manufacturing, new 
energy development, capital management, and finance and insurance services 
(CNPC 2014). The CNPC was is a conventional NOC, prioritizing government 
functions over business functions and putting the interests of the country first 
(Jiang 2012, 380). The CNPC’s annual taxation paid in domestic China was 
407.8 billion Yuan in 2013, and 407 billion Yuan and 338.1 billion Yuan in 2014 
and 2015, respectively (CNPC 2015). The company’s predecessor was the 
Ministry for Petroleum Industries in China, which was founded in 1955 and was 
restructured in 1998. When the CNPC was established, it inherited part of the old 
Ministry for Petroleum Industries’ responsibilities, mainly in terms of taking 
charge of oil and gas upstream operations. The CNPC was a ministerial-level 
corporation with certain government administrative functions operating directly 
under the State Council when it was established in 1988. It has 87 different units, 
including the country’s flagship oilfields. like Daqing and Shengli (CNPC 2017; 
Meidan 2016, 14). It defines itself as “a state oil company endowed with certain 
government administrative functions” (CNPC 2016). In 1999, the CNPC founded 
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its listed company, PetroChina, under Company Law and this was listed on the 
New York, Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. 
 
 
6.3.2. The CNPC and its Listed Company, PetroChina  
 
The CNPC separated its core assets and reconstituted them as branch 
companies, later transferring these assets to its listed company, PetroChina 
(Jiang 2012, 392). The CNPC held 86.17% of the shares of PetroChina. The 
PetroChina Company Limited (“PetroChina”) is the largest oil and gas producer 
and distributor, holding a dominant role in the oil and gas industry in China. It is 
not only one of the companies with the biggest sales revenue in China, but also 
one of the largest oil companies in the world. Unlike the CNPC, PetroChina puts 
more emphasis on its business role by adopting a standard corporate 
governance structure, following the relevant laws and regulations, including 
China’s Company Law and the Articles of Association of Companies Seeking a 
Listing outside the PRC Prerequisite Clause (CSRC 1994 No. 21). It provides 
annual reports and semi-annual reports and holds meetings to report to its 
shareholders (PetroChina 2016). Unlike what happens with central SOEs in the 
competitive sector, which have more than 50% of their shares listed on the stock 
market and available to public investors, the CNPC holds a high percentage of 
the shares of PetroChina, and its shareholding has only decreasing slightly over 
time: from 90% when PetroChina was listed in 2000, to 86.17% in 2015. As 
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explained in chapter 5, the group company and the listed company have different 
functions, and seek to achieve different aims and objectives, through the division 
of labor among the three layers of operation. In the CNBM, the CNBM group 
works as a strategic and coordinating center, while the CNBM listed company 
and its subsidiaries conduct the real business. However, in the CNPC, both the 
CNPC group and the CNPC listed company, PetroChina, conduct business 
activities. The problem of having no clear line between the CNPC and 
PetroChina (Jiang 2012, 402) leads to some overlap in businesses areas and the 
conflict of competition. There has also occurred a potential conflict of interests 
between these two operational entities.  
 
This section describes the different functions of the CNPC and PetroChina. It 
also explains what the CNPC does to avoid competition with its listed company. 
This is important because the listed company has to consider the interests of 
minority shareholders. The CNPC has the power to select the board of directors 
of PetroChina and is also the largest supplier and purchaser of products from 
PetroChina, providing technical services and sometimes an exchange of assets 
when necessary. In 2000, to support PetroChina’s business, the CNPC and 
PetroChina signed the Agreement on Avoiding Competition and Pre-emption 
Rights. This confirmed PetroChina’s rights and priority in acquiring the CNPC’s 
overseas oil and gas assets (PetroChina L2014-018). The controlling 
shareholder, the CNPC, has to inform the listed company, PetroChina, of any of 
its business that might cause competition with PetroChina’s primary business. 
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PetroChina also has priority in acquiring the CNPC’s assets and shares 
(PetroChina L2014-001). 
 
The CNPC’s support for its listed company, PetroChina, can also be seen in the 
case of overseas investment in oilfields. For instance, if overseas investment is in 
a relatively stable oil market, or a market where  the CNPC has already had 
considerable investment experience, and if the time for exploration does not take 
too long and the business can be profitable in the short-term, investment will be 
done by the listed company, PetroChina. However, investment in new markets, 
or in markets where, for political reasons, the country involved does not allow the 
listed company to invest, will be covered by the group company, the CNPC. 
When these investment projects undertaken by the CNPC became profitable, 
they are transferred to the listed company, PetroChina. The CNPC plays the role 
of business incubator for PetroChina (PetroChina 2014/05/21). The CNPC can 
be seen as a post-reform Ministry for Petroleum Industries, which has highly 
politically-oriented goals, such as to guarantee a stable supply of energy while its 
listed company, PetroChina, focuses more on business performance. Like the 
CNBM listed company, PetroChina takes shareholders’ interests as its priority. 
The difference is that the largest shareholder in the CNBM listed company is the 
“public investor”, who holds 53.33% of shares in the CNBM listed company; but 
the largest shareholder in PetroChina is the CNPC, which owns 86.17% of the 
shares. Unlike central SOEs in competitive industries, the CNPC takes the 
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responsibility for guaranteeing the energy supply for the country as its priority 
rather than purely commercial interests.   
 
PetroChina can be seen as a company that is no different from other 
international oil companies. It has taken on western-style corporate governance 
and has a precise definition for the roles each department plays in its business 
activities. The primary goal for the CNPC is providing employment, paying taxes 
and ensuring energy security. It holds more of a government function than a 
business function. PetroChina was created to be an internationalized oil 
company and is listed on stock exchanges so as to attract investors. The 
“taxation generated in mainland China” is presented as one of the core pieces of 
data in the annual report of the group company, CNPC, but is not seen in any of 
PetroChina’s annual reports or semi-annual reports. PetroChina’s annual report 
focuses more on the company’s market performance, corporate governance and 
transparency as a company. Therefore, it can be argued that the CNPC’s report 
takes the SASAC as its primary reader, along with other central government 
departments, while PetroChina’s report aims to show compliance with stock 
markets’ regulations and targets shareholder’s interests, so as to attract more 
capital. Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that, although the SASAC holds 
100% of the CNPC group and the CNPC holds 86.17% of PetroChina, the 
SASAC still chose to put PetroChina on the stock market. Apart from generating 
capital to lessen pressure on the state’s finances, the listing should be seen, 
more importantly, as a method adopted by the SASAC to push forward the 
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reform of the giant ex-ministry CSOEs. As argued in the previous chapters, listing 
of CSOEs can significantly increase the SASAC’s ability in conducting a 
principal’s control of its agents. 
 
Acknowledging the CNPC’s privileged political background and authority to 
access natural resources, an assumption can easily be made that, because the 
CNPC has a stable income from operations upstream in the oil industry, this 
becomes a political ‘cloud’ and means the company is exempted from the 
SASAC’s supervision. The estimated fiscal subsidies granted by the state to 
SOEs were around 314.3 Billion yuan in the period 2001 to 2009 (Yu 2014, 16). 
However, the absence of official data giving the actual number of subsidies, and 
the sources of direct and indirect subsidies, makes it problematic to assess the 
level of support central SOEs have from the government (  
BJSASAC/13/2015). Can the CNPC and PetroChina fulfill the government’s 
political requirement to keep petrol price low, while making profits to hand over to 
the SASAC? As a public arm of the CNPC, PetroChina outperforms many other 
NOCs around the world. Its total assets rose from 432 billion RMB in 2000 to 
2,394 billion in 2015. And it has maintained a stable growth despite the 





6.3.3. PetroChina—The Hybrid Model of a Modern Corporation 
 
The petroleum industry in China has monopoly status, like all the post-structured 
vertically integrated NOCs; and the NOCs have all listed part of their best-
performing assets on various stock exchanges around the world. The analysis 
now moves to a study of PetroChina. Unlike the cross-holding structure of the 
CNBM listed company, PetroChina’s shareholding structure is simple. From 2000 
to 2004, the CNPC held 90% of shares in PetroChina. It then slightly reduced its 
shares to 88.21% in 2005. After that, the CNPC reduced the number of its shares 
very slightly every year, until it reached 86.507% in 2011. The shareholding 
percentage was then kept the same for four consecutive years until, in 2016, it 
dropped slightly to 86.17%. Unlike the CNBM listed company, which released a 
large number of its shares to public investors, the CNPC held strictly to a very 
high percentage of shares in PetroChina. 
 










Figure 6.4. Source: PetroChina Company Limited Annual Reports from 2000-
2016. Currency: CNY ¥ Unit of Measurement: million. Analyzed and presented by 





Figure 6.5. Total Assets, Total Revenue and After-tax Profit from 2000-2016. 
Source: PetroChina Company Limited Annual Reports from 2000-2016. Analyzed 
by the Author.  
 
Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 show the total assets, total revenue and after-tax profit 
from PetroChina from 2000 to the latest available annual report, that of 2016. 
They indicate that PetroChina’s total assets experienced a gradual growth from 
432 billion RMB in 2000 to 643,641 RMB in 2004, and then rose significantly to 
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2,405 billion RMB in 2014. There was then a continued, steady growth to 2,397 
billion RMB in 2016. Unlike the stable and sustained growth of total assets, total 
revenue showed more obvious fluctuations. From 2008 to 2009, revenue 
dropped slightly, from 1,073 billion RMB to 1,019 billion RMB. It then grew again 
until 2014, but suffered a remarkable decrease, from 2,283 billion RMB in 2014 
to 1,725 billion RMB in 2015; and then down again to 1,617 billion RMB in 2016. 
The figures also demonstrate that, compared to the gradual growth of total 
assets and total revenue, the net profit remained low. For instance, in 2005, total 
assets were 785 billion RMB, while profit after taxation was 140 billion RMB. In 
2013, net profit was 142 billion RMB, but total assets were 2,342 billion RMB, 




Figure 6.6. (left) Average Annual OPEC Crude Oil Price 2000-2016. Source: 
www.statista.com (in US dollars per barrel). Analyzed and presented by the 
author.    
 284 
Figure 6.7. (right) After-tax Profit of the PetroChina Company Limited 2000-2016. 
Source: PetroChina Company Limited Annual Reports from 2000-2016. Analyzed 
and presented by the author. 
  
What are the likely explanations for a situation in which PetroChina’s total assets 
and total revenue all show significant growth while net profits fluctuate? Figure 
6.6 shows the average OPEC crude oil price, while Figure 6.7 shows that the net 
profit earned by PetroChina experienced huge fluctuations between 2000 and 
2016. The average annual OPEC crude oil price rose significantly from 23.12 
USD per barrel in 2001 to 94.1 USD per barrel in 2008. In the same period, 
PetroChina’s net profit also increased from 45 billion RMB in 2001 to 155 billion 
RMB in 2007. The OPEC price suddenly dropped in 2009 to 60.86 USD per 
barrel, but soon went back to a rising trend. PetroChina’s net profit also 
experienced an upturn, from 107 billion RMB in 2009 to 151 billion RMB in 2010. 
The OPEC crude oil price reached a peak at 109.45 USD per barrel in 2012. The 
oil price then decreased dramatically from 96.29 USD per barrel in 2014 to 40.68 
USD per barrel in 2016. PetroChina’s net profit showed a similar drop from 142 
billion RMB in 2013 to 29 billion RMB in 2016. 
 
As discussed in the earlier section of this chapter, China’s volume of oil 
consumption is bigger than the volume of its domestic production, so that its oil 
supplies depend significantly on imports from the global oil market. To secure oil 
supplies, the Chinese NOCs have increased their investment in domestic and 
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overseas oil exploration (IEA 2014). The two figures have shown very similar 
waves. Taken together, these results suggest that the steady increase in 
PetroChina’s total assets and total revenue reflect China’s growing demand for 
energy, whereas its net profit relies heavily on the rise and fall of crude oil prices 
on the international oil market. This is the reason why China’s National Energy 
Administration (NEA), as part of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), regulates and issues the retail oil price every ten working 
days, according to the oil price on the international market. The CNPC and 
PetroChina focus on upstream activities, and draw profit from oil exploration and 
associated operations. Therefore, the government-regulated oil price has a 
significant impact on the company’s net profit. 
 
 
6.4. Too Big to be Watched  
 
6.4.1. Government’s Visible Hand in the Petroleum Industry 
 
Before 2008, China was a country that had been without a ministerial-level 
agency to supervise the country’s energy development policies since 1993, when 
the Ministry of Energy was dissolved (Zha 2006, 186). Therefore, China’s 
national energy policy system was fragmented and disorganized. The absence of 
a national government agency to coordinate and make energy development 
policies made China’s energy policies disjointed, and sometimes they had 
contradictory objectives (Xu 2006, 273). The SASAC was the investor that 
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monitored the business performance of the three NOCs. However, it was unable 
to make energy development policies or comment constructively on energy 
security plans. However, in 2008, the National Energy Administration (NEA) was 
created under the NDRC, and was put in charge of energy policies for coal, 
electricity, oil and gas, and renewable energy. The NDRC (including its sub-
bureau, the NEA) and the SASAC became the visible hand that the central 
administration presented to the petroleum industry. 
 
The Chinese government launched a fuel tax and reform of the domestic oil 
pricing mechanism in 2009. The NDRC conducted a trial implementation of oil 
price control in which it set the highest retail price for each province (NDRC Price 
2009 No. 1198). This reform was designed to ensure better profit margins for 
refiners, who had to sell fuel at regulated prices so as to reduce the intense 
energy usage that resulted from lower consumer prices and higher demand. The 
oil product pricing system adopted in 2009 allowed the NDRC to adjust the retail 
price when the average price of imported crude oil moved outside an established 
4% price range for 22 consecutive working days for diesel and gasoline. Despite 
the price reform, international crude oil prices increased at a faster rate than the 
revisions made by the NDRC to retail fuel prices, causing refiners to incur losses 
on their downstream businesses and increase their fuel product exports. To 
promote greater market transparency and to cope with global changes, the 
NDRC revised the pricing mechanism in March 2013 by shortening the retail fuel 
price adjustment period to every ten working days, when prices would 
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automatically be adjusted to international crude price fluctuations greater than 50 
RMB per metric ton (about $1.10/barrel). However, the NDRC did not identify the 
crude oil types that it used for price determination. When international oil prices 
began falling in the middle of 2014, the NDRC approved 12 downward price 
changes. When the benchmark crude oil prices recovered slightly at the 
beginning of 2015, the NDRC raised the retail prices twice (EIA 2015).  
 
The NDRC set the highest price at 130 USD and the lowest price at 40 USD per 
barrel.  In article 6 of Measures of Petroleum Pricing (2016, No. 64), the NDRC 
Price Bureau ruled that when the crude oil price was lower than 40 USD per 
barrel, the refined oil price should be calculated based on USD 40 per barrel as 
the cost. When the crude oil price was higher than 130 USD per barrel, taking 
into consideration the interests of the producers and consumers, and the 
principle of maintaining national economic stability, the government should have 
in place adequate fiscal and monetary policy to guarantee the production and 
supply of refined oil, with the aim of not raising, or only slightly raising, the price 
of diesel. The history of the government’s oil price control can be traced back to 
1998, when the old Ministry of Petroleum Industries was transformed into the 
CNPC. In 1998, the NDRC’s predecessor, the State Planning Committee, issued 
a Notice of Crude Oil and Refined Oil Price Mechanism Reform (1998 No. 52). In 
section 2, article 3 of this notice, it was stated that the price for refined oil would 
be adjusted and set by the State Planning Committee, based on the crude oil 
price on the Singapore market. The State Planning Committee regulated the 
 288 
retail price of gasoline and diesel in each province. The two oil companies, the 
China National Petroleum Corporation and the China Petrochemical Corporation, 
could adjust the retail price within 5% of the price on the Singapore market. 
Recently, the NDRC’s refined oil price has varied from one province to another, 
due to the unbalanced local economic development situation. For example, in a 
notice on decreasing the refined oil price for the domestic market, the NDRC 
(2014 No. 246) ruled that the highest retail price for gasoline and diesel in each 
province would be set subject to the crude oil price on the international market, 
with Beijing paying the highest price at 9400 RMB for gasoline and 8655 RMB for 
diesel, while Xinjiang Province had the lowest-priced supply, at 8975 RMB for 
gasoline and 7985 RMB for diesel.  
 
In considering price mechanisms, it is worth noting that despite having oil price 
control as an objective, the NDRC, in a document on refined oil price 
mechanisms (2016 No. 64), set the importance of sufficient market supply as its 
priority. In chapter 3 article 1 of this document, the NDRC rules that the big three 
NOCs, namely the CNPC, Sinopec and the CNOOC, must continue using 
adequate mechanisms to coordinate the interests of the upstream and the 
downstream aspects of the group’s work: that is, they must coordinate the 
production and transportation of crude oil and refinery oil, maintain sizable stocks, 
enhance the comprehensive coordination and scheduling of emergency 
resources, and ensure market supply. The NDRC, as the government’s visible 
hand, issues energy policies and price guidance, and directs the NOCs in their 
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efforts to maintain energy supplies adequate for national economic stability. We 
shall now look at the other visible hand of the government—the SASAC.  
 
One theme of this thesis is that the SASAC is constantly improving its 
supervision system to play the role of the principal better, and to monitor more 
effectively the operation of its agents, the CSOEs, through both ex ante and ex 
post mechanisms. Leaving aside the supervision mechanisms discussed in the 
previous chapters, which are applied to the CNPC as they are applied to any 
other CSOE, this section focuses its analysis on the SASAC’s supervision of 
CSOEs’ work overseas. The SASAC set as one of its goals the significant 
improvement of the international competitiveness of CSOEs. Since CSOEs were 
increasingly involved in the global market, the SASAC issued more detailed 
regulations to enhance its regulatory power through ex ante mechanisms. 
 
SASAC orders No. 26, 27 and No. 35 (previously No. 28) set out the supervision 
system for the management of CSOE’s assets overseas. The SASAC revised the 
Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Investment by Central 
Enterprises (SASAC 2017 No. 34) and the Measures for the Supervision and 
Administration of Overseas Investment by Central Enterprises (SASAC 2017 No. 
35) to replace previous interim measures in orders No. 16 and No. 28, 
respectively. The revised measures showed the method of regulating these 
enterprises’ working processes as the ex-ante mechanism in the principal-agent 
theory. Both measures, as discussed in chapter 2, rule that the SASAC will 
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require CSOEs to create an administrative system to supervise their investments 
in both the domestic market and overseas. Also, these regulations cover the 
entire working process: pre-investment evaluation, control of the investment 
process, and management after investment (SASAC order 2017 No. 34 and No. 
35). The SASAC also applies the police patrol mechanism and fire alarm 
mechanism as ex post mechanisms in the supervision of CSOEs’ management 
of their overseas assets. It grants CSOEs’ headquarters a certain degree of 
autonomy in the supervision of their overseas assets; but it will conduct random 
checks and inspection tours of their subsidiaries (SASAC 2011 No. 27). The 
performance of overseas assets will also be taken into consideration in the 
assessment and evaluation of CSOEs’ performance; and the economic 
accountability reports of those in charge of CSOEs’ overseas branches will be 
evaluated by the SASAC accordingly (SASAC 2011 No.26).  
 
The Chinese government’s ability to control the NOCs in the situation just 
described has been questioned, due to the fragmented nature of its energy 
sector. China’s decentralization and liberalization of the energy sector led to a 
situation where the state-owned energy companies took over power and 
resources from the government. The NOCs enjoyed greater autonomy, leaving 
the government very limited ability to monitor and direct these energy firms’ 
activities (Downs 2007, 53 and Zhang 2015, 261). Kennedy (2010, 139) too 
notes the central government’s difficulties in controlling the NOCs, suggesting 
that the NOCs sometimes hijacked China's foreign policy, their investment in the 
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overseas oilfields pulling the government closer to states that were international 
pariahs. However, I support the view that the NOCs should not be seen as arms 
of the government. The NOC’s investment activities overseas were not motivated 
solely by the government’s concern for energy security, but also by their own 
economic interests (Downs 2010, 96). Nevertheless, the companies’ greater 
autonomy in making business decisions should not be seen as a sign of the 
government’s diminishing power. Rather, the SASAC played the supervisory role 
in a principal-agent relationship with the CSOEs as they pursued their business 
activities. Also, the NDRCs’ regulated oil price mechanism gave the state indirect 
control of the companies’ finances (Meidan 2016, 15). 
 
This chapter suggests that the state has been able to closely supervise the 
NOCs at the same time as it has retreated from direct interference in the 
companies’ daily market operations, choosing to rely on market standards to 
assess their performance. Although the NOCs have been involved in the global 
oil market, they have never gained full autonomy from the one-party state. The oil 
and gas industry have remained as the strategic assets of the government for the 
maintenance of stable energy supply (Meidan 2016, 55). Taylor (2012, 75) 
provides a similar view, and sees the one-party state's efforts to strengthen its 
political authority in the strategic sector and its capacity to apply top-down 
policies to influence the operation of the NOCs. In order to understand the 
principal-agent relationship between the SASAC and the CSOEs, it is also 
important to examine the personnel system inside the CSOEs. Lin (2015, 125) 
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examines the career pathway of the CEOs of Chinese SOEs, pointing out that 
these CEOs usually spent their entire career in the same group corporation. Also, 
she is correct in arguing that the personnel systems of industrial SOEs are to a 
high degree of closed-off, which favors insiders over outsiders. In the Chinese 
government, the “top-tier of satisfactions in politics and economics are 
synchronized” (Lin 2011, 73). The interviewees for this thesis suggested that the 
people who work at a managerial level in a CSOE start their career as ordinary 
employees in one of the companies/factories of their CSOE’s group. A possible 
explanation might be that one of the criteria for being promoted to CNBM senior 
positions is a clear and complete understanding of the company system, with 
experience of frontline work. This can be helpful for solving principal-agent 
problems inside the corporate group, since the latter is a large enterprise. 
Therefore, it is also reasonable to argue that managers in the CNBM system are 
promoted based on their performance at work rather than their political 
connections. The incentives for staff in central SOEs can be both promotion to a 
higher political position or material rewards. 
 
There are two views as to whether the CCP, as an institution, is in progressive 
decline as regards its control over, and influence on, the political, economic and 
social life of the nation (Shambaugh 2010, 3), or whether the Chinese 
governments’ total involvement of the state in the economy and “complete 
synchronization of a party-government-military-economy regime” is a distinctive 
feature that differentiates it from a traditional developmental state (Lin 2010, 70). 
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This chapter argues that the CCP’s way of control is less direct but more 
versatile. As Chen and Lees (2016, 9) argue, the Chinese government is 
determined to maintain bureaucratic system-monitoring mechanisms and remain 
actively involved in the developmental state model of governance. It disagrees 
with Li (2012, 613), who believes China has “weak government, strong interest 
groups” and accepts the central government’s declining capacity in the effective 
control of key SOEs. As argued in Chapter 4, the SASAC has adopted market 
criteria as a method of exerting effective oversight of CSOEs, so as to achieve 
the goals of a developmental state. It is the SASAC’s mission to maximize the 
value of state holdings, combined with achieving the government’s strategic 
goals, especially in the major industrial sectors  (Naughton 2006, 3).   
 
China’s global quest for energy is highly focused on domestic demand. Since the 
country needs a peaceful world environment to continue its economic growth, it is 
unlikely to pursue an aggressive foreign policy to disturb global politics (Xu 2006, 
267). It is an oversimplification to define the state’s capacity to control as 
meaning government intervention in every single decision-making process. The 
state’s capacity to control should be understood through the theoretical lens of 
principal-agent theory and is about the ex ante administrative policies that ensure 
correct processes in NOC activities. It is also about the ex post supervision 
mechanisms of rotating police patrol and fire alarm oversight. 
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The central government’s strategy for reducing insecurity in oil-supply is to 
internationalize the petroleum industry (Jaffe and Lewis 2002, 122). China’s 
political-economic strategies have become the government’s way of re-enrolling 
in the global economy. The Chinese SOEs are now inextricably linked with the 
western economies, which apply capitalist logic to their global expansion (Lim 
2010, 680). This thesis suggests that the Chinese government has adopted 
market tools in promoting the growth of the country as a developmental state. It 
is an oversimplification to come to the conclusion that the government is unable 
to control the CSOEs because the CSOEs pursue their own economic interests 
or compete among themselves for overseas resources and market share. There 
is no causal relationship between the NOCs’ pursuit of their economic interests 
and the state’s capacity to control. Nevertheless, it is important to limit the state’s 
visible hand in the petroleum industry, since it is in the state’s interest to have the 
NOCs as market actors that are profitable in the global market. Besides, 
PetroChina is a listed company, and since the CNPC is the largest shareholder, 







6.4.2. Regulating the Government’s Invisible Hand in the Petroleum 
Industry  
 
The Chinese government’s primary interest in its dealings with the NOCs is to 
secure its energy supply for economic development. The SASAC’s primary 
requirement for the NOCs is for them to be profitable, which suits the SASAC’s 
core responsibility of maintaining and raising the value of state-owned assets. 
The Economic Value Added (EVA) was adopted as an essential indicator for the 
evaluation of enterprise managers’ performance in the management of capital, 
and for the assessment of the value they generated for shareholders  
(SASACBGA 2014 No .8). After being promoted to ministerial level in 1996, and 
gaining more autonomy afterwards, the three NOCs were put in a position where 
they were neither government puppets nor completely independent corporations 
(Xu 2006,272). It was hard to a draw a line that would limit the scope of 
government intervention. It was also unclear how to define the responsibilities 
and roles of the different governmental agencies that were involved in the NOCs’ 
group businesses. 
 
Therefore, it is crucial to limit the CSOE group’s potential for intervening in its 
listed company, and to limit the government’s intervention at the group level, 
leaving the listed company to play its role as a market actor. Particularly for those 
CSOEs in strategic sectors, where the group holds an absolute majority of the 
shares, the SASAC values the CSOEs’ listed companies as the pioneers of state 
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ownership reform, building modern corporate governance and increasing the 
transparency of companies’ finances. PetroChina created the nomination 
committee for its board of directors, in 2015, according to the standards laid 
down in Hong Kong’s guidelines for corporate governance (PetroChina 
2016/01/08). The State Council (2016 No.19) issued guidance to central SOEs to 
close down their old production facilities, so as to improve production efficiency. 
It also expected central SOEs to reduce the managerial levels from the current 5-
9 levels down to 3-4 levels, so as to increase efficiency and to accelerate 
decision-making processes. 
 
The SASAC sets the boundary that limits the extent to which the group company 
can take an invisible hand in its listed company. The participation of state 
shareholders should ensure the independence of the listed company regarding 
personnel, assets, finance and businesses. The state shareholders should 
promote the interests of the entire company, while improving the core 
competitiveness of the listed company (SASACBPRM 2009 No. 123). This 
measure shows that the SASAC assumes that the state, as the largest 
shareholder, especially in the major sectors, has full control of, or at least a high 
impact on, the listed company, as is the case with the CNPC, which holds 86.17% 
of PetroChina. It is crucial to distinguish the listed company’s goal and business 
activities from that of the group, and not to mix the concepts of CSOEs and 
CSOEs’ listed companies. The listed company has to run under corporate 
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governance, taking the shareholders’ interests as its priority, and comply with the 
regulations of overseas stock exchanges. 
 
The Chinese government has resisted the pressure to privatize the commanding 
heights of its economy. On the contrary, it has attempted to build a group of giant 
SOEs which are globally competitive in order to catch up and compete with the 
high-income countries. These large SOEs, although they went through a long 
reform process of institutional restructuring and technological upgrading, remain 
bound up with the government and the domestic economy (Nolan 2012, 21). The 
SASAC’s goals consisted not only of improving corporate governance and 
instituting enterprise reform, but also of restructuring the firms so that they would 
be able to adjust the sectorial composition of government-owned assets 
(Naughton 2003, 5). Nolan (2012, 59) points out that developing countries that 
opened their markets to neoliberalism had their economies dominated by 
oligopolistic firms. China’s standard-bearing firms were located in strategic 
industries which were broadly the same as those in which the developed 
countries established their standard bearers during their post-war reconstruction. 
China’s large state-owned enterprises not only occupy the pillar industries but 
also have extensive government support. For this reason, market’s high-profile 
entry into China met strong resistance from the domestic market, especially 
those of the major state-owned enterprises. As this thesis has suggested, China 
adopted the tools of marketization to promote the growth of its developmental 
state model, while refusing to decrease state power in the market. Nolan (2012, 
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64) further adds that China’s standard-bearing firms focus more on long-term 
gains than on short-term returns. These SOEs also benefit from cooperation and 
support among themselves. China’s large SOEs, therefore, are able to make 
technological advances based on enormous domestic consumption. This 
orientation towards the domestic market distinguishes China from the classical 
developmental states, which focused on developing an export-oriented economy 
(Zheng 2011, 141). The CNPC, as illustrated above, like other central SOEs, is 
highly vertically integrated, including large numbers of research institutions 
attached to the group company which strengthen the company’s development in 
production and technology.  
  
The listing processes, and the continuous need to respond to the regulations of 
the stock exchanges of New York, Hong Kong and Shanghai, serve as a form of 
external supervision to further improve the company’s working transparency. 
Even if the CNPC holds over 86% of shares of PetroChina, the securitization of 
the company did help in promoting its transparency. In 2007, the China National 
Petroleum Corporation released a further 1.92% of its shares in PetroChina on 
the stock exchange. The CNP’s shareholding dropped from 88.21% to 86.29% of 
shares (PetroChina 2007a, 1-2-5). On the one hand, this assisted the central 
SOEs in attracting finance and acquiring cash flows. Jiang (2012, 394) observes 
that the listing of PetroChina was a way of attracting finance which aimed at 
lifting pressure from the state-owned banks. On the other hand, most importantly, 
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the securitization of central SOEs’ high-performing assets facilitated the 
SASAC’s supervision and examination of central SOEs. 
 
The listing of the CSOEs on the Hong Kong stock exchange has required greater 
financial transparency, better corporate governance and higher pressure on 
profitability, which suits the SASAC’s interest in the principal-agent relationship. 
Also, listing has pushed the central SOEs to face hard-nosed investors and 
respond to their criticisms and questions every year. In order to qualify as a listed 
company, the CSOEs have to follow the regulations of the Hong Kong Exchange. 
Concerning financial transparency, the company has to produce an annual report 
and semi-annual report that comply with international accounting report 
standards. Listing also requires a company to provide general information about 
board members, stock issuers and their families, according to article 12.2 HKEx 
(2016 a., A16-8). It requires that buying and selling shares be prohibited to board 
members at all times, since these people have information advantages (HKEx b. 
2016, 4). In the continuing obligation section, it requires that there must be at 
least three independent non-executive members of the board of directors, which 
accounts for more than one-third of board membership (HKEx 2010). According 
to the PetroChina 2014 and 2015 Annual Reports, there were ten board 
members, nine supervisory board members and nine senior managers, none of 
whom held shares in the listed company. So, the listing of the CSOEs inevitably 
assisted the SASAC in pushing forward the reform of the CSOEs. As this thesis 
has suggested, the SASAC adopted market criteria in the evaluation of the 
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CSOEs so that the CSOEs could abandon their outdated managerial habits from 
the planned-economy past.  
 
 
6.4.3. Social Burdens (Group/Listed Company) 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, CSOEs in competitive industries have 
listed their best-performing assets on the stock exchange through establishing 
listed companies. The problems of the separation of valuable assets from 
burdensome responsibilities is more commonly seen, and harder to solve, in the 
monopolistic sectors. If we analyze the group company CNPC and its listed arm, 
PetroChina, through the three layers of their corporate structure, we can see 
clearly that the group and the listed company have different aims and objectives. 
The CNPC was reorganized into an integrated oil company in 1998, during the 
years of China’s reform of its oil and gas industry. Most of its operation on the 
domestic market is conducted via PetroChina. Unlike PetroChina or Sinopec, the 
CNPC is under no great pressure to boost efficiency and maximize profits 
(Verma 2016, 41). As Naughton (2006, 4) points out, the CSOEs in the 
petroleum industry have valuable oil and gas products, and the refinery firms 
have the money-losing services, and the welfare legacies that were put into the 
“left-behind firms” which took over the burden from the communist past. 
Naughton explains this by using the example of the CNOOC, whose listed firm 
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has 1000 employees and is highly profitable, while the left-behind firms have 
more than 10 times as many employees and are big loss-makers.   
 
The central government has issued policies and measures to support the 
stripping of social functions from the SOEs since 1995. After the “pilot projects” 
conducted in the CNPC and other two CSOEs, 74 SOEs started the reform in 
2005 (MoF Bureau of Enterprises 2005 No. 62). The intense market competition 
has further prompted the government to accelerate the process of stripping their 
social functions from the SOEs. This activity aims to solve the problems left by 
history, so that the SOEs can participate on equal terms in a competitive market. 
The SOEs are expected to have centralized their resources to develop their main 
businesses. They should no longer undertake any public service responsibilities 
that are not compatible with the direction their main business is taking (State 
Council 2016 No. 19). The guidelines on stripping social functions from SOEs 
that were co-issued by the SASAC and three other ministries set a completion 
date of the end of 2017 for finishing the work of transferring municipal 
administration and community management arrangements from the SOEs to the 
relevant local government departments by the end of 2017 (SASACBER 2017 No. 
85).  
 
The CNPC’s other main responsibility is as an employer. It has around 1.6 million 
employees, and problems of over-staffing can be found in many of its local 
branches. For example, in Jizhong city, the CNPC has over 30% redundant staff, 
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but massive lay-offs are impossible because they could lead to serious social 
stability problems for the local government (  BJSASAC/20/2015). Also, 
 (BJSASAC/13/2015) and  (BJSASAC/14/2015) point out another 
concern that arises with stripping the social welfare responsibilities of the central 
SOEs. They explain that, for historical reasons, the CNPC’s factories employ a 
large percentage of local residents in oil fields far away from the developed areas, 
and these locations do not have adequate social facilities, such as hospitals and 
educational institutions. In order to provide a reasonable standard of life for 
employees, social facilities like hospitals and schools cannot be stripped from the 
companies’ assets. The dilemma caused by this situation has meant that the 
reform process has gone slowly. Despite these difficulties, however, the SASAC 
urges SOEs to separate themselves from their social burdens and reduce their 
responsibilities so that they can compete in the market more freely.  
 
 
6.5. Competing in the Market – From Brothers to Competitors 
 
The SASAC’s evaluation of CSOEs’ performance emphasizes financial 
performance, and also the petroleum industry is dominated by CSOEs. This 
circumstance has given rise to oligopolistic competition among CSOEs. Yeo 
(2009, 1015) asserts that, “The SASAC is a quasi-ownership agency and exerts 
real control over the market and the players,” which suggests the SASAC can not 
only regulate the players but also the market itself. This section studies the 
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oligopolistic competition among CSOEs in the same industry. These CSOEs 
have moved from being brothers in the planned-economy era to competitors in 
the market.  
 
From the Tuolasi (corporate trust) in the 1960s to the zonggongsi (general  
corporation) in the 1980s, China has continued its collective political and 
economic thinking, which aims to make the SOEs into business-oriented 
organizations that combine government leadership with business management. 
China’s “large corporations, large business groups” strategy in the mid-1990s did 
not come to an end after the Asian Financial Crisis and the country’s entry into 
the WTO (Li 2016, 4). On the contrary, China integrated modern corporate 
governance and market ideas on market competition into its state assets 
management system. China was not keen to replicate the mistakes of the Soviet 
Union, but rather it drew on the latter’s experience of failure. The Soviet Union 
had failed in many aspects of economic governance, including being unable to 
integrate its enterprises into international trade and financial systems, allowing 
inefficiencies in its central planning, having too much party intervention, and 
failing to develop adequate market mechanisms (Shambaugh 2010,26). So as to 
avoid Soviet-style economic stagnation, which eventually caused the collapse of 
the entire Soviet regime, the Chinese government selectively adopted market 
tools for economic governance and opened the country up to the international 
market. In the petroleum industry, the Chinese government pursued an approach 
similar to that of the Taiwanese developmental state, which focused its “state 
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influence on relatively large-scale firms in the upstream industries, while leaving 
the downstream smaller-scale firms much freer” (Wade’s 1990,73). 
 
The government’s reform of the management of CSOEs aimed at improving the 
efficiency of political institutional control of these enterprises, rather than 
retreating from the game (Li 2015, 56%). It sought to embed the Chinese state’s 
bureaucratic legacy along with the new organizational concepts of modern 
western corporations. In this process, as the conception and boundaries of the 
firm were redefined, the format of central bureaucratic control was remodeled as 
well. The starting point of the reform of SOEs into modern corporations was in 
1993. The Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth CCP Central Committee 
approved the Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on Some Issues 
Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economy (CCP 1993). It 
noted that “public ownership will be the mainstay and multiple forms of ownership 
will develop side by side...... to transform the operating mechanism of SOEs and 
to build modern corporate governance that suits the needs of a market economy”. 
The Fifth Plenary Session of the Eighth Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress approved the Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (1993). The move from the Law of the PRC on Industrial Enterprises 
Owned by the Whole People (1988) to Company Law (1993) marked a change in 
the relationship between the state and the SOEs. In the Enterprise Law (1988), it 
was stated that the business of the SOEs “... shall be operated and managed by 
the enterprise with the authorization of the state...”. This showed the relationship 
 305 
between the state and the SOEs was one of trusted management, while 
Company Law (1993) defined it as investment relationship. The SASAC’s first 
Director, Li Rongrong (2005), notes that the majority of CSOEs under the 
SASAC’s administration were registered under Enterprise Law, not Company 
Law. The SASAC has been working to build corporate governance and establish 
the board of directors according to Company Law.   
 
The Central SOEs are not necessarily achieving the same goals as their 
governmental supervisor-SASAC let alone other relevant regulatory agencies. As 
Xu (2017,123-127) points out that in overseeing State Grid Corporation, the 
goals aimed at vary among different central governmental agencies. For example, 
central government institutions such as the NDRC and the NEA aim to build a 
more regulated energy market, while the SASAC aims to raise the value of state 
assets; and local governments are keen on securing a sufficient petroleum 
supply for local economic development. However, despite the various interests 
held by different levels of government, the Chinese central state’s ability to 
regulate its Central SOEs maintains relatively strong. In the petroleum industry 
as Yeo (2009, 1014) argues, the competition between the two Central SOEs-
CNPC and Sinopec over “structuring for competition (regulation for competition)” 
is bound up with the central government’s ability to steer the economy. 
 
Relations between the Chinese government and the NOCs can be described as 
“love-hate”, as the two are mutually dependent but have different priorities 
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(Mechling, Kong and Madan 2015, 1168). Nolan and Wang (1999) note Chinese 
bureaucrats’ active role in the institutional reconstruction and modernization of 
large SOEs. China’s experience suggests that, rather than destroying a 
bureaucracy, reform and improvement can be a better way.  However, Downs 
(2008) believes that the NOCs’ increasingly strong power and position in China, 
and senior managers’ promotion in the administrative ranks, give the NOCs more 
bargaining chips in energy policy-making and politics. The SASAC’s first director, 
Li Rongrong (2006), provided the blueprint for central SOEs’ economic plan by 
arguing that the government should maintain complete control over the national 
oil companies’ upstream business while pushing forward the reform of these 
NOCs’ downstream business, to bring investment from other owners and 
diversify ownership. For PetroChina, the upstream of the petroleum industry was 
concentrated in the hands of three NOCs. However, downstream businesses 
were relatively more open to other types of ownership. For central SOEs in 
monopolistic industries, the government intentionally created competition among 
them in the upstream area of industry and introduced companies with other types 
of ownership to compete with them in the downstream area of industry. In this 
way, the central government expected market competition to improve the 
efficiency of these CSOEs. 
 
By conventional definition, NOCs hold the majority of petroleum reserves and 
produce the majority of the world’s supply of crude oil. NOCs usually hold 
exclusive rights to the exploration and operation of petroleum resources within 
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their home country. The Chinese public enterprises are not competitive in the 
market, due to their obligation to implement the government’s orders and 
strategic choices (Chan 2009, 53). Chinese NOCs’ close ties with the 
government allow them a certain leeway to not operate strictly by market 
principles. Their government role of job creation and tax generation often runs 
contrary to their market role of profit maximization (Pirog 2007). Neoliberals 
believe that extensive state intervention can encourage large-scale rent seeking, 
as economic agents engage in lobbying activities and request more government 
subsidies than agents actively involved in market competition (Payne and Phillips 
2014, 90). Therefore, the SASAC encourages oligopolistic competition among 
CSOEs. 
 
The SASAC uses economic interest to motivate the NOCs to improve efficiency 
(Liou 2009, 677).    (ZJCNPC/30/2015) consider that 
PetroChina’s main competitors in refined oil products and sales are Sinopec, the 
CNOOC and ChemChina (China National Chemical Corporation). Private 
enterprises are not strong competitors, due to the concentration of oil resources 
in the hands of the SASAC’s national team. The competition is basically an 
internal one among the central SOEs. The SASAC, as the coordinator, often 
works to mediate conflicts between NOCs, or even influence the results. Liou 
(2009, 684) examines an instance of participation by the CNPC and Sinopec in a 
bidding competition over a Sudanese oil field. It was in the Chinese central 
government’s interest to have the CNPC and Sinopec cooperate during the 
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bidding, thus maximizing the government’s access to energy resources.  
 (ZJCNPC/30/2015) echo the idea of the government facilitating 
cooperation between PetroChina and Sinopec to shorten and ease the 
processes of generating oil products. However, cooperation is very difficult to 
arrange, due to the restrictions set by anti-monopoly law, although the Anti-
Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (2008) makes an exception of 
SOEs and legitimizes their monopolistic status. Article 7 of the law reads: “With 
respect to the industries controlled by the state-owned economy and concerned 
with the lifelines of the national economy and national security or the industries 
lawfully enjoying exclusive production and sales, the State shall protect these 
lawful business operations conducted by the business operators therein, and 
shall supervise and control these business operations and the prices of the 
commodities and services provided by these business operators, so as to protect 
consumer interests and facilitate technological advancement.” However, the 
SASAC is unwilling to concentrate three NOCs into one large company group 
because it believes market competition can increase efficiency, thus raising the 
value of state assets.  
 
It is expected that central SOE managers’ high administrative rank and their 
relationships within the bureaucracy can somehow help them clear a path 
through bureaucratic affairs to pursue their firms’ financial interests. Liou (2009, 
678) prefers to view China’s NOCs as market actors, despite their political roles. 
She argues that the global listing of China’s NOCs reveals their corporate 
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performance, whilst their economic performance is more easily observed and 
subject to routine evaluation. A CSOE’s overseas investment should not always 
be seen as representing an act of the state (Liou 2013, 228). A Chinese NOC’s 
bidding on an overseas oil field is more driven by its economic interest than by 
any political interest (Mechling, Kong and Madan 2015, 1161). NOCs should not 
be seen as agents of the state with political motivation, though no political risk 
(Alon, Leung and Simpson 2015). China’s three NOCs have privileges in mining 
rights, refined oil imports, crude oil imports and the right to sell in the domestic 
market. Through controlling refined oil import rights, the three NOCs exclude 
rivals in the domestic market. Also, China has failed to fulfill its promise, as part 
of its WTO agreement, to relax its control of crude and refined oil production by 
the end of 2006 (Zhou, Xie and Huang 2015, 110). Despite this, the CSOEs have 
to face competition among themselves. As noted in the earlier sections, the 
SASAC introduced EVA as one of the core indicators to evaluate central SOEs’ 
annual performance and their senior managers’ performance (SASAC 2014 No. 
8). In addition to this, in order to meet the requirement of the stock exchanges 
they are listed on, the NOCs’ listed companies employ some of the leading 
accounting firms in the world to examine their financial situation, which not only 
helps the stock exchanges and public shareholders to have a clear 
understanding of the firms’ performance, but also helps the SASAC to oversee 
the financial results and to solve the asymmetric information problem in the 
principal-agent relationship. 
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Admittedly, the government’s hand in the petroleum industry has not faded away 
easily. According to PetroChina’s 2014 annual report, the gross profit margin on 
oil exploration and production was 30%, compared with 3.1% on oil retailing and 
2.1% on refining and chemical engineering. This shows that the company’s oil 
exploration and production are highly profitable, due to the monopolistic status it 
holds in China. The retail price is set by the NDRC’s energy bureau, which limits 
the income of the CNPC and PetroChina’s retail branches. Jiang (2012, 406) 
argues that the government’s cross-subsidies to the CNPC downstream in the 
refining and retail sections keep the prices of oil products lower than the full 
market cost. In exchange, the government taxes the upstream of the oil industry 
heavily. From this perspective, the CNPC and other CSOEs in monopolistic 
industries are different from the CSOEs in competitive sectors. The competitive 
CSOEs do not have any privileged access to resources or preferential policies; 
but at the same time they are free from the government’s direct orders and 
interventions in their business activities. The CSOEs with monopolistic status 
enjoy privileges in their monopolistic status in the market and preferential loans 
from state-owned banks; but at the same time, they are constrained by 





6.7. Conclusion  
 
This chapter started with an overview of the petroleum industry in China and then 
moved to a study of the three largest NOCs in China, which are also CSOEs in 
strategic industries under the SASAC’s administration. This was followed by a 
comparative analysis of the NOCs and their international counterparts. After that, 
a review of the CNPC’s background and PetroChina’s business performances 
were provided. The discussion then moved to understanding the different roles of 
the central government in supervising the CNPC and the other two NOCs. In 
addition, this chapter also noted the importance of regulating the invisible hand 
the government takes in the NOCs, as well as lifting the social burdens these 
companies carry from the planned-economy past. Since these CSOEs operate in 
industries that are state monopolies, their competition is mainly among 
themselves. The chapter then discussed market competition among the CSOEs, 
and influences on their corporate governance. 
 
The CSOEs in competitive industries have a clear understanding of their role as 
companies, according to both the government’s definition and their own self-
recognition. The CSOEs in strategic sectors have to deal with more complicated 
relations, and also have a greater economic, political and sociological impact on 
the country as a whole; but at the same time, there are more actors involved in 
their business activities, such as regulatory committee and local government. 
This complex network involves actors with various interests and leads to a more 
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complicated, interdependent relationship among the CSOEs, the SASAC, the 
relevant ministries, the regulatory committee and local governments. This 
chapter has used China’s controversial central SOE, the China National 
Petroleum Corporation and its listed company, Sinopec, as an example to 
provide a comprehensive picture of the operation and development of central 
SOEs that have a monopolistic status. It has argued that central SOEs in 
monopoly industries are significant in terms of their total assets and high 
production capability: the oligopolistic competition among the national teams 
guarantees a certain efficiency and profitability that market competition is 
supposed to achieve. Nevertheless, unlike their peer companies that were 
granted more autonomy and less responsibility, and which compete in the market 
for economic success measured mainly by market criteria, this category of 
central SOEs has shouldered more burdens, while enjoying more benefits, based 
on their status as the scions of a communist state. However, the problem of 
asymmetric information, supervision insufficiency due to multi-level 
organizational structure, moral hazard and adverse selection are more prominent 
in the monopolistic CSOEs than in other industrial CSOEs in competitive sectors. 
The monopolistic CSOEs have to cooperate while competing with each other, at 
the same time as they coordinate their interests with those of various government 
agencies at both central and local levels.   
 
The principal-agent problem between the SASAC and central SOEs can be seen 
as a seesaw battle. The principal, the SASAC, holds the responsibility for 
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conducting efficient supervision of the value of state-owned assets. This thesis 
disagrees with the argument that the SASAC and central SOEs have teamed up 
to form a new interest group and that the CSOEs can reject or distort policies that 
have been set or implemented. Admittedly, the SASAC and central SOEs share 
more interests with each other than they share with any other institution. The 
SASAC’s legitimacy is supported by the central SOEs’ performance. Central 
SOEs’ close links with the SASAC also legitimize their superior status in the 
market, their policy preferences and their bargaining power with banks and local 
government authorities. The CSOEs are evenly distributed across most of the 
industrial sectors in China, and each industry has a different regulatory 
framework and market situation. For example, the central government has been 
able to create competition among the CSOEs in the petroleum industry, as 
discussed in this chapter. However, it is unlikely that the same thing will happen 
in the electricity sector. In the State Grid Corporation of China, the CSOE that 
controls over 90% of China’s transmission networks, the border between the 
administrative role and the business part is even more blurred (Xu 2012, 148). 
The establishment of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) was 
seen as a milestone in the Chinese state’s efforts to build a modern regulatory 
system. The SASAC was the body to which the State Grid Corporation belonged, 
but the SERC took over responsibility as the regulator (Tsai 2014, 460). However, 




“The SASAC is thus the ally and the adversary of the central enterprises” 
(Naughton 2008, 8). As this thesis argued in chapter 4, the SASAC has multiple 
roles as investor, supervisor, facilitator, policy-maker, buffer area and 
peacemaker in the state assets management system. The roles the SASAC 
plays and the goals CSOEs aim at illustrate their mutual influences under the 
developmental state model of economic governance and market competition. 
When we consider the old-style CSOEs with their abundant employees, we 
should take into consideration the welfare burdens they took over from the 
collective ownership past and not just their corporate profits. Given the multiple 
and sometimes contradictory objectives the CSOEs have, it is important to draw 
a clear line between group and listed company by having the three layers of 
operation of the CSOEs. Certainly, future reforms will primarily center on the 
group level. After all, through listing their high-performing assets, the SASAC 
successfully turned the listed companies into modern corporations with greater 
transparency and efficiency; but the group level, which embraced the loss-
making assets, the over-abundant employees and similar historical legacies, 
needs more support and reform pressure from the government. However, these 
difficulties and obstacles will not stop the trajectory of CSOEs moving towards 
marketization. Market competition among monopolistic CSOEs, which has been 
structured by the government under developmental state logic, aims to raise the 
competitiveness of CSOEs. This argument supports the theoretical debate of this 
thesis: that the Chinese government has partially adopted market mechanisms to 
promote the growth of CSOEs. If this strategy is continued, principal-agent 
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problems can be further reduced. As a result, holding a vast amount of state 
assets will further enhance the state’s power. Also, the state’s capacity will be 





















Chapter 7 Conclusion – Beyond the state and market debate, towards a 
hybrid model of state assets management 
 
The debate on what has made China’s economy keep growing over the past 40 
years lies between praising market norms of free trade and the decrease in 
government control, and recognizing the power of the state in promoting growth. 
Academic research on China’s state-owned enterprises has focused on the 
massive state-owned assets all around China, and has discovered problems 
such as low-efficiency, soft budget constraints and insider-control, and 
developments such as the privatization that has taken place in small and medium 
size SOEs in a gradual, non-shock-therapy, way. The above debate, although 
very useful for the understanding of China’s political economy, nevertheless 
misses a pivotal grouping in China’s governance of state-owned enterprises—the 
central SOEs, led by a pilot agency, the SASAC. This study has adopted a hybrid 
theoretical framework to give a novel interpretation of China’s economic 
governance of central SOEs in the post-WTO era.  
 
State-owned enterprises are one of the most problematic issues in understanding 
China’s political economy in the twenty-first century. For the domestic policy-
makers, the SOEs are both an indispensable representation of the government’s 
ideological slogan of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and a key 
infrastructural power in promoting economic growth. The contemporary 
understanding of state-owned enterprises, which is trapped in the stereotype of 
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SOEs, is not as market actors; thus, their presence in the market has led to the 
disruption of the market. China’s continuing economic growth and the country’s 
steadily deepening integration into the global market show the country’s 
cooperation with, and embracing of the global market. However, at the same time, 
the Chinese government tenaciously holds onto a large number of SOEs. In 
particular, the central government of China holds onto the largest SOEs in the 
country, known as the national team of central SOEs. These companies have 
kept growing in size, assets and profits, and are playing an increasingly 
significant role in the domestic market and internationally. It is important to 
understand why the Chinese state insists on owning the central SOEs at the 
central government level, and how these companies can be owned by the state 
at the same time as being a market actor. To analyze this puzzle, the thesis 
studied the interactions of the government, the central SOEs and the market 
through the theoretical lenses of the developmental state with the principal-agent 
theory as the analytical theory.  
 
The central research questions are, from the state perspective: “Why and how 
does the Chinese government supervise and regulate the central SOEs”; and 
from the enterprises’ perspective: “How can the central SOEs be owned by the 
state while being a market actor that achieves a fairly good business 
performance in the market”. As the Chinese government’s requirements in 
assessing the enterprises, and the way it promotes the growth of these central 
SOEs, are highly market oriented, the SASAC, as the largest shareholder, 
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examines the assets, revenue and profit of the central SOEs. This process easily 
translates into the rise of market and the decrease of state power in China. 
However, in fact, China’s embrace of the market is with limitations. The power of 
the central government is strongly maintained, and the pillar industries are still 
largely dominated by SOEs. The closest model with which China can be matched 
is that of the developmental state. Conceptualizing China’s model of governance 
as a developmental state has helped the discipline of political economy to have a 
deeper and more precise understanding of the country, instead of distinguishing 
China from any other political, economic model in the world. Ultimately, the 
purpose of this thesis is to generate useful knowledge in answering the question 
of how state-owned enterprises can be made efficient and productive.  
 
In the first part of this thesis, the questions of why the Chinese central 
government holds the group of central SOEs at the central government level, and 
how it regulates and supervises these enterprises, were explored. China is a 
variant of a developmental state. Market competition was brought in as a toolkit 
to help the Chinese state to govern the SOEs effectively. Instead of massive 
privatization of the SOEs, as happened in the post-Soviet-Union states, the 
Chinese state chose to maintain complete control of the SOEs while using 
market criteria to assess their performance and market mechanisms to motivate 
their business activities. This thesis is not about a debate between the merits of 
state or market; it is about how the state uses the market to exercise control and 
 319 
achieve objectives through the market. It suggests that the state can strengthen 
its control through an arms-length strategy by giving some control to the market.  
 
What the operation of the central SOEs since the introduction of the SASAC has 
brought sharply into focus is the dual pressures – from state and market – that 
have effectively made the central SOEs’ operation into a durable construction. 
Instead of rejecting the global market firmly by isolating the SOEs from market 
influences, or embracing marketization comprehensively by privatizing the SOEs 
in a short period, the Chinese government chose a third road, by managing the 
central SOEs in a developmental state fashion while partially adopting market 
forces to accelerate its growth. The SASAC adopted market criteria in the 
assessment of the companies’ performance and used the Global Fortune 500 
magazine’s ranking of global companies as an international standard to evaluate  
the global competitiveness of central SOEs. The logic behind the Global Fortune 
500 list is also evident in the SASAC’s ambition to push the central SOEs to have 
a global impact that can expand their business into the international market.  
 
Marketization methods can also be seen in the listing of central SOEs on 
overseas stock exchanges. As noted in the empirical chapters, 5 and 6, the 
central SOEs have selectively listed their most valuable assets on stock 
exchanges around the world. The listing was initiated, encouraged and supported 
by the SASAC as a mean of bringing the corporate governance of the companies 
up to international standards and to have the global capital market as a major 
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source of financing. The asset-stripping processes needed for this allowed both 
the SASAC and the central SOEs to elucidate the real financial condition of the 
companies. The listing on foreign stock exchanges also forced the central SOEs 
to sort out their confused working procedures and to be more regulated and 
professional in the international market. Finally, the listing allowed these central 
SOEs to generate a large amount of wealth from the capital market and this 
released the pressure on the previous funder—the Chinese state. The Chinese 
state now no longer provides funds for central SOEs in the competitive industries, 
and gives only limited support to those in the monopolistic industries. Besides, 
the central SOEs are not keen on government funding because changes in the 
shareholding ratio may be troublesome. As discussed in the empirical chapters, 
five and six, central SOEs, as listed companies, must report to the stock 
exchanges where they are listed any adjustment of the shareholding ratio. By 
getting the central SOEs listed, the Chinese government has significantly 
reduced the problem of low-efficiency, soft budget constraint and insider-control.  
 
7.1. The Return of the State  
 
The “grasping the big, letting go the small” strategy of privatizing small and 
medium size SOEs has been categorized as a big step towards marketization, 
with the Chinese state retreating from the market. However, the selectively 
adopted market criteria were set by a developmental-state-driven plan, the 
market competition was driven by a developmental mindset, and the benefits that 
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market brought were contributed to the developmental state. In fact, the Chinese 
state has never left the commanding heights of the economy. As noted in chapter 
2, neoliberalism as an ideology has been resisted by the Chinese state, but the 
marketization the global market brings have been used as a tool to help the 
SOEs regenerate themselves and become modern corporations. The result has 
been that the central SOEs have become profitable and productive, due to 
market mechanisms that have reinforced the state’s capacity to adequately direct 
a large amount of state assets. The market tool not only allows the government 
to authorize the profitable central SOEs to play a social welfare role, but it also 
further strengthens the government’s legitimacy. One of the principal arguments 
made throughout this thesis is that the Chinese state has been able to keep 
finding a balancing point between state-led economic governance and the 
market-led growth. On the one hand, the government is not willing to lose its 
control of this ‘red capital’, which would lead to potential threats to its capacity to 
govern the economy. On the other, the government has realized its inability to 
supervise these giant groups of central SOEs, because the insiders always have 
an information advantage over the outsiders. It has come up with the solution of 
using the market as a means of promoting the efficiency of central SOEs and the 
stock exchange as a means of supervising and regulating their business 
performances: both crucial methods of solving the problem of asymmetric 
information. Also, the government has kept adjusting its policies, and the degree 
to which its hand is visible, in order to achieve a pragmatic balance between the 
state and the market principles.  
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Chapter two presented the macro-theoretical debate underlying the thesis, 
starting with a discussion of the many different political and economic models of 
China, and argued that the developmental state was the most appropriate one for 
studying China. It suggested that it was too vague to define the entire country as 
a developmental state. In fact, China’s political and economic models differ from 
one industrial sector to another and from one province to another. The chapter 
then outlined the relationship between the state and the market. This pragmatic 
strategy of governing through the market allows the state to use marketcriteria to 
assess the performance of the central SOEs, which are managed under the 
developmental state model. Apart from the way in which the developmental state 
and marketization influences reinforce each other in making China’s central 
SOEs profitable, another significant effect – on the state’s supervision and 
administration of SOEs – should not be ignored. Chapter three studied the 
analytical theory of this thesis—principal-agent theory. SOEs were often criticized 
as belonging to all, but belonging to none. To tackle the problem of the lack of a 
principal, the state created an institution called the SASAC as the principal, to 
conduct supervision and administration of the enterprises. Drawing on document 
analysis of 195 SASAC policy documents, the chapter looked at the SASAC’s ex 
ante administrative procedures and categorized them into different sections. It 
then provided a novel understanding of police patrol and fire alarm ex post 
oversight mechanisms by examining multi-police patrol and rotating police patrol 
strategies.   
 323 
 
The crucial point for the success of a developmental state lies in having an 
efficiency-promoting institution as a pilot agency to lead growth; so, Chapter 4 
devoted the entire chapter to looking at this pilot agency – the SASAC – and its 
role in the governance of central SOEs. The chapter provided a comprehensive 
overview of this ministry-level institution, from its organizational structure to its 
interactions with central SOEs. From 2003 to the end of 2016, the number of 
central SOEs dropped from 196 to 102. Half of all central SOEs were merged 
and restructured with other central SOEs, to become giant company groups. The 
chapter focused on the SASAC’s multiple roles as investor, facilitator, supervisor, 
policy maker, buffer area and peacemaker. Chapters five and six presented the 
empirical case study undertaken for the thesis. Chapter five examined the China 
National Building Materials Group Corporation (CNBM) as a central SOE in the 
competitive industries sector, beginning with a discussion of the CNBM’s cross-
shareholding structure, which has meant rising percentages of shares released 
to the general public on the stock exchange by the state. The core of the study 
was an investigation of the division of labor among the CNBM group company, 
the listed company and the subsidiary companies. This three-layer governance 
structure for the enterprise group was formed unintentionally, but became the key 
to understanding the operation of central SOEs. The listed company was 
particularly effective as the middle layer that blocked the developmental state 
above it at the group level, while leaving itself and the operating companies free 
to focus on the competition in the market. Chapter six followed a similar structure 
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to that of chapter five, presenting an analysis of the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) as a central SOE in the state monopolistic industry sector. 
Items that came with the CNPC’s monopolistic status were state regulated 
petroleum prices, social burdens, and a massive superabundance of employees. 
Compared to the CNBM, the CNPC has more government-related issues to deal 
with, and its interactions with the government are far more complicated. The 
chapter then went on to draw out the way in which the international market has 
shifted the dynamic of the relationship between the SASAC and the central SOE, 
and how the one-party state controls central SOEs and thus changes the current 
political and economic status of the world.  
 
7.2. Long Live State-owned Enterprises? Moving Forward the Debate on the 
Future of the Chinese state, Chinese SOEs and the Global Market 
 
The SOEs are the vital forces for building up China’s overall strength to protect 
the people’s interests. We have to make the SOEs stronger, better and bigger, 
with great confidence. We shall also continuously increase the vitality, influence 
and risk resistance capacity of the SOEs.  
 
                                                           Chinese President:     Xi Jinping 2016-07-04                         
 
The problem with all of this is that no matter how marketized the Chinese central 
SOEs are, and no matter what the degree of their integration into the global 
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political economic system, state-owned enterprises are unavoidably political. The 
Chinese government keeps tight control of its SOEs in “commanding height” 
industries through its shareholdings in these companies, and it appoints the 
senior executives through Nomenklatura system and uses the SASAC to monitor 
their performance carefully. As discussed in the earlier chapter, although the 
Chinese NOCs participate in the international oil market and operate in foreign 
countries, China’s domestic petroleum industry is largely dominated by them. 
And the NDRC’s petrol price control mechanism has built a firewall that 
separates China from the global energy market. Lin (2013, 99) defines the 
government’s intervention in the promotion of industrial growth as the best-kept 
secret in any country. Indeed, government intervention was widely used in many 
of the developed economies in the early years of their economic growth, from 
nineteenth century Germany and Japan to post-war France, Norway, Finland, 
Austria, Korea and Singapore. However, there has been little analysis done to 
explain how these countries have successfully used government intervention to 
support sustainable growth, increase employment opportunities and push 
forward structural transformation (Chang 2007 and 2008).   
 
It was the ambition of the SASAC’s first director, Li Rongrong, to build world-
leading multinational companies to follow latecomer industrializing countries’ 
developmental path (Nolan 2005). Also, industrial and technological skills were 
the key to economic development, which required the government’s support in 
forms such as proper import protection, subsidies and institution building (Chang 
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2006). Lin (2013, 99) echoes Chang’s assertion and suggests that sustainable 
economic development is based on cooperation between the public and private 
sectors. This collaboration can lead to a continuous industrial and technological 
upgrading of the country. The Chinese government’s determination to keep 
control of the 102 CSOEs, especially the 52 enterprises in the pillar industries, is 
unchanging. As argued in the theoretical chapter, the Chinese government uses 
the developmental state model of economic governance in the management of 
central SOEs. It uses market strategy to oversight these companies while losing 
the state’s power in the market control. Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005, 795) 
suggest that corporatization, not privatization, can bring sustainable improvement 
in the performance of China’s state-owned enterprises. They argue that the 
growth in productivity in Chinese SOEs is due in large part to the increase in 
incentives, competition and better factor allocation. The former Chinese premier, 
Zhu Rongji (term in office: 1998-2003), who conducted in-depth reform of state 
ownership in the 1990s, during his meeting with George Bush, disagreed with the 
idea of seeing China’s corporatization of SOEs as a western style privatization 
and argued that “China is corporatizing its large state assets, which is just 
another way of realizing state ownership”  (McGregor 2010, 43). 
 
Certainly, compared to central SOEs in competitive industries, which are granted 
more freedom in investment decisions and freedom from other business activities, 
the 53 enterprises are faced with more government intervention, political orders 
and strict regulations.  After all, their primary goals are not limited to meeting the 
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market criteria of being competitive and profitable. As Jiang (2012, 413) argues, 
the CNPC offers evidence of a rough transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy, but its operation is maintained within the framework created for 
a planned economy. Despite the SASAC and the CNPC’s effort to portray 
PetroChina as a modern corporation that can compete with any international oil 
company, PetroChina was, and still is, best described in the words of the 
Goldman Sachs economist Paul Schapira (2010, 61): “the best way to describe 
PetroChina as it was then, was the Ministry of Petroleum”. However, like the 
CSOEs in competitive industries, the CNPC and other NOCs in monopolistic 
industries have considerable autonomy in their business activities, although the 
government maintains tight control of the selection of financial and other 
personnel (the senior management team). Taylor (2012, 75) argues that the 
relationship between the Chinese government and the NOCs can be seen as 
“collaboration governed by hierarchy”. The two cases provide two totally different 
pictures of China’s central SOEs.   
 
What kind of experiences can be drawn from China’s development path that can 
be beneficial to the other developing countries in the world? If state ownership of 
enterprises is unavoidably political, then how does the government play a useful 
role rather than being a troublesome bureaucracy? The success of Chinese 
central SOEs lies not only in governing through their market strategy but also in 
the principal-agent mechanism. Both the SASAC’s ex ante and ex post 
supervision mechanisms have an impact on the activities and business 
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performance of central SOEs. This thesis argues that ownership is not the 
decisive factor in an enterprise’s success or failure, but rather the principal-agent 
relationship is. Since central SOEs operate in many different industries, and each 
of the central SOEs has multiple organizational layers and massive numbers of 
employees, in addition to interactions among central SOEs and various 
government agencies at different levels, future research could study the impact 
these central SOEs have on the government’s industrial policy making. The 
growing significance of industrial associations would also be worth analyzing: for 
example, the relationship between central SOEs and industrial associations, and 
what impact this network has on the making of industrial policy. These 
interactions are crucial to an analysis of state ownership, and have great 
importance in helping us make sense of the wider state and market debate in 
China.  
 
The high-performing central SOEs have functioned as an engine of China’s rise 
as a developmental state, following the adoption of selective market forces as a 
tool for the development of state-owned assets. The market indicators were 
adopted, as was the listing of the central SOEs, not purely for financial reason, 
but in order to push forward the reform of these SOEs: to give them international 
standards of corporate governance, to increase the transparency of their financial 
performance, and, most importantly, to have the international market and public 
shareholders as external supervision entities. It is a painful struggle for the 
Chinese government to justify to itself the strategy of using market criteria to 
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strengthen state capacity. The government has used overseas listing to revitalize 
and activate the Leninist legacy. Obviously, it is embarrassing and difficult for the 
state to explain this to the Chinese people. Difficulties are also posed by 
resistance from workers in the SOEs to the enterprises’ transition towards a 
profit-oriented market mechanism, because political ideology and political 
propaganda had portrayed SOEs as representing the superiority of the Socialist 
system and as a major source of the CCP’s legitimacy. The Chinese state has 
maintained its vital role in conducting incremental institutional reform to achieve 
compatibility with capitalism (Jung 2011, 121). However, this transition to 
integration into the global market has never been easy: apart from pressure from 
the government, there has also been resistance from the workers. It is the 
market, not the state or state-directed resource allocation, that defines today’s 
labor relations inside the SOEs. Resistance from workers was widely seen in the 
transition towards a market economy (Jia 2016, 9-14). The official discourse in 
2003 was that the central SOEs were becoming bigger, stronger and better; but 
at that time, SOEs, in general, were loss-making, inefficient entities with unpaid 
loans. The process of China’s promotion of SOEs was full of self-contradictory 
strategies. Using market mechanism to reactivate the legacy of the Leninist 
system, adopting market criteria to assess and supervise SOEs that the state 
was unable to evaluate and run by itself, this meant a period of distrust, self-
adjustment and resurgence.   
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This is significant because it represents a policy paradox: to some degree, it runs 
contrary to the stereotypical image we have of Chinese SOEs, particularly when 
we compare them with the SOEs of Latin America and most other developing 
countries. The Chinese government has exercised entirely different strategies 
from the ones used in these countries. Its cautious and gradual way of adopting a 
supervision system builds on a market standard has been part of its pragmatic 
governance. When we look at China, we see that the market mechanism has had 
a significant influence on the government, which has used a cautious, gradual 
way to learn the supervision mechanisms of the market world. China’s well-
thought-out supervision of its central SOEs presents an entirely different picture 
of what SOEs are like. The problem of state-owned enterprises has never been 
an issue of what ownership the company comes under, but rather one of the 
state’s inadequacy in monitoring the performances of these enterprises. 
Compared to the massive regulatory lacunae in the supervision of public 
enterprises in other developing countries, such as that of Petrobras in Brazil, the 
Chinese government’s assiduous efforts to improve the supervision and 
administration of its central SOEs is aimed at minimizing loopholes in the system. 
Therefore, it is sufficient to argue that, for developing countries, it is worth 
considering that SOEs can be a possible solution to stimulating economic growth 
and can be seen as a positive factor in leading the country’s development, at 
least in the earlier stages.  
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When we discuss China’s state-owned enterprises, we tend to fall into an 
analysis of the Chinese state behind them. The Chinese state plays a significant 
role in international political economy, and so do Chinese central state-owned 
enterprises. Chapter 6 looked at the China National Petroleum Corporation, and 
extended the discussion of China’s central SOEs to the international stage by 
looking into this corporation’s engagement in the global market, and how this 
affects the petroleum industry in China. As Linda Weiss (2003, 317) points out, 
yes, the state has been transformed by global markets and international 
competition, but this has happened in unexpected ways. Instead of weakening 
state capacity, globalization has enhanced the national state’s power in the 
market.  
 
This thesis has shed light on China’s state ownership system, looking at the 
complexity and various shades of thinking behind every step of reform. Future 
research could study the central SOEs’ local operations, to see how these have 
developed, and what happens when the vertical line of administration studied by 
this thesis meets  horizontal administrative arrangements. How can central SOEs 
work across the complex vertical and horizontal interconnections, and balance 
the interests of all parties, as they expand their business? Although the thesis 
provided discussion on Chinese central SOEs’ overseas business in chapter six, 
more could be done. Questions worth pursuing in future research could be 
expanded to engage with China’s domestic political economy, for instance, 
looking at the extent to which the central state’s supervision of central SOEs 
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could be duplicated to cover SOEs at local levels. How does the listing of central 
SOEs on stock exchanges improve the general reform situation of SOEs, and 
what are the implications of building a more regulated market in China? 
Research could be extended to engage with the discipline of international 
political economy, to see how China's developmental state model of economic 
governance impacts on international political economy. From the perspective of 
the state, the rise of state capitalism represents the realization by third world 
countries that they must protect their resources from exploitation by the 
industrialized countries through international corporations and under the cover of 
neoliberal ideology (Lin 2010, 92). What does the rise of China’s central SOEs 
and their ambitious global expansion mean to the world market? Are central 
SOEs investment bargaining chips or burdens for the Chinese government in 
international negotiations? How do the Chinese government’s global investment 
strategies such as “one belt one road” facilitate the growth of Chinese Central 
SOEs and vice versa?  
 
 
7.3. Towards a hybrid model of economic governance  
 
China should not be examined as an individual unit. Instead, it should be seen as 
a collection of different political economic models which vary among regions, 
provinces and industries. China is a variant of the developmental state that has 
different developmental states across the country. If China can embrace market, 
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why shouldn’t the neoliberal western economies consider embracing state-owned 
enterprises? China’s experience suggests that state-owned enterprises can be 
competitive in the market, and that SOEs can support the government in leading 
the country’s industrial growth, thus contributing to the development of the 
country. It may be a solution to the problem of what a government can do to raise 
its country out of poverty in a short period. Chinese central SOEs will continue to 
be a significant player in the market, as there are more responsibilities to be 
taken and more problems waiting to be solved. The rise of China’s central SOEs 
challenges the preconception that state-owned enterprises are a drain on the 
state and have intrinsically low efficiency. This thesis started with a macro 
theoretical debate on China’s developmental state model and its selective use of 
marketization. It argued that although the two theories seem contradictory, they 
can coexist to promote economic development in the Chinese context. The 
Chinese government is pragmatic and ideologically relaxed about the economic 
models that it has adopted to encourage the growth of the economy. When we 
discuss the SOEs, we are not discussing what ownership means, but what 
ownership can do and how that influences the market. Instead of shoehorning 
neoliberalism into developing countries, a better way would be to rethink and 
readjust the different developmental models that suit different local conditions. In 
fact, as Lin (2012, 241) points out, the government has played a major role in 
helping individual firms to overcome coordination and externality problems in 
their transformation during the country’s development. The key to success is not 
whether the government should interfere in, and thus facilitate, the growth of 
 334 
industry, but how. This thesis suggests that managing SOEs in a developmental 
state can be a way of taking the first step towards prosperity.  
 
Discussion of SOEs should not just be limited to research into government’s 
support for them: the role of the market is equally important. The core reason for 
Chinese central SOEs performing better and growing stronger lies in the 
principal-agent relationship. The innovative ex ante and ex post supervision 
mechanisms adopted have enabled the key principal, the SASAC, to maximize 
its ability to overcome asymmetric information. Given China’s magpie behavior in 
economic policy making, the Chinese government will continue to push forward 
market reform in China and to become better integrated into the global market. It 
is political realism, dynamic activity and minimal ideological constraints that have 
contributed to China’s industrial success. 
 
Future reforms should be focused on the group level of central SOEs. This does 
not necessarily mean that the group level should be eliminated, or that the 
importance of the group level should be reduced. In fact, the group is the 
fundamental level that has stabilized the structure of this hybrid governance 
system. This important level of the system needs to be reorganized, and its 
functions need to be further clarified so that it operates better as a coordinating 
center that interlinks the developmental state and marketization. Espousing a 
“governing through the market” strategy has significantly reduced the problems of 
the state ownership system, but more effort needs to be made in the promotion 
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of listing the entire group and stripping out the loss-making assets that have piled 
up in the past years.  
 
All in all, as Breslin (2012, 29) puts it, “Despite the rise of the private sector, the 
Chinese state retains control of key industries and resources and thus shapes 
the nature of the market that non-state actors operate in.” From governing the 
market to governing through the market, the Chinese state has adopted an 
adaptive, flexible, pragmatic style of economic governance. The central SOEs, as 
part of this governance strategy, will extend their influence into the international 
market, as China plays an increasingly crucial role in global governance. At the 
time when this thesis was completed, another two central SOEs-- China Guodian 
Corporation and China Shenhua were being restructured and combined into a 
giant business corporation-- State Energy Investment Corporation (国家能源投资
集团), so that the total number of central SOEs was reduced to 98. This research 
only represents a beginning. It is clear that it is now time to rethink China, the 
Chinese state-owned enterprises and, most importantly, the state’s strategy of 
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